


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# La Cábala

una introducción a la mística judía



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
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## El progreso consiste en renovarse

Después de un año en el dique seco, La Cruzada del Saber desenvaina su espada y vuelve a la carga haciendo de la frase del gran Miguel de Unamuno su leitmotiv. A lo largo de nuestro proyecto se nos han ido presentando diferentes problemas que poco a poco hemos conseguido superar, pero la realidad es que se llegó a un punto en el que cada vez nos costaba más organizar un nuevo número.

Como se suele decir, en ocasiones todo pasa por "renovarse o morir", y eso es precisamente lo que hemos hecho. En el apartado estético, el lector apreciará algunas pequeñas diferencias en esta entrega, pero el mayor de los cambios radica en el cierre de algunos temas y la apertura de otros nuevos. Hemos decidido prescindir de las ciencias naturales y centrar la revista en las áreas de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales. Sin abandonar el tono divulgativo, pretendemos hacer de La Cruzada del Saber una revista más técnica que aborde temas como Historia, Filología, Derecho, Psicología, Arte o Filosofía, entre otros.

Además, con la intención de hacer llegar la revista a más personas en todo el mundo y recibir artículos del extranjero, abrimos la posibilidad de publicar artículos en inglés, de los que se ofrecerá siempre un pequeño resumen en castellano. Y por supuesto, continuamos siendo una revista sin ningún tipo de orientación política o religiosa.

Sin más, pedimos perdón por nuestra prorroga y esperamos que entiendan y aprecien todo el trabajo que hay por detrás para poder ofrecerles este renovado décimo número.

La Cruzada del Saber.



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historia de la

# Esclavitud en Brasil

por Noemí Cedillo Gordillo

Tendemos a visualizar la esclavitud como una tragedia de la raza humana, un rasgo vergonzoso. Muchos de nosotros no comprendemos cómo se llegó a ese punto en el que algunos seres humanos dejaban de considerarse humanos para ser propiedad de otra persona. Para entender la Historia, debemos entender el punto de vista de una sociedad esclavista como aquella. Y es que la esclavitud era una actividad económica muy provechosa.

## Los primeros tiempos de la esclavitud

La esclavitud es una práctica que se ha ejercido desde la Historia Antigua. Sociedades como la egipcia o la sumeria ya contaban con esclavos entre ellos. Pero en la sociedad romana alcanzaría una gran relevancia, llegando a convertirse en el pilar económico más importante.

En la Edad Media fue también muy importante para la economía del mundo árabe. La sociedad se dividía en dos partes: libres y esclavos. Consideraban al esclavo una persona, pero no una capaz de ser plenamente responsable de sus actos. El dueño nunca podía hacer daño o abandonar a su esclavo. El Islam favorecía a aquellos que liberaban a sus esclavos, así que era frecuente que se ordenara su liberación en el testamento.

Seguimos en la misma época, la Edad Media, pero ahora en Europa. Los esclavos fueron sustituidos por los siervos en el Sistema Feudal. El siervo tenía unas condiciones en un principio diferentes, pero en práctica muy similares a las del esclavo: era un hombre libre, pero no lo era. El señor cobraba tributos, tenía el derecho de pernada, el de ser recibido y alimentado por sus siervos, hacía las veces de juez en sus territorios... Todo esto a cambio de que protegiera a sus siervos. Éstos tenían obligaciones para con el señor feudal en los terrenos económico, social, jurídico y político.

Aunque esta práctica fuera la habitual en Europa, la esclavitud no desapareció por completo, debido a las campañas militares que se realizaron contra los musulmanes.

Al final de la Edad Media la esclavitud cobró importancia otra vez en Europa. Y es la esclavitud precisamente una de las hipótesis que se barajan para explicar la expansión marítima portuguesa: ampliación y mejora de su economía.

## Los comienzos del comercio de esclavos en el Imperio Portugués de Ultramar

Portugal comenzó a realizar navegaciones por las costas del continente negro. En la década de 1440-1450 el comercio de esclavos se desarrolló en la costa occidental africana. Fue Antão Gonçalves quien trajo a Europa a las

primeras personas negras desde Mauritania, en 1441. El gobierno portugués vio en ellos una mina de oro, y supo cómo aprovecharse de ellos para mejorar su economía: tres años después transportaron a 235 esclavos en seis carabelas.

Al ver su buen funcionamiento, siguieron con este sistema, y este comercio se desarrolló de forma exponencial: entre 1441 y 1448 llegaron desde las costas africanas 1000 esclavos. Ya para la década de 1450, Europa recibía anualmente alrededor de unos 700 u 800 esclavos.

Quiero destacar una parte importante de la Historia, y es que nos imaginamos a estos marineros que traían esclavos como personas crueles y sin piedad. Pero ellos no actuaban solos, tenían ayuda. No eran los portugueses quienes capturaban a la mayor parte de los esclavos que llegaban a Europa. Eran capturados por locales y musulmanes, y después comerciaban con los portugueses a cambio de los productos que éstos conseguían en Marruecos, como si de una mercancía se tratase (que, en realidad, es lo que eran: mercancía).

Así, el comercio de esclavos se convirtió en uno de los negocios más lucrativos para Portugal, además del comercio de azúcar.

Esta población esclava no tenía derechos. No se respetaban sus lazos familiares a la hora de venderlos, exceptuando el caso de un esclavo muy joven y su madre. Por lo general los dueños les trataban bien; todo lo bien que se pueda tratar a una persona a la que se le niega la libertad.

## La esclavitud en Brasil

Fue en este contexto en el que apareció Brasil. Su descubrimiento el 22 de abril de 1500 marcó una nueva época para la esclavitud.



índigenas esclavizados. Por Rugendas.



Navio negreiro

Los portugueses encontraron tribus que se caracterizaban por la desunión habitando aquellas tierras, y sabrían aprovechar esta debilidad.

En esa época el único interés era el desarrollo del comercio. Portugal tenía acceso a África, pero sus tierras no eran buenas para producir lo que necesitaban; azúcar, trigo... Sin embargo, Brasil era una tierra muy rica, pero se necesitaba una buena mano de obra. Tenían los recursos necesarios para conseguir su objetivo, pero cada recurso en un continente. Así que decidieron unirlos.

## Los indígenas brasileños

La llegada de los portugueses a Brasil cambió radicalmente la forma de vida de los indígenas. Muchas tribus fueron esclavizadas y exterminadas, y terminarían desapareciendo. Los brasileños no se revelaron como buenos esclavos para desempeñar las tareas agrícolas, pero tenían una ventaja: salían más baratos, puesto que traer a esclavos de África conllevaba un coste de transporte.

Los Jesuitas formaron misiones con los indígenas. Allí les enseñaban el Catolicismo para intentar salvar sus almas y les defendían de

los otros blancos que intentaban esclavizarlos y venderlos. Esta situación llevó al extremo la esclavitud: se crearon cotos reservados para la caza del indio.

La abolición de la esclavitud indígena se produjo un siglo antes de la abolición completa de la esclavitud en Brasil. Fue promovida por el Marqués de Pombal. Comenzó en Maranhão y Grão-Pará, ampliándose más tarde para todo Brasil.

## Esclavos africanos en Brasil

Los portugueses ya habían comprobado que los esclavos africanos eran fuertes y trabajadores. Como hemos dicho antes, decidieron unir ambos recursos. Así que desde mediados del siglo XVI Brasil se convirtió en el primer importador de esclavos.

Se desarrollaría el comercio de azúcar y madera, y más adelante el del tabaco procedente de Brasil. Al mismo tiempo se desarrolló también el comercio de esclavos entre África y Brasil. Sin embargo, el número de esclavos importados en Portugal disminuyó durante el siglo XVII.

En Brasil, la esclavitud era desconocida

hasta la llegada de los portugueses. Hagamos números: debido a este éxito del comercio de esclavos, en Brasil había, a finales del siglo XVIII, 1.000.000 de esclavos africanos y 399.000 libertos aproximadamente. Se calcula que el Imperio Portugués realizó unos 30000 viajes, durante los cuales transportaron a unos 4.650.000 esclavos. Y ahora el dato más duro: estos cuatro millones fueron los que llegaron, pero en realidad se capturaron unos doce millones de africanos. Eso significa que la diferencia entre los que capturaban y los que llegaban morían debido al trato que recibían desde que los compraban hasta que terminaba su viaje.

Estos esclavos traídos de África constituyen hoy en día la mayoría demográfica de Brasil, superando a europeos e incluso indígenas.

## Vida cotidiana de los esclavos en Brasil


Los esclavos eran vendidos y comprados en mercados. Su precio dependía de su edad, sexo, sus conocimientos...

Existía el “esclavo hipotecado”, un esclavo empeñado para saldar deudas. El esclavo, en este estado, no podía comprar su libertad. Como era considerado como una posesión, podía ser alquilado, donado, vendido, prestado, confiscado...

Los esclavos en Brasil vivían en las *senzalas*, un alojamiento muy simple hecho de madera y barro. Estas construcciones no tenían ventanas ni divisiones: había una única habitación. En ellas, las mujeres y los niños vivían por un lado y los hombres por otro. Allí dormían, en el mejor de los casos sobre paja. A veces eran encadenados, para evitar fugas.

Era habitual la presencia de un *pelourinho* ante las *senzalas*; de esta manera, todos los que vivían en ellas presenciaban los castigos de los esclavos. Hoy en día todavía se pueden visitar algunas *senzalas* que se conservan en haciendas de café.

El alimento básico para los esclavos era la harina de mandioca. Pero su alimentación variaba mucho, dependiendo de la riqueza de su dueño. Si era pobre, complementaban esta harina de mandioca con frutas. Si era rico, se podía complementar incluso con pescado y carne.



Recibo de compra y venta de esclavos.

Rio de Janeiro, 1851.

Las actividades laborales que los esclavos desempeñaban eran muy variadas. Muchos de ellos trabajaban cultivando azúcar o café. Con la conversión de Minas Gerais en el centro económico de Brasil del siglo XVIII se necesitó mucha mano de obra. Así que muchos esclavos fueron llevados allí para trabajar en las minas de oro. El descubrimiento de diamantes en Brasil tuvo exactamente las mismas consecuencias.

Los esclavos podían colaborar en la fabricación de cualquier producto. Realizaban cualquier actividad que fuera lucrativa para su dueño. Otras veces trabajaban para proporcionar comodidad a su dueño como porteadores de palanquines, cocineras, actividades domésticas,... Las esclavas también podían trabajar como *mucamas*, una palabra que proviene del quimbundo y designaba a la esclava que era amante de su dueño. Pero su significado se extendió para definir a aquellas que acompañaban a sus señoras, o incluso podían trabajar como amas de leche.

Otros dueños, los que eran más pobres, mandaban a trabajar a sus esclavas en la

prostitución para poder conseguir algún dinero.

La escasez de mujeres blancas en Brasil provocó que los colonos se uniesen con las mujeres indígenas y, más tarde, con las mujeres africanas. La Corona Portuguesa fomentó esas uniones para tener una población mixta, con la que planeaban formar un ejército de ultramar para afirmar militarmente su poder.

En las familias importantes, las uniones continuaron celebrándose entre personas de raza blanca, pero los adulterios y concubinatos con indígenas y africanas eran más que frecuentes. Así, había hombres que vivían desafiando a la ley de la Iglesia y tenían un gran número de hijos ilegítimos. Los hijos que nacían de estas uniones ilícitas eran esclavos. Muchos de estos hombres tenían dos familias paralelas; una legítima, con los miembros de la élite de la sociedad, y otra ilegítima, con hijos mulatos (resultado de la unión de la raza blanca y la negra) o caboclos o mamelucos (resultado de la unión de la raza blanca y la indígena).

El concubinato con mujeres negras o indígenas, como acabamos de decir, era habitual; pero el matrimonio entre ellos no era imposible.

También se sabe, por documentos de la época, que había mamelucos que vivían vidas paralelas, fundiéndose perfectamente en las dos culturas de las que procedía. Incluso tenían una mujer en la sociedad indígena y otra en la sociedad colonial, casados por la Iglesia.

También se dio otra mezcla de razas menos frecuente, entre negros e indígenas. El resultado era el cafuzo.

Con respecto a los esclavos, algunos se unían a pobres. La práctica del matrimonio cristiano era igualmente válida para los esclavos, cuyos hijos estaban presentes en las listas parroquiales de bautismo.

Las creencias religiosas eran muy importantes en la sociedad de la época. Los blancos quisieron imponer también el Cristianismo, la única fe verdadera para ellos. Por eso fueron prohibidas otras fiestas y rituales.

La excusa oficial para la invasión que los portugueses realizaron en las tierras indígenas fue la de salvar sus almas. Muchos esclavos terminaron por aceptar la religión católica. La Semana Santa se vivía con gran fervor. La devoción a los santos y a las santas reliquias era generalizada. Había procesiones de hermanadas negras, donde había música y podían participar esclavos, forros o libres.

Pero no todos los cristianos practicaban el Cristianismo de la misma manera: muchos cristianos nuevos, para pasar desapercibidos ante la Inquisición, asistían a los rituales impuestos, pero mantenían en secreto sus verdaderas creencias. Y estas creencias eran muy numerosas, cosa lógica si se tienen en cuenta los diversos orígenes de los esclavos. Había esclavos negros musulmanes, los indígenas también tenían sus propias

Esclavos en la plantación. Por Marc Ferrez



creencias... Pero lo que más abundaba eran las creencias tribales africanas. Y es en esta área donde se nos presenta el famoso *Candomblé*, diversos cultos de origen africano. Fue prohibido por la Iglesia, pero sobrevivió hasta la abolición de la esclavitud. Más tarde consiguió difundirse entre la población, siendo actualmente un culto muy seguido en Brasil. Hay otras creencias practicadas en este país que tienen origen africano, como el *Macumba*, el *Umbanda* o el *Omoloko*.

Como podemos comprobar, la esclavitud dejó una marca muy significativa en las prácticas religiosas que todavía hoy se siguen en Brasil.

Por lo normal, el vestuario de los esclavos era precario. Tenemos testimonios de que las mujeres negras, ya fueran esclavas o libres, usaban adornos que podían revelar cultos religiosos o su posición jerárquica dentro del grupo tribal. Esto demuestra que tenían relación con su cultura natal.

A veces los esclavos exhibían ropas lujosas, porque así se daba a conocer el gran poder adquisitivo de la casa señorial a la que servía. Pero había otros dueños que vestían a sus esclavas de esta manera para poder ganar más dinero con la prostitución.

Antes del descubrimiento de Brasil, en Portugal ya existían leyes referentes a las vestimentas, que debían reflejar la condición social de la persona que las llevaba. Para mantener este lenguaje visual de prestigio social, en el siglo XVIII el rey D. João V prohibió que los negros, los mulatos o sus hijos, ya fueran esclavos o libres, usasen sedas o tejidos finos.

En cuanto a las joyas, no podían usarlas si eran de oro o de plata. La persona que no cumpliese esta ley podía ser castigada mediante multa o azotes. Si reincidía, podía ser desterrada. Así, el lujo pasaba a ser exclusivo de la raza blanca. Cuatro meses después de ser promulgada, la ley fue anulada.

De la misma manera que los hombres negros o mulatos libres usaban espadas para exponer visualmente su condición de forro, las mujeres libres usaban vestidos y adornos lujosos para diferenciarse de aquellas mujeres de su misma raza que eran esclavas. El uso del lujo tenía un significado diferente para blancas y negras: para las blancas representaba su alto status social; para las mujeres negras simbolizaba su libertad.




Cicatrices por azotes

Ya hemos nombrado a los forros. Pero ¿quiénes eran? Un esclavo podía comprar su libertad, llamada "alforria". El esclavo que conseguía su alforria se llamaba forro. Esta práctica era ventajosa para el dueño, pues conseguía del esclavo el dinero suficiente para comprar otro esclavo más joven, y así conseguía deshacerse de un esclavo envejecido. Era frecuente conceder la alforria al esclavo varios años después del pago; así el dueño conseguía más ganancias.

Algunos forros hacían un trato con sus antiguos dueños: cultivaban una pequeña parcela de tierra para su subsistencia y obtenían la protección de su antiguo dueño. Otros forros hacían productos para venderlos en el comercio local.

El esclavo vivía con miedo al castigo. El *pelourinho* del que hemos hablado no era la única prueba. Existen imágenes de la época que reflejan uno de los aspectos más duros de la esclavitud. También hay una carta del rey D. Pedro II de Portugal dirigida al Gobernador General, datada en el año 1700, en la que se



Castigo folha-de-flandres

queja de los malos tratos que los esclavos recibían. Estos castigos eran utilizados por los señores como forma de dominación, una forma de impartir disciplina entre sus trabajadores para mejorar su productividad. De cara a la sociedad, los castigos debían ser moderados y justos. Pero en las haciendas no se cumplía, porque estaban apartadas de las ciudades. Eso sí, intentaban no matarlos: «o sentimento da propriedade moderava a ação, porque dinheiro também dói». (el sentimiento de la propiedad moderaba la acción, porque el dinero también duele). En la época había un dicho popular que rezaba que los negros debían ser tratados con las tres “P”: paño, pan y palo.

Esta situación provocó que las formas de tortura fueran muchas y variadas. El azote era muy común; no fue abolido hasta 1885. Otra forma de tortura era la máscara de *folha-de-flandres*, que tenía dos variantes: una que cubría la cara completamente, dejando dos agujeros para los ojos y otro para la boca. La otra variante cubría solamente la boca. Servía para que los esclavos no bebiesen ni comiesen. En la zona de Minas Gerais servían para que no se escondieran piedras preciosas en la boca.

El hierro en el cuello (*gargalheiras*) era para aquellos que intentaban huir. También existían hierros para pies y manos. Para los que habían

huido se podía marcar una F (de “fugido”, huido); y si volvían a intentarlo, se les cortaba una oreja.

La esclavitud también creó un nuevo oficio: el de capturar esclavos huidos. En el cuento *Pai contra Mãe*, de Machado de Assis (la figura más importante de la literatura brasileña), el protagonista se gana la vida buscando esclavos huidos para entregarlos a sus dueños y cobrar la gratificación. A pesar de esto, muchos conseguían la libertad, y esto tendría consecuencias.

La esclavitud en Brasil obtuvo resistencia desde el principio. Hubo muchas revueltas contra los señores. Una de ellas, muy curiosa, fue la *Revolta dos Malês*. Esclavos musulmanes exigían que se estableciera una monarquía musulmana y que se esclavizase a todos aquellos que no profesasen su religión. Fue contenida por las autoridades rápidamente. Sin embargo, esta revuelta tenía motivos religiosos; no querían conseguir la libertad.

También hubo casos de esclavos huidos que crearon quilombos, núcleos que se transformaron en aldeas, donde se unieron esclavos, indígenas, y también blancos que huían. Allí eran libres incluso para realizar prácticas religiosas prohibidas. Estos *quilombos* eran autosuficientes; se mantenían con su trabajo y a veces comerciaban. Se convirtieron en una especie de paraíso para los esclavos que soñaban con la libertad. El más famoso es el *Quilombo dos Palmares*, hoy desaparecido por la represión del Gobierno.

Normalmente escogían locales de difícil acceso, para poder defenderse mejor de los ataques. Hay que tener en cuenta que los dueños intentaban recuperar a sus esclavos. Estos *quilombos* eran una auténtica amenaza para el sistema esclavista que quería mantener la élite de la sociedad de la época.

La abolición de la esclavitud en Brasil fue gradual. En 1850 se abolió el tráfico de esclavos, y 21 años después, se aprobó la *Lei do Ventre Livre* (Ley del Vientre Libre), mediante la cual los hijos de los esclavos nacerían libres. En 1884 la provincia del Ceará abolió la esclavitud. Poco después la provincia del Amazonas y tres municipios de la provincia de Rio Grande se unieron a ella. En 1885 surgió otra ley: la *Lei dos Sexagenários*, que liberaba a los esclavos mayores de 65 años. De esta manera, el número de esclavos en 1888 era ya muy reducido.

La abolición de la esclavitud en Brasil

estuvo al margen de partidos políticos concretos; fue defendida por artistas, entidades civiles, periódicos... Para entenderlo, es importante saber que muchos países ya habían rechazado la esclavitud, y Brasil fue uno de los últimos países en abolirla. Tras varias aprobaciones, la Lei Áurea fue firmada por la princesa *Dona Isabel* y por el ministro *Rodrigo Augusto da Silva* el 13 de mayo de 1888.

Después de leer todo esto, cabe hacernos una pregunta: ¿Qué lleva a una persona a considerar a otra una propiedad?


El esclavo es dominado por otra persona. Es considerado un semi-animal, porque su condición le impide discernir con claridad. El esclavo no tiene libertad y es considerado como una propiedad. Esta posición del esclavo entre el hombre y el animal puede ser explicada por el concepto del “otro”. El “otro” es una persona que es diferente en costumbre, idioma, raza... la falta de identificación con el “otro” es lo que permite situar al esclavo en una posición inferior: él no es como yo, no tiene los mismos sentimientos. Es un salvaje, y por eso su sociedad está poco desarrollada. Si todos pensásemos que estamos al mismo nivel, la humanidad nunca habría aceptado la esclavitud.

Tomemos a Robinson Crusoe y a Viernes como ejemplo. Un hombre blanco apartado de su sociedad, pero con la mentalidad de esa sociedad todavía presente, quiso tomar a un natural de la isla donde se encontraba como esclavo. Pero Viernes le consideraba un amigo y trabajaba para ayudarle. Recuerda a esa inocencia primitiva de los indígenas brasileños y cómo se aprovecharon sin escrupulos los colonizadores.

Las sociedades que practicaron la esclavitud a lo largo de la Historia se consideran superiores al resto en tecnología, sociedad y religión. Pero, en realidad, la única superioridad que tenían era la de la fuerza. De la misma manera que se puede capturar a un animal con la fuerza, podían capturar a aquellos que eran diferentes de ellos.

Ahora pasemos al punto de vista contrario, el del esclavo. Y esto es más difícil de comprender: ¿Qué lleva a una persona a considerarse a sí misma una posesión de otro?

De niños, nuestros padres nos castigaban si suspendíamos alguna asignatura, por no hacer bien nuestro trabajo, e intentábamos mejorar por miedo a otro castigo. Del mismo



Anuncio en periódico de un esclavo huido.

modo se trataba a los esclavos: había que castigarles para que aprendiesen a trabajar bien. Trabajaban por miedo al castigo. Porque esa es la base de la esclavitud: el miedo. Y este miedo y el paso del tiempo hacían que muchos interiorizaran la idea de superioridad de sus dueños y su propia inferioridad. Asimilaban la ideología que imperaba en la sociedad. Esto me hace recordar el cuento *As mãos dos pretos* (Las manos de los negros), de Luís Bernardo Honwana. En él un niño pregunta porqué ellos (los negros) tienen las manos blancas, y una persona le dice que es para que no ensucien la comida de los blancos al prepararla.

Por eso algunos esclavos libertos se quedaban con su dueño; tenían tan asimilada su inferioridad que no sabían qué hacer con la libertad.

Dicen que la esperanza es lo último que se pierde. Y lo demostraron todos aquellos que, descontentos con su situación, lucharon para conseguir la libertad. Consiguieron mantenerse fuertes psicológicamente, a pesar del peligro constante que corrían sus vidas. Y esto es un rasgo lógico en el ser humano: la supervivencia.



Lei X. 1888 a 15 de Maio de 1888.

# D eclarada extinta a escravidão no Brasil

**A**PRINCEZA IMPERIAL Regente em Nome de Sua Magestade o Imperador e Senhor D. PEDRO II, Faz saber a todos os subditos do Império que a Assembleia Geral Decretou e Ela sancionou a Lei seguinte:

Artigo 1º É declarada extinta desde a data desta Lei a escravidão no Brasil.

Artigo 2º Revogam-se as disposições em contrário.

Manda portanto a todas as autoridades a quem o anhabeimento e execução da referida Lei pertinhar, que a cumpram e façam cumprir e guardar tão integralmente como n'ella se contem. O Secretário de Estado das Negocios d'Agricultura, Commercio Outras Publicas e Interior das Nações Estrangeiras, Presidente da Junta Conselho de Sua Magestade o Imperador e faça imprimir, publicar e comutar.

Onde no Palacio do Rio de Janeiro, em 15 de Maio de 1888 - 17 da Independência e do Império.

*Firmeza Imperial Regente*  
Annie A. da Silva

Carta de Lei, pela qual Passa Alvara Imperial Manda cumular o Decreto da Assembleia Geral, que houve por bem sancionar declarando extinta a escravidão no Brasil, como n'ella se declara.

Carimbo - min. de Segurança

Assento de Ministro da Guerra

Brasília - em 12 de outubro de 1988

Caro Jesus Alvará Imperial ex.

*João José de Almeida Braga*





# Hanseatic League

## A Community of Interest

Helene Peterbauer

El siguiente artículo trata sobre la liga hanseática, una suerte de semi-confederación comercial de ciudades del norte de Alemania que dominó el comercio en el norte de Alemania, el Báltico, las costas de Escandinavia y algunas áreas costeras atlánticas de lo que hoy es Gran Bretaña, Holanda, Bélgica y Francia entre los siglos XII y XVII. La autora describe brevemente la historia de la Hansa y aborda los últimos estudios sobre la misma. Pese a que históricamente se suele referir a la Hansa como a una federación (comercial) de ciudades, en realidad no era sino una comunidad de intereses en la que los alemanes dominaban desproporcionadamente tanto el comercio como el poder y la influencia que éste conlleva.

The Hanseatic League, a community of merchants which was active and basically dominating the trade in the Baltic and the North Sea from the 12<sup>th</sup> until the 17<sup>th</sup> century, left its traces all over its places of business, but especially in Sweden and Norway, where the German merchants managed to maintain their influence longer than in any other of their host countries. The Hanseatic League was a community of interest, consisting of northern German tradesmen. “Community of interest” is one of the latest definitions of the Hansa, and it hits the mark quite well: association, company, guild – all these modern terms for business types don’t fit this truly medieval partnership, as we find it represented by the Hanseatic League.


At first glance, it looks quite well organized: apart from the tradesmen working in their hometowns (and basically every northern German city with direct or indirect access to the sea was some time between the 12<sup>th</sup> and the 17<sup>th</sup> century part of the Hanseatic League) there were four branches: the so-called *kontors* in London (*St-alhof/Steelyard*), Novgorod (*St. Peterhof/Yard of St. Peter*), Bruges (*Haus der Osterlinge/House of the Eastern people*) and Bergen (*Tyskebryggen/The German Wharf*). The *kontors* used to house the northern German tradesmen during their stay in the host country. Especially in the case of Novgorod and Bergen, where winters and especially the conditions on sea were rougher than in other European countries, the merchants needed a permanent place to stay over the months they traded with the local residents. There were winter

sailors and summer sailors, which departed from their northern German hometown with a ship full of German goods (grain, beer, wine), then spent the next months selling their goods to the inhabitants of their host country and in return bought products of the host country, for example the (dried) Norwegian fish. As soon as the ice broke and the sea was navigable again (in the case of the winter sailors; the summer sailors stayed until October/November and then departed back home), the German merchants departed with ships full of fish and sold it in Germany. Others were independent of the seasons: Most of the sailors simply followed the “Hanseatic route” Novgorod-Reval-Lübeck-Hamburg-Bruges-London, selling and purchasing in every single city and thereby forming the basis for pan-European trade. But even though the Hanseatic League had meetings (not annual, but rather irregular) where the spokesmen of the diverse cities discussed and passed several measures of regulation and standardization, the secret of its success lies in its unregulated beginnings.

There has been inter-European trade before Hanseatic times, mainly performed by good sailors like the Vikings or the Saxonians. But the year 1159 introduced a new era of trade. Lübeck, the mother of all Hanseatic cities, started off as a fiefdom given to Adolf II. (1128-1164), Count of Schauenburg and Holstein, by his lord Henry the Lion (1129-1195). Lübeck turned out to be the perfect setting for trade between the Baltic and the North Sea, not only because of its central

Lübeck in the 17th century






(though rather located at the Baltic Sea) but still protected location, but also due to its adjacency to Hamburg, the gate to the North Sea. Adolf II. saw all these advantages and soon trade and hand-craft began to flourish. Being the Duke of Saxony, Henry the Lion felt he should have his share, and forced Adolf II. to hand back his fiefdom. Under the direct protection of Henry the Lion, Lübeck before all other northern German cities enlarged trade with the rest of northern Europe and with a powerful lord like Henry bolstering the city's merchants, Lübeck soon managed to obtain diverse trading privileges. By this time it was not the city of Lübeck trading with other northern European cities, but the individual merchants living in the city. Until the 14<sup>th</sup> century these individual merchants will live and trade next to each other, they will work and stick together, merely out of their willingness to do so. No greater institution will force them to work together until in the second half of the 14<sup>th</sup> century the Hanseatic League slowly turns into a community of cities. The reason for this change lies in the expanded trade area, including even Spain and Portugal, and not least in the increasing trading activity performed by Dutch, English and southern German tradesmen. Especially the merchants from Southern Germany formed a danger to the privileged tradesmen of northern German cities, since they started to settle in the north of Germany, which made them even more direct competitors than the Dutch. The Hanseatic League felt it to be their very own prerogative to conduct, single-handedly, the exchange of goods between the East and the West of Europe, and therefore passed the rule that only merchants who were born in a Hanseatic city were allowed to run the trade between the two seas. Unfortunately, this (in a common German sense) egoistic way

of thinking was also traceable among the diverse "native" northern German tradesmen, who were hardly ever disinclined to marry their daughter to a promising and aspiring assistant from the south. Egoistic sanctions were one of the main reasons for the starting fall of the Hanseatic League in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. Although preserved account books from the 15<sup>th</sup> and especially the 16<sup>th</sup> century show increased numbers, the Hanseatic League has certainly lost its dominant position by this time. After the discovery of the New World, seafaring and trade flourished all over Europe. The Hanseatic League gained more profits, but so did the rest of Europe. At its heyday, the Hanseatic League consisted of almost 200 cities. It goes without saying that these cities were spread over a vast territory, leading to different main sales territories and thereby to very different priorities and notions about how to conduct foreign policy. One example:

Due to its rough climate and vast mountain areas Norway is not exactly made for agricultural purposes. Therefore this country depended more than others on the goods imported by merchants. The German merchants took advantage of the Norwegians' disadvantages and threatened to cut all aliment logistics whenever the Norwegians felt that the Germans had too many privileges in their own country. Medieval Bergen had a population of about 7.000 inhabitants, the Hanseatic League added 1.000. This number alone was intimidating enough, but the German merchants housed the entire harbor, they had their own church (whose



The seal of the Hanseatic city of Stralsund



The Hanseatic Kogge

priest was elected and sent by Lübeck) and their own laws (sanctioned by the Norwegian king; times became different when Norway got under Danish sovereignty and thereby had a stronger king to oppose the Germans). At its high point Lübeck even regulated inter-Norwegian trade and forbade Norwegian fishers to sell all their fish to the one offering the best price. Instead the Norwegian fishers had to sell a certain amount of their fish to a certain merchant, appointed by Lübeck. Of course, this merchant didn't feel constrained to offer the best price, and as a result the Norwegian fishers were constantly in debt. And as a result of that, at a certain point the fishers lost all motivation and didn't care whether they caught fish or not. Comprehensible enough, the Norwegians tried several times to limit the privileges of the Hanseatic merchants, but the king proved to be too weak to negotiate with a strong opponent like the merchants of Lübeck. In 1284 frustration took over and the Norwegians attacked and plundered a German ship, causing a boycott of alien

ment delivery to Norway. The eastern German cities stucked to this boycott, but Bremen, located in the west, didn't agree to cut all trade with Norway in favour of the Wendish cities and therefore its merchants got excluded from the Hanseatic community. The boycott was a full success, it led to famine in Norway and finally the Norwegians had to buckle, providing the Hanseatic merchants with even more privileges than before.

But the conduct of Bremen is symptomatic for the weak point of the Hanseatic League. As long as the community was not a community in the modern sense (following the same rules, acting in a homogeneous way), it worked by itself. What kept the Hanseatic merchants working together was their sense of solidarity, based on their free will and on their opportunity to choose. But when the spokespeople of the diverse cities met and had to agree on certain laws, the solidarity started to shake. Very often spokesmen simply left the meeting precociously in order to avoid



Tyskebryggen in the 1920's

having to agree to something which could turn out to be of disadvantage to them. Bremen's conduct was not a single case, later boycotts were not as successful, due to the different points of view and ways of conduct of the diverse cities. In addition, the Dutch expanded their territory and were welcomed with open arms by all those suffering under the endless privileges of the Hanseatic merchants.

In the course of the 16<sup>th</sup> century it became obvious that the time of the Hanseatic League was over. The Hanseatic "Kogge", a ship once so revolutionary that it ended all trading activity performed by the Vikings, could no longer keep up with the new Dutch ships. Antiquated thinking was the second nail in the Hanseatic League's coffin. The League's trading activity span over almost half a century and in this time the world changed profoundly, especially in the early modern age. Latest research tends to appoint the climax of the Hanseatic League's time at 1370, when the war between the League and Denmark was settled with the Treaty of Stralsund. In the following years the Hanseatic League tried no longer to expand its territory, but rather to maintain its old privileges. Maintaining the status quo was

from then on the main activity of the German merchants. But that turned out to be a crucial mistake: In a world changing as rapid as in the time of discoveries and inventions, stagnancy would sooner or later keep one behind. And so it was with the Hanseatic League: The competition sailed to India, Africa and America, and even the Danish fish swarms, that used to be a profitable trading good for Hanseatic merchants in the good old times, had moved away. But still German tradesmen sailed within Europe from East to West and backwards to get goods that no longer found demand. In the course of the 16<sup>th</sup> century the spokesmen of the diverse Hanseatic cities met to discuss and decide about ways of consolidating and revive the community, but the Hanseatic trade never reached its previous volume again. The Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) finally ended all (serious) attempts to reanimate the Hanseatic League.



# La cábala

## una introducción a la mística judía

Carlos Santos Carretero

La cábala es la corriente mística del judaísmo. Se trata de un conjunto de enseñanzas esotéricas que tratan de explicar la relación entre el Dios eterno y el universo mortal y finito (su creación). A lo largo de las siguientes páginas vamos a realizar un pequeño escarceo por este mundo ignoto, alejado de las escrituras tradicionales judías y al mismo tiempo muy cercano a ellas, pues no se puede entender la cábala sin la Torah o el Talmud. Rastrearemos las principales fuentes históricas y literarias, así como a maestros cabalistas como Rabí Aquiba, Abraham Abulafia o Moše de León, autor para unos, compilador para otros, del Zohar, el mayor tratado cabalístico existente. La mística judía debe mucho a los escritos apócrifos y apocalípticos del Antiguo Testamento, por lo que también serán mencionados a su debido tiempo. Por último, trataremos de dilucidar complejos conceptos cabalísticos, empezando por la distinción entre cábala especulativa y cábala práctica, así como elementos abstractos tales como las sefirot, la merkabah o el Árbol de la Vida. Para su mejor comprensión adjuntaremos fragmentos de algunas obras que ilustren lo expuesto.

A lo largo de los últimos años, numerosas figuras públicas han afirmado ser afines a movimientos religiosos y espirituales poco ortodoxos o desconocidos para el gran público con tal de estar en el candelero: Los Beatles, John Travolta, Tom Cruise o Madonna son solo algunos de ellos. Esta última ha afirmado en no pocas ocasiones ser una practicante de las doctrinas cabalísticas, pero a ojos de un profano, ¿qué es la cábala?

Se dice que Ibn Gabirol, místico judío español, fue el primero en emplear este término en un sentido técnico, allá por el s. XI. Cábala literalmente significaría “tradición recibida”, y es según las palabras de este erudito, “la enseñanza que pasa de la boca al oído”, es decir, la transmisión directa de, en este caso, una enorme sabiduría espiritual.

Una definición más extensa sería la siguiente: Se trata del conjunto de enseñanzas esotéricas del pueblo hebreo; de un sistema cuyo estudio y práctica apuntan a lograr un acercamiento a la divinidad (Calvo, B., 2007:7). Su objetivo es comprender, clasificar y describir las energías divinas que operan en el cosmos y ofrecer al estudiante la capacidad de modificar su interior con el fin de acercarse a la perfección, a Dios (Scholem, G., 1988:11). Dichas prácticas tuvieron su origen al final del periodo del Segundo Templo y han llegado a ser elementos importantes sumamente importantes dentro de la historia judía.

Tras estas definiciones, la cábala entraría dentro de los movimientos llamados “místicos”, pero ¿qué es el misticismo? ¿Existe tal cosa? Es algo que numerosos estudiosos y expertos en religiones se han preguntado a lo largo de la historia, dando casi tantas definiciones del término como autores hay sobre el tema. La definición que más casa con “cábala” es la siguiente: “El misticismo es el tipo de religión que hace hincapié en la percepción inmediata de la relación con Dios, en la conciencia íntima y directa de la presencia divina. Es la religión en su momento más vivo, agudo e intenso” (Scholem, G., 1996:24)

Para los cabalistas, ese acercamiento con Dios es al mismo tiempo el esfuerzo por comprender la irreabilidad, la nada de las cosas. Este concepto de *nada* ahora puede resultar extraño y confuso, pero volveremos a él en su debido tiempo.

## Fuentes de este movimiento

La cábala y su vasto mundo se basan fundamentalmente en la Torah, el Talmud y en las leyendas que han pasado a formar parte de la tradición judía. Además, pese a no existir escuelas cabalísticas como tales, la enseñanza de estas doctrinas se ha ido modificando de acuerdo a las circunstancias culturales y geopolíticas de sus practicantes desde las prácticas de los rabinos antiguos de la Academia de Yavne en época romana, hasta los cabalistas neoyorquinos de hoy día.

Algunos ejemplos que ilustran esto son los siguientes: los cabalistas del s. I d. C. basaban sus visiones del Trono de Dios en el libro de Ezequiel<sup>1</sup>. A su vez, los místicos del s. XIII intercambiaban a través de diversas operaciones, las cuatro letras del Tetragrámaton Divino “יהוה”, o los maestros hasídicos del s. XIX, herederos de Israel Ba’al Šem Tob, introducían conceptos cabalísticos a través de canciones y danzas.

Rodeada de un profundo aura de exotismo, la cábala ha sido vista en el mejor de los casos como un saber impenetrable, y cuando no, como algo sumamente peligroso. La mística hebrea comparte con sus equivalentes cristiana y medieval la persecución que sufrió a manos de la Iglesia medieval, siendo obligada a vivir en la oscuridad. Oscuridad reforzada por toda una capa de elementos esotéricos y códigos. (Scholem, G., 1996:26). Si en no pocas ocasiones los judíos eran perseguidos por el simple hecho de ser judíos, al “judío mago” se le perseguía con más hincapié.

Para continuar con la introducción a esta “magia”, como dirían los gentiles<sup>2</sup>, la primera forma organizada de meditación judía aparece en unos manuales del s. VI a. C. llamados *Ma’ase Merkabah* (Obras, hechos del Carro) (Epstein, P.1997:24). La finalidad de quienes seguían estos manuales no era otra que experimentar directamente la realidad divina a través de la concentración en unas imágenes que mostraban las *Hekalot*, palacios celestiales (de los cuales hay una extensísima literatura) que conducían al Trono de Dios. Rabí Aquiba (40 d. C- 135 d. C.), máximo dirigente de la escuela rabínica de Jerusalén en la época de la sublevación judía de Bar Kokba, elaboró un método para todo aquél que quisiera seguir dichos manuales. Él y

1 Ezequiel 1, 4-28 y 10.

2 Apelativo para referirse a los no judíos.


tres rabinos allegados a él siguieron este método, aunque los resultados no fueron tan satisfactorios como eran de esperar: uno de ellos murió del esfuerzo, otro acabó loco, y el tercero renegó del judaísmo. Sólo rabí Aquiba “volvió” intacto, y la razón es, según maestros posteriores, debido a que fue capaz de armonizar espiritualidad y vida cotidiana<sup>3</sup>.

Sin embargo, no todas las místicos posteriores siguieron el método de Rabí Aquiba, como por ejemplo, la escuela babilónica del Gaón Hai (939-1038), que en lugar de tratar de buscar imágenes tales como las que aparecen mencionadas en los dos capítulos de Ezequiel, iban en pos de la expansión individual de la conciencia espiritual. Otros métodos de cábala aparecen en el famoso libro *Sefer Yesirah*, (Libro de Creación), al cual se le atribuye el origen de varias ramas posteriores de la cábala, especialmente aquellas que utilizan las permutaciones de letras del alefato y las diez (u once según el texto consultado) *sefirot*, las emanaciones divinas del árbol de la vida. (Scholem, G., 2006:32)

A estas permutaciones del *Sefer Yesirah*, los cabalistas franceses del s. XII, a través de la obra *Sefer ha-bahir* (Libro del Brillo), dieron lugar a una “cábala moderna”, a la hora de añadir diversas meditaciones sobre el Tetragrámaton, conceptos acerca de los colores y formas, e incluso ejercicios de respiración y posturas corporales, que entre 1280 y 1286, el cabalista español Moše de León compiló junto con el mundo cabalístico antiguo en uno de los tratados cabalísticos más importantes de todos los tiempos, el *Zohar* (Libro del Esplendor) (Bension, A., 1992:9).

El *Zohar* es un tratado arameo, cuyas enseñanzas se van desglosando a partir de un comentario del Pentateuco entre otras fuentes, y supuestamente inspirado en los escritos del cabalista del siglo II Rabí Simón bar Yojay, sucesor de Rabí Aquiba. Gracias a este tratado, la cábala castellana del s. XIII logró un prestigio incommensurable.

Junto a Moše de León, otros cabalistas castellanos destacados son Abraham Abulafia (Scholem, G., 1996:141-178) y Yosef ibn Chiquitilla<sup>4</sup>. El primero de ellos,



Árbol de la vida

rebelde y polémico, abrió el camino de la meditación de tal manera que cualquiera podría dedicarse a ello, incluyendo a las mujeres judías y los gentiles. Esta cábala “liberal y aperturista” desató un conflicto con las autoridades judías y puso a la Inquisición tras su pista, sentando también las bases de futuros cultos mesiánicos que proliferarían en los siglos venideros hasta la llegada del hasidismo en el s. XVIII. En cambio, ibn Chiquitilla fue mucho más sosegado en sus estudios. Discípulo de Abulafia e influenciado por los escritos de Moše de León; tras sus estudios iniciales de filosofía y exégesis del Talmud se centró en la mística, empleando el resto de su vida tratando de conciliar la filosofía con la cábala, lo cual recuerda al famoso tema de la controversia entre “razón y fe” del cristianismo medieval.

Yosef ibn Gikatilla [www.jewishencyclopedia.com](http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com)

<sup>3</sup> El texto acerca de este episodio de rabí Aquiba es un extracto del Talmud Babli, concretamente el tratado Jaguigá 14.2.

<sup>4</sup> También conocido en otras fuentes como

## Evolución histórica y tradición cabalística

El periodo de desarrollo inicial de la mística judía es muy extenso, ya que su producción literaria abarca nada más y nada menos que del s. I a. C. hasta el s. X d. C., un total de 1000 años, destacando el hecho de que algunas de las obras más importantes de entonces han llegado a nosotros, lo cual es bastante sorprendente. Entre este “misticismo primitivo” por llamarlo de alguna manera, y la Cábala medieval hay un abismo insospechable, pues a la hora de realizar una evolución histórica de todo el misticismo judío hay bastantes problemas debido a numerosos detalles históricos que aún hoy se hallan envueltos en cierta oscuridad, debido no sólo a la escasez en algunos casos de fuentes verídicas y aceptadas, sino también la aparición de otras más polémicas como pueden ser obras apocalípticas y apócrifas como el ciclo de libros basados en el patriarca antediluviano Henoc<sup>5</sup> o el “Libro cuarto de Esdras” (Calvo, B., 2007:10). Según esta última, no todos los preceptos que recibió Moisés en el Sinaí debían ser transmitidos al pueblo. Según mandato divino, algunos deberían ser enseñados durante el día y otros por la noche, lo cual dejaría a entender que parte de estas enseñanzas contienen elementos místico-esotéricos, y que sólo debían de ser transmitidas a los sabios y sacerdotes. Sin embargo, nada de esto aparece en pasaje alguno de las Sagradas Escrituras.

Otras historias con aire de leyenda afirman que los orígenes de la transmisión de estas enseñanzas en la humanidad están en el arcángel Raziel, conocido como “guardián de los secretos” y “ángel de los misterios”, al que se atribuye la autoría del *Sefer Raziel ha-malak* (El libro del ángel Raziel) donde está anotado todo el conocimiento humano y terrestre, y que a través del ángel Metatrón<sup>6</sup>, y

5 Especialmente el *Libro Hebreo de Henoc*, una de las obras más importantes de la ya citada literatura de palacios celestiales, también conocida como 3Henoc.

6 Muchas tradiciones afirman que Metatrón es el mismo Henoc convertido en ángel. El origen de esta controvertida tradición, no vista con muy buenos ojos por el rabinismo ortodoxo tiene su origen en el destino final de Henoc en la Biblia. Según Génesis 5, 21-24: Vivió Henoc sesenta y cinco años, y engendró a Matusalén. Y caminó Henoc con Dios, después que engendró a Matusalén, trescientos años, y engendró hijos e hijas. Y fueron todos los días de Henoc

comunicaría sus enseñanzas al pueblo de Israel, empezando por Noé, que de ahí pudo haber sacado las instrucciones para fabricar su arca, pasando a Abraham, Moisés, y de mano en mano hasta llegar a Salomón, teniendo éste control sobre la magia y el dominio de los demonios.

Otro elemento común que guardan en común un los autores de estas obras apócrifas y apocalípticas con los hombres que se adhirieron a las primeras ramas del misticismo judío, es el hecho de que todos ocultaron su identidad tras los grandes nombres bíblicos del pasado como Adán, Henoc, Noé, Abraham, etc... (Scholem, G., 1988:20)

Las esperanzas de que algún día se conozca la verdadera identidad de estos autores son prácticamente nulas, lo cual dificulta aún más el hecho de establecer una evolución histórica correcta. Sólo unos pocos nombres auténticos han llegado a nuestros oídos, procedentes en su mayoría de místicos de la etapa postalmúdica, como por ejemplo, Yosef ben Abba, director de la academia de Pumbedita hacia el 814, o Aharón ben Šemuel de Bagdad, personaje envuelto en un halo de misterio y que lo único que se tiene claro de él, es que fue el principal responsable de que los conocimientos místicos judíos pasasen de zonas como Mesopotamia al sur de Italia, y de ahí al resto de judíos de Europa (Scholem, G., 1996:62-63). Estas dos figuras pertenecen al s. IX pero antes de esta fecha prácticamente estamos en total oscuridad, sin saber nada de los principales representantes del misticismo clásico e incipiente. Aunque algo de lo que prácticamente no hay duda alguna es el hecho de que Palestina fue la cuna de estos movimientos, y de la misma manera conocemos también a los más altos representantes del pensamiento místico entre los sabios de la Mišná, lo que ayuda a ir avanzando en la elaboración de esta evolución histórica. Se trataba de un grupo de alumnos de Yojanán ben Zakkay que vivieron aproximadamente en el s. I d. C., que se reunían en pequeños círculos esotéricos. Como ya hemos dicho antes, estos autores no aparecían con sus nombres propios, sino con los de personajes importantes, esta vez no bíblicos, sino de maestros un poco anteriores, recordando a la costumbre de Platón de presentar en sus textos como protagonista a Sócrates, aunque quien realmente hablase era Platón. Algunos de estos nombres empleados eran el ya citado Yojanán ben Zakkay, Eli`ezer ben Hyrcanos o `Aquila ben Yosef.

trescientos sesenta y cinco años. Caminó, pues, Henoc con Dios, y desapareció, porque le llevó Dios.



Serafines

Durante todo el período del Segundo Templo se enseñaba un cierto esoterismo en círculos farisaicos, basado en ciertos temas de discusión e interpretación, tales como el primer capítulo del Génesis (la Creación), y el primer capítulo de Ezequiel (la visión del carro divino). Obviamente, dichos temas se exponían en círculos reducidos y en secreto.

Llegados a este punto, podemos comprobar que ahondando concienzudamente en la historia no encontramos más que oscuridad en lo referido a la “mística primitiva”, por lo tanto no queda más remedio que abandonar los hechos históricos y adentrarse en los textos.

Como es bien sabido, el texto más antiguo de la tradición judía es la Torah, que según la tradición fue entregada al pueblo hebreo hacia el 1313 a. C. Sin embargo, hay otros libros de aparición más tardía que, al parecer, aunque fueran escritos con posterioridad venían siendo transmitidos oralmente desde épocas anteriores a su aparición. Ese es el caso del ya citado *Sefer Yesirah*.

Considerado como uno de los primeros textos de la literatura hebrea, es transmisor de las palabras clave de la mística cabalística, teniendo al mismo tiempo el honor de ser el texto especulativo más antiguo escrito en hebreo, datado aproximadamente entre el s. I y V. Se trata de una obra muy breve, escrita en un hebreo solemne y pausado, que sirvió no en pocas ocasiones a cabalistas medievales y místicos cristianos e incluso musulmanes.

El *Sefer Yesirah* destaca por encima de otras obras posteriores por ser la primera en conjugar la mística de los números y la de las letras en un mismo tratado. El texto explica los treinta y dos caminos de la sabiduría utilizados en el proceso de la creación. Según esto, dichos caminos están comprendidos en las diez luces divinas o *sefirot*, que actúan como canales creativos, en las 22 letras del alefato hebreo y en los diez primeros números. Con estas letras y dígitos, es posible realizar las combinaciones y permutaciones que empleó Dios para crear el mundo con palabras. El famoso árbol de la vida representa los treinta y dos senderos y las diez *sefirot* visibles.

Pequeño extracto del primer capítulo del *Sefer Yesirah*, que condensa prácticamente todo el contenido de la obra en unas breves líneas:

“Mediante treinta y dos caminos místicos de sabiduría, Yah, El Eterno de las Legiones, Dios de Israel, Dios Vivo, Soberano del universo, El Šaday, Clemente y Misericordioso, Elevado y Exaltado, Morador de la eternidad, Cuyo Nombre es santo y supremo, grabó y creó su universo, con tres dimensiones: con texto, con número y con comunicación” (Calvo, B., 2007:10)

## El universo cabalístico

La cábala es una mística dividida en dos cuerpos doctrinarios bastante diferenciados, por lo que, antes de indagar en el núcleo de este saber hermético es necesario hacer una serie de apreciaciones sobre dichas divisiones:

- **Cábala especulativa:** Investiga los sentidos ocultos relacionados con las Sagradas Escrituras y los misterios de la naturaleza y la Creación, y se subdivide en artificial o simbólica, y real o dogmática.

*Cábala especulativa simbólica:* su principal objetivo es el estudio de la Torah, ya sea bajo forma escrita

o bajo la forma de transmisión oral. Se divide a su vez en tres métodos:

- *Gematriah*: Estudia el valor numérico de las palabras que aparecen en los textos sagrados adjudicando a cada letra un valor específico.
- *Notariqon*: Este método consiste en formar una palabra con las iniciales de las letras finales de los vocablos que conforman la frase, o bien en tomar las letras de una palabra y posteriormente convertirla en iniciales o bien finales de una oración.
- *Temurah*: Es un método de transmutación de los fonemas o letras que forman las diferentes palabras.


*Cábala especulativa dogmática*. Se trata de la parte menos accesible al individuo, y se llega a ella tras la lectura del *Sefer Yesirah* y del *Zohar*. Pretende explicar los sentidos ocultos de ciertas palabras de la Biblia, con aplicación de fenómenos de la historia de la Creación. Es de dos especies, la ciencia de la *Merkabah*, que trata del mundo supralunar, es decir, de la teología y la metafísica, y la ciencia de *Berešit*, que se ocupa del mundo sublunar, el de los fenómenos.

**- Cábala práctica:** Pretende modificar el entorno; elaborar amuletos y talismanes cuya utilización proporcione efectos sobre el mundo material, tales como obrar milagros en la curación de un enfermo, la expulsión de un demonio, a través de la invocación o escritura del Tetragrámaton o ciertos pasajes y palabras de la Biblia. Esta práctica es menospreciada por los místicos que sólo emplean la cábala como un método para acercarse a Dios.

En los apartados anteriores han aparecido figuras como los *Hēkālōt* o las sefirot. Estos conceptos y otros que veremos a continuación son fundamentales para entender la mística judía, por lo que dedicaremos este último apartado a bucear un poco en ellos.

### **El Carro (*merkabah*)**

Para el ascenso en la meditación, el cabalista antiguo se valía de un elemento preconcebido en los ya citados textos del profeta Ezequiel que hablan de un simbólico viaje al cielo. Transportado más allá de las nubes en un carro alado, llameante, arrastrado por animales divinos y seres angélicos descritos con todo lujo



Adam Qadmon

de detalles, Ezequiel se convirtió en el ejemplo a seguir para el judío antiguo que practicaba la meditación.

Un fragmento de los textos de Ezequiel para ilustrar mejor la situación es el siguiente:

“ En medio de estos cuatro seres se veían como brazos incandescentes a modo de antorchas que se agitaban de acá para allá entre ellos. Resplandecía el fuego, y del fuego se desprendían fulgores. Los seres iban y venían lo mismo que el relámpago. Me fijé en el suelo, y vi una rueda al lado de cada uno de los cuatro seres. El aspecto de las ruedas, su estructura, resplandecía como el crisólito.

Tenían las cuatro la misma forma y parecían dispuestas como si estuviese en medio de la otra. Al rodar iban en las cuatro direcciones, sin volverse en su movimiento. Su circunferencia era de gran altura, y las llantas de las cuatro estaban cuajadas de ojos todo alrededor. Cuando los seres se movían, iban también las ruedas junto a ellos; y cuando aquéllos se elevaban de la tierra, se levantaban también las ruedas. Iban hacia donde los impulsara el espíritu; y las ruedas también se elevaban, porque el espíritu de los seres estaba en las ruedas. Cuando andaban ellos, andaban las ruedas; y cuando se paraban ellos, se paraban también las ruedas; cuando ellos se elevaban de la tierra, se elevaban también ellas, porque el espíritu de los seres estaba en las ruedas. Sobre los seres había una especie de firmamento, esplendoroso como un cristal extendido por encima de sus cabezas, y bajo el firmamento estaban extendidas sus alas una junto a otra, mientras que las otras dos alas de cada uno de los cuatro seres les cubrían el cuerpo".<sup>7</sup>

Este viaje en el carro está tan claramente descrito por el profeta que el interesado en la meditación podía conocer lo que le acontecería antes incluso de comenzar a meditar. Durante este viaje pasaría a través de siete estadios o niveles de conciencia, los *Hēkālōt*, antes de llegar al tan ansiado Trono de Dios. Allí, el practicante se encontraría con *'Adam Qadmon* (Epstein, P., 1997:24), el hombre cósmico y primordial, síntesis del árbol de la vida que emana del *'Ein Sof* (אֵין סֻפּ), que se traduciría como "sin límites", o incluso "nada" (a esta *nada* nos referíamos en la introducción). Este *'Ein Sof* es el Todo Supremo para la mística judía, aquello que podemos llamar Dios en su aspecto más elevado, no siendo, en el sentido más estricto de la palabra un "ser", ya que siendo auto-contenido y auto-suficiente, no puede estar limitado por la propia existencia, que limita a todos los seres. Del *'Ein Sof*emanan las *sefirot*, para formar el Árbol de la Vida, representación abstracta de la naturaleza divina (Scholem, G., 1988:121). Podríamos definir también el *'Ein Sof* como el No Ser, un principio que permanece no manifestado e incomprendible para la inteligencia humana. Se dice que también es el modelo del *Adam ha rišon*, el primer hombre que habitó el Paraíso.

Volviendo al viaje del místico en el carro, para evitar que cualquier pensamiento en su viaje pudiera distraerle, representado por ejemplo por un demonio, el místico se valía de cantos, visualizaciones en imágenes



Portada del Zohar

concretas o repetir el nombre de *Adonay*, hasta que dicho demonio u otro elemento que le dificultase desapareciese. Otros métodos curiosos que empleaban los místicos eran los ya citados manuales de instrucción de Rabí Aquiba, basados en cantos y recitación de pasajes bíblicos. Uno de dichos métodos preparaba al místico para el *haluq*, una visión de luz tan brillante, que ha terminado siendo identificada como el manto en el que se oculta Dios y percibió Moisés<sup>8</sup>.

### *El cuerpo de Dios*

Aunque no se haya mencionado previamente, el "cuerpo de Dios" es otro elemento fundamental y está intrínsecamente relacionado con el viaje en el carro y el encuentro con Adam Qadmon, por lo que el viajero que era capaz de llegar hasta el Trono y se encontraba con el hombre arquetípico, se visualizaba a sí mismo sobre los pelos de la barba del ser cósmico. Cuando el místico se perdía a sí mismo entre la luz divina y se bañaba en el óleo que desprendían las hebras del cabello, el viajero era bendecido por haber llegado al mismo nivel que Moisés. Se da por sentado que muy pocos han llegado a este estado,



Golem

como por ejemplo Rabí Aquiba, Rabí Simón bar Yojay, Isaac Luria, Abraham Abulafia e Israel Baal Šem Tob.

Otro aspecto a tener en cuenta, y bastante curioso, es la meditación durante este viaje místico sobre lo que se conoce como la Sekinah, el aspecto femenino de Dios, que consistía en la visualización de una mujer espléndida de setenta caras, cada una de las cuales escondía un aspecto del alma del viajero tras un unos vestidos muy elaborados. Como colofón, en la forma más avanzada de meditación, el cabalista se encontraba con los “cuerpos masculino y femenino de Dios abrazados como amantes” (Epstein, P., 1997:26). Al tener acceso a esta visión, el viajero unificaba los tres niveles del alma humana: vital, intelectual y espiritual.

### ***Las sefirot y el Árbol de la Vida***

El Árbol de la Vida (עץ החיים), contiene los “frutos” de la emanación divina, y podríamos decir que representa el mapa del viaje del cabalista. A través de dicho mapa, Dios se hace accesible a los seres humanos a través de un orden descendente (y ascendente para el cabalista) de cualidades. Dicho árbol consta de un tronco dividido verticalmente en una mitad “masculina” (derecha) y mitad “femenina” (izquierda). Además consta de diez ramas (según otras versiones once) que, portan *sefirot* (plural de *sefirah*). Dicho vocablo hebreo se ha traducido de diversas formas, desde esferas, pasando por emanaciones, mundos o incluso estados de conciencia. El árbol aparece representado además según el siguiente postulado: “Como

arriba, así abajo”. Las *sefirot* representan la Creación como un Gran Cadena, que lo abarca absolutamente todo.

Esto puede expresarse a través de la siguiente cita de Moše de León en el *Zohar*:

*“Él es el alma de las almas. Él está fuera de todas las cosas, y sin embargo dentro de todas las cosas. Él está en todas direcciones y llena los espacios superiores e inferiores. No hay otro Dios fuera de los diez Sephiroth, de los cuales emanan y dependen todas las cosas.”* (Bension, A.1992: 31)

Por lo tanto, si hacemos caso a lo que dice Moše de León, vemos como el viajero que se encuentra en el árbol puede tomar como punto de partida cualquier punto del árbol, porque siempre podrá encontrar el camino de regreso. De este modo, todas las *sefirot*, a simple vista distintas, se identifican con el Infinito y no pueden ser contadas o presentadas en el tiempo.

El viaje místico a través de las *sefirot* y los cuatro reinos arquetípicos (representaciones del cosmos creado por Dios a partir de sí mismo) requiere una gran familiaridad con lenguajes simbólicos, y para ello no son pocos los cabalistas y estudiosos que han afirmado que el mejor mapa para guiarse a través de las “esferas” es el *Zohar*, que contiene detalladas instrucciones para la contemplación de las diversas emanaciones divinas, funciones mentales humanas, partes del cuerpo, nombres sacros y colores, lo cual daría lugar a cientos y cientos de páginas explicando nuevos y enigmáticos conceptos.

### **Consideraciones finales**

Como hemos visto a lo largo de estas páginas, la mística judía es apasionante y al mismo tiempo sumamente hermética, dando lugar a unas posibilidades de estudio y especulación numerosas. Desgraciadamente hemos tenido que dejar otros aspectos muy interesantes en el tintero, como la cábala cristiana, cuyo máximo exponente es el gran pensador mallorquín Ramón Llull y otras obras importantes, como *Sefer ha Qabbalah*, del sefardí Abraham ibn Daud, plagada de relatos y cuentos para entender este complejo sistema de acercamiento a Dios.

Los usos mágicos que se dice obtener a través de



Carro de Ezequiel

esta ciencia mística también son motivo de investigación, como las leyendas que giran en torno al Golem. Se le atribuye a Ibn Gabirol la creación del primero de estos seres, curiosamente de forma femenina, siendo también muy conocida la historia de Rabí Yehudah Loew, rabino de Praga que construyó un Golem en el siglo XVI, llegando incluso a ser adaptada al cine.

Independientemente de dónde y cuando hayan vivido, a través de los siglos los cabalistas han tenido un único objetivo: lograr la unión con Dios. Ya sea interpretado en términos más o menos abstractos, tales como la “vida en la nada” o de manera más práctica, mediante recitaciones y cánticos.

En lo que todos están de acuerdo es que en este mundo los únicos que pueden lograr el fin de alcanzar a Dios son los seres humanos, debido a su creencia en que somos originarios de Dios, pues como se dice en la Biblia: “Hagamos al hombre a nuestra imagen y semejanza”<sup>9</sup>.

9 Génesis 1, 27.

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
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# Jovellanos

BICENTENARIO DE UNA OCASIÓN PERDIDA

Mario Martín Lera

Corría el año de gracia de 1798 cuando Goya, el genial pintor, retrataba a Jovellanos sentado en su despacho. Retrato que penetraba en la conciencia de un hombre ya cansado, abismado de trabajo y responsabilidad -Ministro de Gracia y Justicia era por entonces el patricio-, que tenía mucho en qué pensar. En todo lo que un hombre honesto que no quiere dejar de serlo puede pensar en medio de la espiral de poder e intereses que era la corte en aquella época, tal y como dejaba escrito antes de aceptar el cargo:

“... gritos, abrazos, mientras yo, abatido, voy a entrar a una carrera difícil, turbulenta, peligrosa...”

*“Haré el bien, evitaré el mal que pueda. ¡Dichoso yo si vuelvo inocente! ¡Dichoso si conservo el amor y opinión del público que pude ganar en la vida oscura y privada!”*

A los nueve meses sería cesado de sus funciones. La fortuna volvía, como otras veces, a serle esquiva. Gijón, su ciudad natal, le recibiría de nuevo con los brazos abiertos. Esta es la historia de Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, literato, orador, jurista y político, la historia de una ocasión perdida.

## A orillas del Cantábrico

En la que hoy es la ciudad más populosa del Principado de Asturias, Gijón, nacía Jovellanos un 5 de enero de 1744, haciendo honor su nombre a la fecha, víspera de la Epifanía, en que vino al mundo: Baltasar Gaspar Melchor María. Era el pequeño el undécimo hijo de los Jove-Llanos, cuya casona familiar se levantaba -y aún lo hace- lindera a la costa de la población, una pequeña aldea de pescadores que al trasiego de los siglos se había convertido

en una modesta urbe de en torno a 4.000 habitantes.

Los primeros años, que pasaron entre juegos, ya dejaban entrever la afición del niño por los libros, que sumada a su inclinación por el estudio, llevó a su padre a elegir para el joven Gaspar Melchor la carrera eclesiástica. Así pues, a los 13 años partía a la capital, Oviedo, dejando su casa.

Oviedo, sede episcopal y centro universitario, contaba entonces con unos 8.000 habitantes, y en las aulas del Estudio con una de las celebridades del siglo impartiendo magisterio, el padre Feijoo. No obstante, como era costumbre en la época, Jovellanos pasaría tras el primer curso a estudiar en Ávila, donde se licenciaría en Leyes y Cánones, abandonando por primera vez el verde paisaje

Autorretrato, Francisco de Goya



astur. Su buen hacer estudiantil le deparará aún otro destino, ésta vez como becario, en la ilustre Universidad de Alcalá de Henares, en la que una vez finalizados los estudios dará clase. En esta etapa conocerá a algunos de sus mejores amigos, como su biógrafo Ceán Bermúdez, y empezará a frecuentar las tertulias, dejando traslucir toda la poesía que su espíritu, curioso de las artes, contiene. La gaya ciencia le atraerá siempre, aunque en su opinión no recompensará sus esfuerzos con inspiración, si bien sí -y esto es característico de Jovellanos, como buen ilustrado- embellecerá su ya fuerte espíritu crítico, con el que anhela ayudar a sus amigos en su quehacer poético:

Y pues que no me es dado que presuma  
Alcanzar por mis versos alto nombre,  
Dejadme al menos en tan noble intento  
La gloria de guiar por la ardua senda  
que va a la eterna fama, vuestros pasos.

Pero esto llegará luego. Antes tendrá que hacer frente al primer revés de su carrera, el suspenso en las oposiciones a una cátedra de Cánones. Hasta entonces todo habían sido rosas para Jovellanos, que no había dado aún con las espinas que conllevan. Había llevado la vida del estudiante, tan famosa en los siglos de Cervantes, de tertulias, músicas y bailes, despuntando, según se dice, por su celebrada voz. Aún en vistas a la vida retirada y tranquila de eclesiástico provinciano optó por opositar en la Catedral de Tuy, pero a su paso por Madrid en búsqueda de recomendaciones sus parientes y amigos le abrieron los ojos a un cambio de carrera, siendo así propuesto para alcalde del crimen en la Real Audiencia de Sevilla.


## El sol de Sevilla

A sus 24 años Jovellanos ocupa un primer cargo importante. Un cargo para el que no ha sido educado, situación de la que es muy consciente:

“Entré a la jurisprudencia sin más preparación que una lógica bárbara y una metafísica estéril y confusa, en las cuales creía entonces tener una llave maestra para penetrar en el santuario de las ciencias...”

Sin embargo, “incansable en el estudio y fuerte y duro para el trabajo”, como Ceán Bermúdez nos lo pinta, pronto desempeñaría con brillantez sus funciones. Centrando sus esfuerzos en humanizar la justicia, intenta desterrar el tormento de los interrogatorios, cuyo uso aún era muy frecuente en la época, lo que no se vería sancionado por ley hasta las Cortes de Cádiz más de cuarenta años después. Asimismo, ignoraba el cobro de tasas que como juez le correspondían, ejerciendo gratuitamente, y si bien la presión de sus colegas de profesión le hizo volver a la antigua práctica, salió del

Jacques Rousseau



paso fijando cantidades simbólicas.

Diez años dura esta feliz época. Diez años en los que Jovellanos termina de formar su pensamiento y forjar su carácter. Diez años en los que el antaño aspirante a clérigo es atraído por los aires nuevos de la ilustración. En la barroca Sevilla se halla entonces Pablo de Olavide, espíritu puramente dieciochesco, polémico, viajado y leído -ha conocido ya personalmente a Voltaire-, con una amplia biblioteca, y cuya predilección por lo francés, aún no vista con malos ojos, es sobradamente conocida. Olavide, favorecido por Carlos III, intenta impulsar una renovación en el teatro de la época, ejerciendo su influencia, a la manera de París, con una selecta tertulia en sus salones; Jovellanos accede a ella y con este acceso se abre las puertas a las obras de los autores de su tiempo: Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau... aprendiendo la lengua inglesa para leer otros como Hume, Bacon o Milton. Este ambiente es en buena medida la causa de su variada producción literaria en la etapa sevillana: los dramas "La muerte de Munuza" (o "Pelayo") y "El delincuente honrado", de notable éxito éste, y un sin fin de poesías.

Cuando de amor la flecha penetrante  
no hubiera aún mi corazón herido,  
tú fuiste, Enarda, el ídolo elegido,  
que primero adoró mi pecho amante.

Fui tu primer amor, y tú, inconstante,  
de tu fe me ofreciste el don mentido,  
don que después la ausencia y el olvido  
volvieron a llevarte en un instante.

Medió largo intervalo, volví a verte,  
volviste tú a jurarme amor eterno;  
mas diste luego a otro tu albedrío;



Felipe V

a otro que, ausente yo, fingió quererte,  
¿Y ésta es , Enarda, tu constancia? ¡Cuerno!  
¡Malhaya si otra vez de ti me fío!

Como se ve, fue una época en que el comedido Jovellanos estuvo subyugado por el amor. Y amor derrochó en sus versos (aunque no lo mismo aconsejara a sus amigos poetas de Salamanca, a los que llevaba por vías más metafísicas) tal cual ocurrió en su vida entonces. Esta *Enarda* fue quizás su gran pasión, a quién encontró, después de Sevilla, en su estancia en Madrid; amor desdichado y fallido, cuya existencia puede rastrearse en su producción poética. Sin embargo, por su talante discreto, poco más puede saberse a ciencia cierta de su vida amorosa más allá de estas conjeturas en torno a poemas y cartas.

## Madrid, villa y Corte

En 1778 Jovellanos debe abandonar Sevilla; es llamado a la capital de las Españas para ocupar el cargo de alcalde de Casa y Corte, y se va despidiéndose de sus amigos y de la ciudad en que tantos recuerdos deja con lágrimas en los ojos y una emotiva epístola poética. Hasta aquí la serenidad de sus días. A partir de ahora la fortuna, en forma de favor real, marcará su destino con ascensos y descensos, cuyas consecuencias a duras penas intentará capear. En un principio, sin embargo, la conquista de la capital es temprana. Un Jovellanos en esplendor físico y mental, tiene 34 años, llega precedido de su buen hacer en Sevilla y, salvo alguna sombra (Olavide ha sido procesado por herejía, lo que podría hacer que se dudase de su buen nombre), los augurios, de la mano de su paisano Campomanes, que ya triunfa en Madrid, y de la confianza en el reinado de Carlos III, no pueden ser mejores. Todas las puertas se le abren: las Reales Academias de la Lengua, de la Historia, y de Bellas Artes le acogen como miembro en años consecutivos; también las Sociedades Económicas de Madrid y Asturias le quieren en su seno.

Durante más de una década mantiene una intensa actividad: participa en numerosos informes en cada organismo del que forma parte, presidiendo al poco tiempo las dos Sociedades Económicas en que está presente; redacta sus "Cartas del viaje de Asturias" durante el trayecto que le lleva a su patria chica para realizar diversas mejoras; y como consejero que es de Órdenes Militares desde 1780 se ocupa de su reforma, sobre todo en el plano educativo. No quedará tampoco la vertiente poética descuidada por entonces, involucrándose activamente en las trifulcas literarias del momento con varias sátiras, lances en los que no sale mal parado.



Francisco de Cabarrús

En el plano personal el citado encuentro con *Enarda* ha sido un fracaso. Otra mujer ocupará sus versos y su vida durante un tiempo, *Alcmena*, con la que es posible se llegase a pensar en matrimonio... Y después la nada. No volverá a escribir de amor.

Entre tanto, la década termina y con ella muere el reinado de Carlos III. En 1788 finalizaba una época, un gobierno de treinta años que había encarnado los ideales del despotismo ilustrado. Poco antes de su muerte la Sociedad Económica de Madrid encarga a Jovellanos un homenaje al rey, el titulado *Elogio de Carlos III*. En él se cantan las virtudes de sus antecesores,



Museo casa natal Jovellanos

Felipe V y Fernando VI, que abrieron el camino a su labor, cuyas gestas Jovellanos enumera mientras insiste en la necesidad de estabilizar la obra:

“No nos engañemos: la senda de las reformas, demasiado trillada, sólo hubiera conducido a Carlos III a una gloria muy pasajera, si su desvelo no hubiese buscado los modos de perpetuar en sus Estados el bien a que aspiraba.”

“Ciencias útiles, principios económicos, espíritu general de ilustración... ved aquí lo que España deberá a Carlos III.”

Bien sabía Jovellanos que la inminente sucesión era un prueba de fuego para la senda iniciada. ¿Cómo actuaría el actual Príncipe de Asturias, futuro Carlos IV?

### ***Quid verum, quid utile***

La respuesta no se hace esperar: la nueva etapa no pudo empezar peor para los intereses españoles. Vientos de revolución soplaban allende los Pirineos y azuzaban las ya de por si enfrentadas facciones hispanas. Jovellanos, que se hallaba en Salamanca inspeccionando los Colegios Militares, es informado del encarcelamiento de Francisco de Cabarrús, director del Banco de San Carlos (posterior Banco de España), y decide volver a la capital, real licencia mediante, para interceder por el que es su amigo. Las puertas, sin embargo, están cerradas para él. Se le insta a partir inmediatamente a Asturias para proseguir las misiones encomendadas respecto al examen de las minas de carbón de la tierra. En plena Revolución Francesa no interesa su presencia en la corte: es 27 de agosto de 1790

y, aunque no de manera oficial, Jovellanos está desterrado.

Los siguientes siete años son años felices, aunque pueda parecer lo contrario. Jovellanos sabrá mantenerse en un discreto segundo plano y desde Madrid no tendrán interés en inquietarle, trabaja mucho y bien en Asturias y eso beneficia a todos. La fundación del Real Instituto de Náutica y Mineralogía (*A la verdad y a la utilidad pública rezaba su blasón*) es su obra cumbre: la encarnación de sus anhelos educativos en los que, además de la indispensable formación moral y religiosa, las ciencias se unían a las letras para mayor aprovechamiento de una juventud española, de una joven nobleza, que carecía de suficientes salidas y no podía seguir ensuciando la memoria de sus antepasados:

“Si el instituto llegare a ser lo que yo pienso, él será el mejor conservador de mi memoria...”

“Aprobado todo por Su Majestad, y removidos diferentes obstáculos que se oponían a la ejecución, verifiqué, dice, la solemne instalación de aquel establecimiento y la apertura de sus estudios el 7 de Enero de 1794. A la enseñanza de las Matemáticas puras, Cosmografía y Navegación, Lenguas y Dibujo natural y científico, agregué en 1796 la de Humanidades castellanas en un plan que abrazaba, no sólo los principios de Gramática general, propiedad de la lengua, Poética y Retórica castellana, sino también los de Dialéctica y parte de Lógica que pertenece a ella”.

Pese a un final poco tuvo que luchar para su establecimiento y posterior mantenimiento. Los años corrían en controversias con la vecina Universidad de Oviedo, por tradición señera y quizás recelosa de la competencia, cuando es

requerido en Madrid. En el transcurso de estos años su viejo amigo Cabarrús ha recuperado sus influencias y conseguirá para Jovellanos el Ministerio de Gracia y Justicia...

## Las tormentas y la paz

“¡Adiós felicidad, adiós quietud para siempre!- escribía en su Diario- Empieza la bulla, la venida de amigos y la de los que quieren parecerlo; gritos, abrazos, mientras yo, abatido, voy a entrar a una carrera difícil, turbulenta, peligrosa.”

Como dijimos al comienzo, apenas nueve meses le duró el cargo. El ambiente cortesano logró malquistar a Carlos IV con su ministro, el mismo que no hacía tanto era alabado, por medio de rumores e injurias. Atrás quedaría una inacabada reforma de la Inquisición, Gijón volvía a ser el destino de Jovellanos. Era un fracaso, sí. Pero a pesar de que su cese suponía un fracaso, éste no podía tener más dulce castigo: Gijón sería de nuevo su centro de operaciones; retomaría con interés su labor en el Real Instituto. Y sin embargo este regreso a casa no era como el anterior; si antes volvía con todo el prestigio intacto, ahora lo hacía con la erosión de un hombre que ha estado en el gobierno. En el panorama europeo, además, la tensión se había elevado hasta límites insospechados, la Francia sobre la que rodasen dos cabezas regias era ya la Francia del Directorio, la futura Francia de Napoleón. Y los que se asemejaban al ideario francés estaban en cuarentena. Jovellanos, que, aunque hijo de su tiempo, no tenía en alta estima el humanitarismo roussoniano y hasta cierto punto despreciaba la propia revolución -estaba, en realidad, muy cerca de los modelos ingleses de liberalismo y lejos del vecino- no vio venir el golpe: el 13 de marzo de 1801 el regente de la Audiencia de Oviedo, con fuerte escolta, se presentaba con

Juan Malasaña junto al cadáver de su hija Manuela



una orden para apresarle. Así se iniciaba su segundo destierro, camino de Mallorca.

Una vez en la isla, primero vino su breve estancia en la Cartuja de Valldemossa, donde pasó una temporada tranquilo -quizá por eso fue breve- y disfrutando del trato de los monjes. Ajeno al bullicio pudo degustar la vida que había abandonado al decidirse por Sevilla en detrimento de Tuy en su juventud:

“Acudo a la Mesa sagrada cada quince días; he leído de segunda vez toda la Biblia; he decorado un salterio, acomodado a mi solicito, y por toda lectura piadosa tengo el mejor de los libros no canónicos, Kempis, mi antiguo amigo.”

No tardará en ser recluido en el castillo de Bellver; allí el rigor aumenta y la prisión debilita aún más a Jovellanos, quien a la estimable edad de 58 años empieza a acusar una incipiente vejez agravada por el destierro. Afortunadamente prendas no le faltaban para ganarse a la gente de su entorno y poco a poco su nueva estancia empieza a hacerse habitable. La situación cambiará de tal manera que en los dos últimos años en Bellver Jovellanos logaría seguir escribiendo (alguna pieza, como su descripción del castillo, es parte fundamental de su obra) y enviaba y recibía cartas, así como visitas.

## Los dolores de la patria

Tras el motín de Aranjuez del 19 de marzo de 1808 toma la corona el príncipe Fernando y Jovellanos, que lleva otros siete años penando en el destierro, es puesto en libertad. Parte de la isla en mayo y desembarcado en Barcelona pasa luego por Zaragoza poco antes de que ésta sea asediada. Desde el Madrid afrancesado llegarán cantos de sirena para que ocupe algún



Fernando VII

puesto de responsabilidad, muchos de sus compañeros de tantos años ya lo han hecho... mas nombrado ministro de Interior por José I -medida a la par de presión y de halago- Jovellanos se niega a aceptar; su lugar estará al lado de los suyos:

“Desde Gijón a Cádiz, desde Lisboa a Tarragona, no suena otro clamor que el de la guerra. La justicia de la causa da tanto valor a nuestras tropas como desaliento a los mercenarios que vendrán a batirlas. El dolor de la injuria, tan punzante para el honor castellano, agujará continuamente el valor y la constancia de los nuestros; y crea Vm. que cuando el triunfo [del invasor] sea posible, el conquistador verá a su trono sobre ruinas y cadáveres. Y ya no reinará sino en un desierto.”


Así lo expresa Jovellanos a Cabarrús, uno de aquellos viejos amigos que habían aceptado el poder del invasor. Él, sin embargo, ocuparía su puesto en la Junta Central, órgano que debía unificar la resistencia y regir el país hasta el regreso de Fernando VII. Nuevamente será un tiempo agridulce para el asturiano. La Junta, tras dos años de idas y venidas, deposita sus poderes en la Regencia, que se halla entonces arrinconada en Cádiz por el ejército napoleónico. Jovellanos, cansado, ansía retirarse, pero sólo se le concede un permiso temporal para volver a Gijón, único lugar donde quiere estar después de diez años de ausencia. Realiza la travesía por mar y una vez desembarcado en Asturias será informado de que su ciudad está ocupada por los franceses, noticia desafortunada que le desgarra el corazón... No obstante, el dominio no es estable y tras unos meses puede pisar su casa, maltratada por el invasor igual que su querido instituto. Esa misma inestabilidad de los frentes hará que al poco el ejército francés entre de nuevo en la urbe y Jovellanos deba volver a embarcarse. Fue su último viaje. El humilde Puerto de Vega en que recaló por culpa de una tempestad le verá fallecer el 27 de noviembre de 1811, donde recibe cristiana sepultura, descansando sus restos hasta que en 1815, finalizada la guerra, sean trasladados a su añorada ciudad.

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A portrait painting of Alfonso I d'Este, the Duke of Ferrara, by Titian. He is shown from the chest up, wearing a dark blue velvet jacket over a white ruff collar. A gold chain hangs from his neck. His hair is powdered white, and he has a full, bushy beard. The background is a mottled brown.

# Tiziano

Y las obras para Alfonso I D'este

Alvaro Rodríguez Sarmentero

## La pintura del renacimiento en Italia

El renacimiento dio a las artes la oportunidad de crear grandes conjuntos, en su mayoría destinados a obras de carácter religioso, incluso a pesar de narrar una historia profana, como es el caso de las escenas de Pinturicchio sobre la vida de Enea Silvio Piccolomini en la Biblioteca Piccolomini de la catedral de Siena. También resulta sorprendente el primer gran encargo de los Medici. En un principio, Filippo Lippi pintó un retablo para su oratorio privado de Florencia. Poco después, hacia 1460, los Medici mandaron pintar el Corfejo de los Magos sobre los muros casi carentes de ventanas.

Por lo que respecta a grandes encargos, hay que suponer que no todo el mundo tenía acceso a las obras. Las salas de reunión de las llamadas scuole se decoraron y se cuidó mucho la arquitectura que las envolvía. El esplendor de los encargos se oía más de lo que se veía, y entre los autores rivalizaban para saber quién creaba la obra más llamativa.

El renacimiento pictórico hizo que se crearan multitud de escuelas, cada una con unos rasgos independientes, lo que otorga a esta época un matiz único con piezas importantísimas y un gran legado para la historia del arte. Podemos distinguir dos grandes etapas: el quattrocento y el cinquecento.

### El Quattrocento

La pintura del quattrocento supone un avance importantísimo, pues se intenta acercar al hombre con la naturaleza mediante la perspectiva. Se trata de representar la escena según el ojo lo ve y reproducirlo con la mayor fidelidad posible.

#### Escuela de Florencia

En la primera etapa destaca el desarrollo pictórico de Florencia, aunque en ciertos aspectos impera aún la pintura de Fra Angelico.

Masaccio, un artista de corta vida, es el precursor del renacimiento pictórico con importantes obras como *La trinidad*, en Santa María Novella y los frescos de la capilla Brancacci. También destaca la pintura de Piero della Francesca pintor entre las dos partes del siglo.

### El Cinquecento

Más conocida como la pintura del pleno renacimiento, se hace más natural y vital. Se comienza a representar la figura humana como el ideal de belleza. Es el momento en el que coinciden tres genios: Miguel Ángel, Rafael y Leonardo. El primero de ellos sería el iniciador del manierismo.

### El arte Veneciano del siglo XVI

Aunque en la Europa de la época la práctica del arte era sin duda una actividad comercial más que un vehículo de expresión individual, en Venecia su naturaleza mercantil era especialmente notable. Al igual que los demás oficios que se practicaban en la ciudad, las artes estaban protegidas y controladas por el estado. Los arquitectos y escultores que labraban la piedra tenían que formar parte del Arte dei Tagliapietra, o gremio de los canteros.

A los artesanos se les reservaba también un papel en manifestaciones de carácter extraordinario, como las que siguieron a la victoria naval veneciana sobre la tropa turca en Lepanto en 1571.

Con esto hay que señalar que los gremios venecianos, a diferencia de muchos de sus homólogos de Florencia y de otras ciudades, nunca tuvieron autoridad política real. La principal ocupación de los gremios venecianos era el ejercicio diario de su oficio, y su principal efecto en los artesanos era el impacto económico. El gremio restringía el número de aprendices para cada oficio. Estas normas estaban concebidas para allanar el terreno de juego a los artistas venecianos de un nivel aceptable, pero muy distintos en cuanto a destreza y creatividad. También estaban pensadas para ofrecer a dichos artistas todas las ventajas posibles frente a la competencia exterior.

Los aspectos sociales y religiosos de la vida artesanal se centraban en la scuola, que estaba ligada al gremio. Estas funcionan como mancomunidades en miniatura. Habitualmente cada scuola tenía un altar en una iglesia parroquial o, si era especialmente rica, su propia sede para celebrar las reuniones. En cualquiera de los casos, el embellecimiento decorativo servía para mantener el honor del grupo.

A pesar de ello, a veces se entregaban dispensas especiales para otros objetivos económicos particulares. Así, el gobierno autorizó a los pintores

a trabajar en los días festivos obligatorios, sólo si estaban terminando retablos que había que trasportar por mar al extranjero. A estos artistas no les estaba permitido trabajar fuera de Venecia ni vender objetos como el cristal producidos en otro lugar.

Venecia, por sus constantes relaciones con Oriente, se ha mantenido fiel al arte Bizantino. Venecia entra en escena cuando las pinturas de Roma y Florencia llegan a la madurez. Los pintores Venecianos exaltarán el color y la naturaleza.

En Venecia los artistas no tenían modelos clásicos como sucedía en Roma, aunque esto no limitó la producción mitológica de estos autores. Por ello, la música fue el gran arte de Venecia durante siglos, al mismo tiempo que la pintura se iba desarrollando.

En aquella época, ni los letrados se dieron cuenta de lo que sucedía con la nueva visión del arte en Venecia, consecuencia de un cambio de espiritualidad y de otra manera de sentir. Las pinturas se creaban sin preparación, es decir, sin boceto alguno, al contrario de lo que hacían los artistas romanos con grandes estudios anatómicos y selecciones de movimientos en las representaciones. Lo que se proponía era pintar sobre un lienzo lo que se pinta mediante la técnica de al fresco.

El arte veneciano pasa de un color a otro difuminándose, sin diferenciaciones claras del color.

## Biografía de Tiziano

Tiziano Vecellio fue el primer pintor veneciano que alcanzó reconocimiento europeo en vida. Incluso a mediados de su carrera ya gozaba de cierto prestigio, con encargos provenientes mayoritariamente de fuera de Venecia.

No se conoce exactamente la fecha de su nacimiento, aunque en una carta a Felipe II dice que nació en 1476. Posteriormente se ha revelado que probablemente fuera una exageración del pintor y que en realidad nació en 1486, lo que sin duda contribuye a que los inicios de su carrera sigan siendo muy controvertidos. Durante más de un siglo la familia Vecellio había destacado en Cadore, un territorio veneciano. Muchos de los miembros de la familia de Tiziano fueron notarios, entre ellos su abuelo Conte.

Tiziano era el hijo mayor de Gregorio, y fue bautizado con el nombre del patrón de la familia. A los 10 años fue enviado a Venecia, a la casa de un tío suyo, para formarse como pintor. Gracias a un pintor llamado Sebastiano Zuccato, probablemente amigo de la familia, entró en contacto con el taller de Gentile Bellini y después pasó al taller Giovanni Bellini, el pintor más importante de la ciudad. En 1506 encargaron a Giorgione pintar frescos en la fachada que daba al Gran Canal del Fondaco dei Tedeschi. Tiziano fue el encargado de pintar una de las fachadas laterales.

Hoy en día de aquel proyecto solo sobrevive una figura y algunos fragmentos de Tiziano, pero los textos de quienes lo vieron aseguran que las artes de Tiziano eran superiores. Ya en 1508 tenía un estilo característico y sobre todo una capacidad para dotar de vida y movimiento a sus figuras, que Giovanni Bellini no podía igualar. Probablemente hacia 1506 había pintado Jacopo Pesaro encomendando a San Pedro, cuyas figuras recuerdan aún el estilo de Bellini, tanto en los ropajes como en las poses.

El estilo de Tiziano no denota ningún síntoma de inseguridad. El agrupamiento de las figuras es natural e informal pero grandioso, la caracterización realista, y la monumentalidad de las formas

Pieve di Cadore.

Lugar de nacimiento de Tiziano



no era igualada por ningún otro artista activo entonces en Venecia o sus alrededores. Muchos de sus cuadros tienen combinaciones de colores parecidos y comparten el mismo interés por el paisaje. Pero la escala y proporción de las figuras, así como la seguridad de dibujo, varían de un cuadro a otro, lo que sugiere que Tiziano podría haber cambiado su estilo en cuanto a las figuras en un periodo corto o que gradualmente lo iba modificando.

En mayo de 1518 quedó patente la superioridad que tenía frente al resto al presentar la obra *La asunción de la Virgen* en el altar mayor de la basílica de Santa María Gloriosa. El cuadro fue una auténtica bomba, pues se mostraba el verdadero poder innovador de Tiziano, su maestría en la representación humana. Tiziano introdujo un novedoso sistema de abordar la pintura, al tiempo que creaba para sus figuras un nuevo tipo real, a la vez amable e impresionante. Tiziano también adopta en muchas de sus obras un estilo retórico para las figuras, acentuando el movimiento exagerado, los escorzos y la musculatura prominente, y mostrándose al corriente de las últimas innovaciones artísticas de Florencia y Roma<sup>10</sup>. Estas obras parecen anticipar los ideales del siglo XVII. Los colores probablemente fueran más brillantes de lo que hoy según lo que podemos observar de las copias de sus coetáneos.

Para 1530, principalmente en sus cuadros de altar y mitológicos de gran tamaño, Tiziano había cambiado el lenguaje de la pintura veneciana, creando nuevas fórmulas que estarían en la vanguardia durante dos siglos. Tiziano también está creando un nuevo estilo figurativo, idealizado pero plausible, y un nuevo tipo de paisajes pintando directamente sobre el lienzo mientras que los principales artistas de Florencia y Roma primero lo marcaban a través del dibujo. El resultado son obras que ninguno de sus contemporáneos fueron capaces de superar.

Otro aspecto de Tiziano es su actividad como retratista. Su logro es conseguir una caracterización halagüeña y favorecedora, pues el artista pintaba a sus modelos como ellos querían aparecer, pero al mismo tiempo fijaba unos cánones para el retrato aristocrático que ejercieron influencia

10 Cuadro de La virgen de la Familia Pesaro. Hay que señalar que en cuanto a las innovaciones artísticas no se alude en momento alguno al Manierismo pues Tiziano no se corresponde con ese estilo artístico.



Alfonso I d'Este

durante siglos. Al iniciarse la década de 1530 Tiziano era el pintor más importante del norte de Italia.

Si bien no conocemos la vida doméstica de Tiziano más que el nombre de sus dos hijos y su primera esposa, lo que sí que podemos señalar son sus amigos más íntimos, el escritor Pietro Aretino y el escultor Jacopo Sansovino. El primero contribuyó notablemente a la difusión de las dotes del artista por toda Europa a través de sus cartas<sup>11</sup>, en las que hace más de 200 referencias al artista. De este modo, cortesanos y gobernantes de toda Europa querían que les retratase, pues sabían que era el mejor retratista de Italia.

Con el tiempo las técnicas de Tiziano evolucionaron, algo que se puede ver en las de contenido mitológico de su última etapa, donde las formas no están totalmente definidas, sino que están sugeridas mediante pinceladas aparentemente muy libres. Este efecto lo había usado en algunas partes de sus cuadros anteriores, pero ahora se utiliza en toda la superficie pictórica. El resultado, tal como dice Vasari, es que <<Parecían Vivos>> Tiziano no fue el único en representar las obras de éste modo; muchos artistas venecianos lo intentaron, pero ninguno con la majestuosidad a la que llegó Tiziano. Esta forma de pintar influenció a autores como Rubens o Velázquez, quienes la vieron en la colección real española.

11 Publicadas en 6 volúmenes en 1557

Usando la terminología de la época, Tiziano fue el representante del colorito<sup>12</sup>, frente a autores como Rafael o Miguel Ángel, más preocupados por el disegno<sup>13</sup>

Tiziano falleció a los 85 años de edad, el 27 de agosto de 1576, durante la mayor epidemia de peste que asoló Venecia en el siglo XVI.

## Tiziano y Ferrara

La actividad de Tiziano se había centrado en el círculo de Venecia hasta que fue conocido en Mantua y en Ferrara como un excelente pintor. Estos lugares fueron visitados muchas veces por el artista veneciano y desde entonces recibió varios encargos. Fue dado a conocer por Alfonso I d'Este (1476-1534).

Desde 1517, El duque de Ferrara había encargado a varios pintores como Rafael, Fra Bartolomeo y Dosso Dossi, la realización de un conjunto de pinturas con tema mitológico con destino a una de las estancias de su palacio, el studiolo o Camerino de alabastro<sup>14</sup>, que comenzaba a remodelar con el espacio conocido como Vía Coperta. En ese lugar iba a instalar una obra de Bellini, *el Festín de los dioses*, que poseería desde 1514. Así se uniría el castillo de San Michele, con la torre del palacio, actualmente el Palazzo Municipale.

Al menos desde 1511 el duque tenía la intención de decorar una habitación de su palacio con seis historias tal y como le cuenta el humanista Mario Equicola a Isabella d'Este, con fecha del 9 de Octubre de ese mismo año<sup>15</sup>. Es muy posible además que los encargos se los realizara en alguno de sus viajes a Roma.

Los dos ambientes más importantes de este conjunto son conocidos como *Camerini d'alabastro*. Fueron los que albergaron a lo largo del siglo XVI los relieves de Antonio Lombardo y el conjunto de pinturas de Tiziano, Bellini y Dossi, cuya dispersión comenzó en 1598, en el momento de la



Ferrara

devolución del ducado de Ferrara a los estados pontificios, llegando dos cuadros de Tiziano a la corte de Felipe IV en Madrid.

Cuando en 1517 Alfonso I d'Este decidió decorar una de las pequeñas estancias de sus aposentos de la Vía Coperta con varias pinturas, recurrió en principio a artistas como Fra Bartolomeo, al que encargó una Ofrenda a Venus.

Tiziano aparece en escena en 1518, con su *Ofrenda a Venus*, pensada como sustituto de la obra similar de Fra Bartolomeo. En 1519 sólo estarían terminados el cuadro de Bellini, *La Bacanal*, y un cuadro de Tiziano. En 1520 se le encarga a este último *Baco y Adriana* como sustitución al *Triunfo de Baco en India* de Rafael, y al año siguiente el cadorino comenzó *la Bacanal de los andrios*, pensado por el duque para remplazar el cuadro de Peregrino de San Daniele.

Para la composición de todos estos cuadros, Alfonso dio textos a los artistas de Filostrato, Ovidio y Catulo como fundamento iconográfico, dando un paso en la iconografía mitológica. Muchos de estos cuadros están inspirados en unos dibujos y estampas depositados en Mantua en los que se estudia el movimiento anatómico, los trajes y relieves antiguos, algo que se puede ver en dos de las obras de Tiziano. Lo que intentaron Tiziano y Alfonso I fue revivir la pintura de los antiguos.

Alfonso I d'Este se encuentra entre los más famosos protectores de las artes de principios de siglo XVI. Era hijo de Ercole I d'Este (1431-1505), al que se le otorga la <<adición hercúlea>>, una de las empresas urbanísticas más importantes del renacimiento.

12 Entendiendo este como en manejo de los colores brillantes

13 Creación de formas idealizadas a través del dibujo

14 Este nombre se debe a los relieves de Antonio Lombardo que albergó

15 A. Luzio y R. Renier, <<La colturae le relazioni letterarie di Isabella d'Este Gonzaga>> 1899 pp 8

La obra de Alfonso es un ejemplo de interés cultural. Quería reconstruir un ambiente all'antica desde el punto de vista de la escultura y a través de los objetos de la colección que imitaban a lo antiguo.

Su gobernación sobre Ferrara se compara con la de Pericles en Atenas, al menos en lo que se refiere al cultivo de las bellas artes. De ahí las inspiraciones de Atenea como diosa protectora.

## Obras de Tiziano para Alfonso I d'Este

### *La Ofrenda a Venus*

En su primer encargo de 1519, Tiziano actuó con prudencia. Su punto de partida fue la propia composición de Fra Bartolomeo, cuyo dibujo le fue enviado a Venecia como modelo por Alfonso. Este conjunto de ninfas que rodean la escultura se concibió para dar máxima importancia a Venus. Tiziano evitó esto y la retiró de su ubicación inicial, situándola en un lateral, copando todo el protagonismo los amorcillos que se extienden por el prado.

La inspiración literaria de la obra procede del libro *Imágenes*, del escritor griego Filostrato, quien al inicio de su descripción resalta el tema de la aglomeración y del elevado número de amorcillos:

<<No te sorprenda su número. Son hijos de las ninfas y gobiernan a todos los mortales, y son muchos porque muchas son las cosas que aman los hombres>>

La colorista escena que nos presenta Filostrato es también la que se nos muestra a través de las descripciones de Filostrato, de los dorados, rojos y amarillos de las manzanas y de los variadísimos colores de los erotes. Filostrato también habla de la existencia de cuatro erotes destacados, apareciendo también en la pintura de Tiziano.

El único momento en el que Tiziano no se muestra fiel al texto es en el momento en el que unos erotes persiguen a una liebre. Según dice el autor clásico:

<<Los erotes lo persiguen y se precipitan tras él, uno batiendo palmas, otro gritando, un tercero agitando su clámide; unos vuelan por encima de la liebre, otros siguen su rastro a pie; toma uno impulsos para lanzar sobre ella, pero la bestezuela hace un regate y consigue

escapar en el momento en que otro, Eros intenta agarrarla por una pata>>.

El artista siguió con fidelidad el texto de Filostrato, más que las ideas esbozadas por Fra Bartolomeo en lo que se refiere a Venus y sus ninfas:

<<Fíjate en Afrodita. ¿Dónde está? ¿Debajo del manzano? ¿Ves la gruta que hay en esa roca de donde mana una corriente del más profundo azul, fresca y potable, que se distribuye en regueros para alimentar los manzanos?>>

A pesar de seguir el texto de Filostrato, a Tiziano no le fue impedimento alguno para realizar una extraordinaria pintura. Los frutos del amor que se presentan y las historias que se cuentan no son más que deseos que se rigen por un elemento unificador como es el amor divino, tal como dice el autor:

<<Dicen que hay un amor celeste que rige los asuntos divinos>>

Isabel de Este. Mecenas de Tiziano. Retratada por Tiziano.





La bacanal de los Andrios. Tiziano

La escultura de Afrodita que Tiziano nos muestra es la Afrodita Urania o Venus Celeste, una de las dos versiones de la diosa del amor que admitía la filosofía neoplatónica.

En el fondo de la obra se abre un fondo compuesto que supone la visión de la costa. Es el paralelo naturalista al prado donde se desarrollaban los juegos, luchas y escarceos de los erotes. Una vez más la naturaleza juega un papel muy importante en el programa decorativo que el duque pensó para su camerino de Ferrara.

El éxito de esta pintura y de la que sigue a esta, *Baco y Adriana*, abrió las puertas a Tiziano para componer la mejor obra de las que tenía que entregar al duque.

### ***La Bacanal de los Andrios***

*La Bacanal de los Andrios* era uno de los cinco cuadros que debían decorar el segundo camerino de alabastro o studiolo de Alfonso I d'Este.

Como en la pintura anterior, es de nuevo el libro de Filóstrato la fuente utilizada por el artista. Según su descripción <<La corriente de vino que asola la isla de Andros y los andrios que se han emborrachado de vino son el tema de esta pintura>> Se trata de una llamada de atención ante los efectos positivos del vino y la ebriedad por medio del tema del canto y la música; la bebida exalta los efectos de riqueza, dadivosidad y conciencia de la propia belleza.

Las personas que dominan la composición visten unas con atuendos contemporáneos de la época de Tiziano, mientras que otras van desnudas. La explicación de ello está también en parte en el texto de Filóstrato:

<<Si seguimos adelante más allá de los grupos de bebedores, acabamos por encontrar en la desembocadura de los Tritones, que recogen vino en sus conchas, unos beben, otros soplan en sus instrumentos marinos y otros ya borrachos cantan>>.

Las figuras vestidas que cantan, danzan o, re-costadas, beben y portan una flauta, son los habitantes de Andros, mientras que los desnudos masculinos de la derecha y el del centro se refieren a los tritones y otras figuras mitológicas. Tiziano ha destacado con claridad el fondo en el que se ve la nave de Dionisos, pero ha introdu-




Carlos V. Su imperio impresionó a Tiziano,  
lo que le hizo trasladarse a España.

cido tres figuras que no aparecen en el cuadro descrito por Filóstrato. La extraordinaria figura de la mujer desnuda del primer plano es la única cuyo cuerpo podemos observar en su integridad en las pinturas. Es sin duda uno de los habitantes de Andros, ya dormida por los efectos del vino y el cansancio del baile. Su figura se basa en un sarcófago antiguo encontrado en Mantua, aunque es una derivación de la Venus de Giorgione, cuyo paisaje fue terminado por el propio Tiziano.

La contraposición de esta figura hay que establecerla con el otro dormido de la escena, el viejo dios río, que igualmente ha sufrido los efectos del vino y que es el origen de la corriente, pues su mano expresa un racimo de uvas del que surge un flujo voluminoso. Filóstrato se refiere a él de la siguiente manera:

<<Vemos en la pintura lo siguiente: el río, presa de gran atención, yace sobre un lecho de racimos, vertiendo vino puro; junto a él cre-



La ofrenda a Venus. Tiziano

cen tirso, del mismo modo que lo hacen las cañas junto a los ríos del agua>>

Tiziano logró exaltar los efectos desinhibidores, creativos y purificadores de la belleza de la música, el canto, la danza, y la bebida, asuntos una vez más de profunda raigambre clásica. El vino es sin duda el protagonista de la composición, por ello justo en su punto central y recortada sobre una nube, aparece una jarra de vidrio de Murano que llama la atención al espectador; jarras, copas, cuencos aparecen densamente representados en la composición.

## Presencia de Tiziano en la España del Siglo de Oro

Quien insistió en presentar a Tiziano en la corte española fue Isabella d'Este. Tiziano realizó un primer retrato que hoy se encuentra desaparecido. Carlos V reconoció la superioridad del artista tanto moral como en sus dotes pictóricas, llegando a ser nombrado el Apeles del siglo mediante una real cedula en la que también se le conceden honores imperiales.

Las relaciones de Tiziano con la casa real persistieron hasta su muerte en 1576, después de pintar a multitud de nobles del tiempo como Fernando de Austria, la emperatriz Isabel o todos los retratos del heredero Felipe, siendo éstos los más conservados en la actualidad. El afecto que tenía a los monarcas españoles no solo era personal, sino dinástico, y se ilusionó con la idea del imperio universal que a punto llegó con Carlos V. Esto fue retratado en una pintura en la que aparece España defendiendo a la Religión.

Tiziano es nombre usual en la literatura y en la crónica española, y su presencia en la historia de nuestra pintura es constante desde que obras suyas fueron llegando a nuestro país, siendo conocidas y admiradas rápidamente.

Las pinturas religiosas fueron sin duda alguna las más conocidas y las que de modo más directo y temprano pudieron ejercer su influencia sobre nuestros artistas.

Lope de Vega es testigo de excepción de lo que ocurre en la España del momento y comenta en *Virtud, pobreza y mujer*:

<<Imágenes tenía que no eran del mundo, ni del Bassan ni del Tiziano>>

Estas menciones en la literatura se hacen frecuentes entre el siglo XVI y XVII, y aun no resultando significativas nos dan una idea del prestigio del que gozaba Tiziano entre las gentes de cultura, siendo para estos el pintor por excelencia. Se habla de Tiziano en obras como *La quinta Florencia*, *La Viuda Valenciana*, o en *La Dorotea*.

Tiziano ejerció una fuerza a diferentes artistas como Pablo Schepers o Roland de Mois, quien se inspiró en sus retratos. Aunque quizás el más importante es El Greco, considerado discípulo de Tiziano. Esta vinculación puede apreciarse en la producción del cretense en muy diversos grabados. El Greco por el contrario vive en otro mundo donde el gozar de los sentidos ha desaparecido.



# cuentos del extremo oriente

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Pedro Díaz San Miguel

# CUENTOS DE CHINA

## La leyenda del dragón y el ave fénix

Cuando todavía las aguas no estaban controladas y los ríos en su desborde arrasaban los campos, la diosa madre procreó benéficos descendientes que terminaron ordenando ese caos diluvial.

Trabajando en el control de los ríos, de los lagos, del mar y de las nubes, los brillantes dragones navegaron por las aguas y el cielo. Con zarpas de tigre y garras de águila, rasgaban con estruendo las cortinas de lo alto que chispeando ante el descomunal embate dejaban en libertad a las lluvias. Ellos dieron cauce a los ríos, contención a los lagos y profundidad a los mares.

Hicieron cavernas de las que brotaba el agua y por conductos subterráneos las llevaron muy lejos para que surgieran de pronto, sin que el asalto abrasador del sol las detuviera.

Trazaron las líneas que se ven en las montañas para que la energía de la tierra fluyera, equilibrando la salud de ese cuerpo gigantesco. Y muy frecuentemente tuvieron que luchar con las obstrucciones que provocaban los dioses y los hombres ocupados en sus irresponsables afanes. De sus fauces brotaba como un humo la niebla, vivificante y húmeda, creadora de mundos irreales.

Con sus escamosos cuerpos serpentinos cortaban las tempestades y dividían los tifones. Con sus poderosos cuernos; con sus afilados dientes, ningún obstáculo era suficiente, ningún enredo podía permanecer. Y gustaban de aparecerse a los mortales.

A veces en los sueños, a veces en las grutas, a veces en el borde de los lagos, porque en éstos solían tener sus escondidas moradas de cristal en las que bellos jardines se ornaban con frutos destellantes y con las piedras más preciosas.

El Long inmortal, el dragón celeste, siempre puso su actividad (su Yang) al servicio del Tao y el Tao lo reconoció permitiéndole estar en todas las cosas, desde lo más grande a lo más pequeño, desde el gran universo hasta la partícula insignificante.

Todo ha vivido gracias al Long. Nada ha permanecido inmutable salvo el Tao innombrable, porque aún el Tao nombrable muda y se transforma gracias a la actividad del Long. Y ni aún los que creen en el Cielo y el Infierno pueden asegurar su permanencia. Pero el Long ama al Feng, al ave Fénix que concentra el germen de las cosas, que contrae aquello que el Long estira.

Y cuando el Long y el Feng se equilibran el Tao resplandece como una perla bañada en la luz más pura. No lucha el Long con el Feng porque se aman, se buscan haciendo resplandecer la perla. Por ello, el sabio arregla su vida conforme al equilibrio entre el Dragón y el Fénix que son las imágenes de los sagrados principios del Yang y el Ying.

El sabio se emplaza en el lugar vacío buscando el equilibrio. El sabio comprende que la no-acción genera la acción y que la acción genera la no-acción. Que el corazón de los vivientes y las aguas del mar, que el día y la noche, que el invierno y el verano, se suceden en el ritmo que para ellos marca el Tao.

Al fin de esta edad, cuando el universo haya llegado a su gran estiramiento, volverá a contraerse como piedra que cae.

Todo, hasta el tiempo, se invertirá volviendo al principio. El Dragón y el Fénix se reencontrarán. El Yang y el Ying se compenetrarán, y será tan grande su atracción que absorberán todo en el germe vacío del Tao. El cielo es alto, la tierra es baja; con esto están determinados lo creativo y lo receptivo... con esto se revelan los cambios y las transformaciones.

Pero nadie puede saber realmente cómo han sido ni cómo serán las cosas, y si alguien lo supiera no podría explicarlo. El que sabe que no sabe es el más grande; el que pretende que sabe pero no sabe, tiene la mente enferma. El que reconoce la mente enferma como que está enferma, no tiene la mente enferma.

El sabio no tiene la mente enferma porque reconoce a la mente enferma como la mente enferma.



## El profesor que renunció

Por tener buen sentido del humor, al intelectual Tang le gustaba hacer chistes. El profesor de una escuela, cercana a la casa de Tang, solía negar la existencia de los fantasmas diciendo: "Los budistas inventan fantasmas para asustar a la gente. ¿Dónde están esos fantasmas?"

Una noche Tang tiró arena a la ventana del profesor y, a la vez que daba gritos horribles, golpeaba su puerta; el maestro casi muere del susto; preguntó quién era y Tang le respondió: "Soy la encarnación de las energías Yin y Yang del universo."

El hombre llamó a dos alumnos para que lo acompañaran y, temblando, se tapó la cabeza con la manta. Al día siguiente, sintió dolor y cansancio en todo el cuerpo, no pudiendo levantarse de la cama. Cuando los amigos fueron a visitarlo, él sólo atinó a gemir, diciendo: "Los fantasmas sí existen."

Todo el mundo se burló del maestro, pero, después de ese día, todas las noches, realmente vinieron fantasmas. Al principio la gente imaginó que todavía Tang estaba con sus chistes, pero no era así. El profesor abandonó el puesto y regresó a su pueblo nativo. Tal vez, después del susto, había perdido la energía positiva para resistir a la malignidad de los fantasmas.

# CUENTOS DE COREA

## La leyenda de la Pagoda Seoka

Frente al santuario principal del templo Bulguksa, en Gyeongju, la milenaria capital del reino de Silla, se alzan una al lado de la otra dos torres de piedra muy bellas, pero de lo más dispares. Son la torre Dabo, que se caracteriza por su diseño adornado y barroco, y la torre Seoka, que es, en cambio, pura sencillez y minimalismo. Siendo tan diferentes, ambas fueron erigidas por un mismo escultor a mediados del siglo VIII. La Pagoda de Seoka es conocida también como la “torre sin sombra”, debido a una famosa leyenda que se cuenta sobre su construcción.

Según la leyenda, ambas torres fueron labradas por un artista originario de Baekje llamado Asadal. Gracias al extraordinario talento para trabajar la piedra que poseía, se le encargó la construcción de las dos pagodas principales del templo Bulguksa. Asadal se entregó en cuerpo y alma a su arte y al cabo de algunos años, terminó la torre de Dabo, que despertó la admiración de todo el mundo por su extraordinaria elegancia y hermosura. De inmediato, se sumergió en la erección de la segunda torre, la torre Seoka. Mientras Asadal estaba completamente embebido en su trabajo, en su tierra natal, en el reino de Baekje, lo esperaba con ansias su esposa Asanyeo. Sin embargo, los años de espera habían terminado por colmar su paciencia y no pudiendo soportar más la añoranza que sentía por su marido, Asanyeo se puso en camino y llegó después de muchos avatares hasta la entrada del templo Bulguksa. Cuando estaba a sólo unos metros de ver por fin a su añorado esposo, el monje a cargo del templo le prohibió terminantemente el paso. “Este templo es sagrado y ningún ser impuro puede franquearlo hasta que esté totalmente finalizado. Tu presencia podría llamar a la mala fortuna y provocar una desgracia. Debes alejarte de aquí.” Asanyeo le explicó su situación y le suplicó que le permitiera ver a su marido, aunque fuera sólo por unos instantes. Sin embargo, el monje fue inflexible, pues temía que Asadal perdiera la concentración artística si veía a su mujer. De todos modos, conmovido por el amor que la mujer sentía por su esposo, le hizo la siguiente sugerencia: “Cerca de aquí,

hay un lago llamado “Yeongji”, donde se refleja el templo Bulguk. Cuando veas que se refleja en la superficie del agua una nueva torre, sabrás que tu marido ha terminado su trabajo y que podrás reunirte con él.” Asanyeo le dio las gracias y se fue a vivir a las orillas del lago, donde, en efecto, se podía ver reflejado el templo en su totalidad. Los días, luego los meses y luego los años fueron pasando, sin que una nueva torre apareciera en la superficie del agua. Asanyeo fue perdiendo la esperanza y una noche, engañada por los reflejos plateados de la luna, se tiró al lago creyendo que abrazaba a Asadal.

Un tiempo después, Asadal terminó la torre Seoka, que fue considerada por todos una obra maestra. El monje a cargo del templo le contó entonces que su mujer había venido a buscarlo unos años antes. Deseoso de reencontrarse con Asanyeo, Asadal se dirigió rápidamente al lago, pero allí no quedaba un sólo rastro de ella. En la superficie del agua se reflejaba todo el templo menos la torre Seoka, debido a que quedaba tapada por la torre Dabo. Presintiendo lo que había pasado, Asadal lloró a su mujer con gran dolor. Desde entonces, lloviera, tronara o nevara, en lugar de volverse a su tierra natal, Asadal vagaba por las orillas del lago añorando a su mujer. Un noche de luna llena le pareció que una silueta humana se recortaba sobre el lago. Creyendo que era Asanyeo, fue corriendo a abrazarla. Sin embargo, cuando llegó, comprobó que se trataba sólo de una roca. Al día siguiente, para consolarse, comenzó a tallar en la superficie de la roca la imagen que guardaba en la memoria de Asanyeo. Cuando terminó su trabajo se dio cuenta de que no había tallado a su mujer, sino a Buda. No pudiendo soportar por más tiempo la ausencia de Asanyeo, se tiró al lago como queriendo abrazar el reflejo de esta roca en el agua. Conmovidos por el profundo y trágico amor que se había demostrado esta pareja, la gente comenzó a llamar a la torre Seoka como “la torre sin sombra” y a la torre Dabo como “la torre con sombra” y conservó la memoria de este amor durante siglos hasta nuestros días.

## Heungbu y Nolbu

Érase una vez en que vivieron unos hermanos llamados Heungbu y Nolbu

El hermano mayor, Nolbu, era tan malvado y codicioso que hacía cualquier cosa a su antojo. Pero el hermano menor, Heungbu, era bondadoso.

Heungbu y Nolbu también vivieron juntos después de casarse.

En cuanto los padres fallecieron, Nolbu expulsó a la familia de Heungbu para que sólo él poseyera su fortuna.

“¡Ahora mismo sal de esta casa!”

Pero Heungbu, bondadoso, no reprochó a su hermano (mayor).

Heungbu construyó una choza pequeña y trabajó mucho.

Pero él no sólo no tenía fortuna alguna, sino que tenía muchos hijos, por eso era muy pobre.

“Mamá, tengo hambre” “Papá, dame algo de comer, por favor”

Heungbu suplicó a Nolbu después de visitarlo.

“Un poquito de grano de cebada para mis hijos, por favor...”

Pero Nolbu le dejó decir sin prestar atención. Entonces, la esposa de Nolbu salió de la cocina. “Vaya, ¿Quieres grano de cebada?” La esposa de Nolbu le dio una bofetada “plaf” a Heungbu con el cucharón. Heungbu volvió débilmente con las manos vacías.

Llegó la calurosa la primavera.

Las golondrinas anidaron y pusieron huevos debajo del alero de la casa de Heungbu pobre.

Un día en el nido de la golondrina apreció un boa.

¡Uy! Aquella boa.....

Heungbu expulsó a la boa rápidamente pero antes había herido a una golondrina en la pierna. Heungbu cuidó la golondrina con todo corazón.

Nada más llegar el otoño, las golondrinas dieron una vuelta alrededor de la casa de Heungbu ágilmente y volaron muy lejos hacia el cielo.

Cuando llegó la primavera los pájaros cantaban.

“Pío, pío”

El canto de una golondrina se oyó en alguna parte y (el marido dijo a su mujer)

¡Oye, las golondrinas regresaron!

“Cariño, también tiraron las semillas de la calabaza”

Entonces, Heungbu la sembró bajo una valla con todo corazón.



De ahí germinó un retoño verde y empezó a crecer a ojo vista.

Después de unos días, la esposa de Heungbu gritó mirando al techo.

"Cariño, ven aquí"

¡Las calabazas cuelgan en racimos!

Ese día, la familia de Heungbu se reunió en un patio.

"Bueno, vamos a cortarlas en dos ahora mismo."

Heungbu y su esposa empezaron a cortarlas en dos. Heungbu cantó alegramente.

"Vamos a cerrarlas rozándolas ligeramente"

¡Que consigamos una calabaza grande!

Si la cortamos en dos, mi familia no tendrá hambre.

Apenas la partió, el arroz blanco emergió.

De la segunda calabaza salieron los tesoros.

Una vez Nolbu oyó la noticia de Heungbu, le envidió.

Si curara las patas de la golondrina, me haría rico. Entonces Nolbu rompió las patas de una golondrinita y en seguida se las curó.

Con lo cual una golondrina también trajo la semilla de la calabaza a la casa de Nolbu.

"Jajaja, Nuestra familia será la más rica en el mundo"

Nolbu siguió bailando de alegría y el matrimonio Nolbu siguió cortando las calabazas en dos y vieron que en ella había agua con excrementos "Dios mío, por avaricioso lo hemos perdido todo."

Partió la primera calabaza. En este momento se inundaron del agua con excremento.

"Madre mía.... ¿Qué es esto?"

De la segunda calabaza salieron monstruos y golpearon al matrimonio Nolbu con palos.

Y de la tercera salieron demonios y rompieron la casa de Nolbu.

"Dios mío... Lo he perdido todo, todo, todo, todo....."

El matrimonio se apeó del burro.

"¡Parece que codiciamos demasiado!"

Y ellos fueron a casa de Heungbu y luego le pidieron perdón.

Heungbu acogió cariñosamente al matrimonio.

"Hermano, vamos a vivir juntos durante mucho tiempo"

Heungbu y Nolbu vivieron íntimamente.

## CUENTOS DE JAPÓN

### El mito de la vida y la muerte: Izanagi e Izanami

Izanagi e Izanami descendieron un día a la superficie de la tierra, construyendo primero una columna celestial y a su alrededor un palacio. Despues comenzaron a girar en sentido opuesto en torno a esa columna hasta encontrarse, pero Izanami dijo palabras de amor a Izanagi en primer lugar, mientras giraban a su alrededor y de aquí procede la tradición japonesa de la noche de bodas en la que debe ser siempre el varón el primero en hablar. El hijo de ambos, Hiruko, nació débil en demasía y fue abandonado a las aguas en una balsa; después tuvieron una hija que tampoco les satisfizo y que convirtieron en la isla Awa que está en la costa de Osaka. Poco contentos con aquellos dos primeros hijos, fueron al Cielo a consultar con las divinidades, quienes concluyeron que aquellos nacimientos habían sido nefastos porque Izanami había hablado antes que el varón. De nuevo en la tierra, repitiendo la ceremonia correctamente, ya que Izanagi fue ahora el primero en decir las palabras de amor, tuvieron los catorce hijos que formaron las ocho grandes islas y las seis menores de Japón.

Tras haber creado las catorce islas, dieron vida a las diez divinidades:

O-wata-tsumi , dios del mar; al matrimonio Hayaaki-ts-iko y Hayaaki-Tsu-hime, dioses de los ríos y padres de los ocho dioses del agua; Shima-ts-hiko, dios del viento; Kukuno-chi, dios de los árboles; O-yama-tsumi, dios de las montañas y Kayanu-hime, diosa de los llanos, padres de otros ocho dioses de la tierra; al dios Ameno-tori-bune; O-getsu-hime, diosa de los alimentos; y a Kagu-tsuchi, dios del fuego, el último de los diez hijos divinos.

Pero la creación de Kagu-tsuchi fue horrible para Izanami, quien, devorada por el fuego, cayó postrada en terrible y mortal agonía de la que nacieron el dios y la diosa monte-metálico, el dios y la diosa del barro, el dios de la cosecha y la diosa serpiente de agua.


Al ver morir a su amada Izanami de aquella terrible manera, el marido divino echó a llorar



desconsolado, pero las lágrimas del viudo Izanagi todavía servirían para dar vida a la diosa del llanto. Pasado aquel primer momento de desconsuelo, Izanagi se encolerizó con el hijo que fuera causa de la muerte de Izanami y cortó la cabeza del Espíritu del Fuego con su espada, acabando con su vida, pero haciendo también el doble prodigo de que su sangre diera vida a otras ocho nuevas divinidades, del fuego, de las rocas, triturador de las raíces, triturador de las rocas, de la lluvia, del sol, del viento, de los valles, y que de las partes del Espíritu de Kagutsuchi - el Dios del Fuego - se hiciera nacer a otras tantas nuevas divinidades de las montañas, protectoras de caminos, de laderas, del refugio, de la oscuridad, de los bosques, etc. Pero todo ello no llegaba a consolar al doliente Izanagi, que quería recuperar a su perdida esposa a cualquier precio; así que decidió descender a los infiernos y allí la encontró; pero también supo por sus palabras que la infeliz Izanami ya había comido de la mesa del país de los muertos y que, por lo tanto, no podía abandonar jamás aquel recinto infausto, si no fuera con la especial licencia del dios del infierno. Con aquella promesa, Izanami desapareció en el negro interior. Pasaba el tiempo y la amada no regresaba, así que Izanagi tomó una púa de un peine, la prendió fuego, a modo de tea, y se metió por el mismo camino por el que había visto pasar antes a Izanami. Allí la encontró, entre los ocho dioses del trueno - de aspecto bastante terrible -, que habían nacido del cuerpo de su amada. Izanagi quedó aterrado, más aún, al escuchar la invectiva que le lanzaba Izanami, por haberla humillado con aquella contemplación de su metamorfosis infernal.

Al grito de la indignada Izanami acudieron los seres infernales, pero el astuto Izanagi lanzó a tiempo su corona al suelo, y ésta milagrosamente se transformó en un racimo de jugosas uvas que los demonios, siempre hambrientos e insaciables, se detuvieron a recoger; después volvieron a correr tras él, pero Izanagi lanzó las púas que quedaban en su peine, que ahora se convirtieron en brotes de bambú tierno, y los demonios volvieron a detenerse, recogiéndolas con gula; pero los brotes se acabaron y los infernales seres siguieron en pos de Izanagi, ahora acompañados de los ocho dioses del trueno, al mando de una horda de mil quinientos demonios que la humillada Izanami había mandado en auxilio de sus estúpidos súbditos. Izanagi, sin dejar de

uir, blandía la espada a su espalda, matando a todo el que se acercaba demasiado, y así prosiguió, hasta llegar a Izumo, donde está la boca del infierno, en donde pudo recoger tres melocotones maduros que arrojó contra sus muchos perseguidores, consiguiendo ponerlos a todos en fuga. Agradecido, Izanagi paró, tomó aliento y habló a los melocotones que le habían salvado la vida: "Al igual que habéis ayudado a Izanagi, ayudad a los hombres del Japón cuando estén necesitados de auxilio". En ese momento, los melocotones quedaron convertidos en frutos divinos. Pero la propia Izanami se había puesto tan furiosa al ver que todos le fallaban, que ella misma salió a acabar con el que fuera su marido amado en la vida, porque ahora ya no era la esposa, sino que se había transformado en la mayor diosa del infierno, pero el veloz Izanagi supo cerrar la entrada del infierno con una enorme roca, pero no totalmente, de modo que cuando llegó Izanami, ella pudo todavía amenazarle, anunciando que se vengaría de él, matando en un solo día a mil seres humanos; pero Izanagi no se inmutó ante las tremendas palabras de Izanami y le respondió que si ella mataba a mil hombres, el haría nacer a otros mil quinientos, y tapó del todo la entrada con la divina roca, la que impide la entrada a la casa de los muertos.



por un monje budista y varios monjes súbditos. Y aunque los onbi se calmaron, seguían dándose episodios ocasionalmente.

Por la comarca deambulaba un mendigo ciego con un biwa (laúd japonés), que cantaba los cantares y las épicas más preciosas que se habían podido ver nunca en Japón. Su arte, su sensibilidad y su interpretación, arrancaban todo tipo de sentimientos de los que escuchaban. Pero el hombre Hoichi era muy, muy pobre. El monje de Amidaji, conmovido por la calidad de su interpretación, le ofreció vivir en el templo a cambio de sus magistrales actuaciones. Así que Hoichi vivía en el templo, y todas las noches recitaba para los bonzos algunas de las líricas japonesas más hermosas.

Una noche el sacerdote tuvo que salir del templo, mientras el músico estaba sentado en la parte trasera del jardín del palacio por el fuerte calor que hacía. Allí estaba con su biwa, recitando versos, cuando oyó unos pasos que se acercaban por el jardín. Hoichi dijo, con actitud arrogante, sin cortesía ni respeto, por lo que el ciego pensó que se trataba de alguien importante, de algún samurái.

El hombre le dijo que le siguiera, que tendría que recitar para alguien importante. Hoichi tenía dudas, pero negar la voluntad de un samurái podía traer terribles consecuencias. Así que sintió

## Hoichi sin orejas

Corrían los tiempos de la gran guerra civil japonesa allá por 1600, cuando las familias de samuráis Heike y Genji se enfrentaron en una cruentísima batalla en la cual los Heike fueron masacrados, incluido el samurai Antoku, por los Genji. Fue en la batalla de Dan no Ura, de la cual se escribió un cántico de 6 actos que narraba la batalla y su brutal resultado. A partir de entonces en Akamagaseki, donde se produjo tal batalla, cerca del mar, se veían "onbi" que asustaban a los habitantes.

Onbi es un fuego espiritual, algo así como un fuego fantasmagórico que brota de los espíritus (es la visión mitológica de los fantasmas en Japón, una pálida llama que deambula.) Para ahuyentar y calmar el fuego de los espíritus sueltos se construyó un santuario-cementerio para los heiki, con el fin de que pudiesen hallar la paz, así como el templo de Amidaji, regentado



que alguien tomaba su mano y le hacía seguirle rápidamente. Sintió cómo caminaba, cómo alguien corría la aldaba de un portón y le hacía entrar a un palacio. Allí le pidieron que cantara la lirica de Dan no Ura, que narraba la batalla de los Heiki contra los Genji.

Tan maravillosa y visceral fue su interpretación que sintió como a su alrededor los asientes lloraban y gemían con el cántico. Después alguien le acompañó de vuelta al templo, sin que nadie se diera cuenta. Tuvo órdenes de hacer lo mismo durante 6 días y de no decir a nadie lo que iba a hacer.

Al día siguiente, le ocurrió otra vez lo mismo, y el monje patrón del templo se percató de su huida y temió algo terrible.

A la tercera noche, mandó que alguien siguiera a Hoichi, pero dada la oscuridad y la rapidez con la que salió del jardín le perdieron al poco rato. Pero esto fue lo que llamó la atención del monje. Hoichi era ciego y no podía caminar tan rápido por el jardín del templo, lo que significaba que alguien tiraba de él.

Así que comenzaron a ir por la comarca, preguntando a todo el mundo si habían visto a Hoichi. Pero nadie le había visto. Fue encontrado en el cementerio de los Heiki, tocando de forma encolerizada el canto de Dan no Ura alrededor de los Onbi. Así que temiendo que hubiera sido hechizado por los Heiki, los sacerdotes sacaron a Hoichi de allí a la fuerza y lo devolvieron al templo. Presionaron al ciego para que contase

su secreto, y al final reveló todo. Todo era una ilusión, él imaginó los ruidos y los murmullos porque había sido hechizado.

Y como era ciego no podía saber si eran espíritus o personas quienes tiraban de él y aplaudían sus cantos. Dijeron que si seguía haciendo eso durante las noches al final los espíritus se apoderarían de su alma y le descuartizarían. Así que el maestro monje urdió un plan. Tendría que sentarse en el jardín del templo como todas las noches y estar en absoluto silencio, sin decir ni gritar nada, en situación de meditación. Los monjes le desnudaron y escribieron sobre todo su cuerpo, incluidas las palmas de las manos y las plantas de los pies, el sutra (oración budista) de "Hanna Shin Kyou" para alejar a los espíritus malignos.

Cuando estaban terminando de escribir todo el sutra el maestro monje recibió una llamada para un funeral y tuvo que abandonar el templo. Hoichi hizo como le dijeron: se sentó a meditar en el jardín desnudo y con todo el cuerpo cubierto con un sutra. Cuando llegaron los espíritus y Hoichi escuchó los pasos en el jardín, su pulso empezó a acelerarse y empezó a sentir mucho pánico.

Pero los espíritus no podían verle debido al sutra que tenía escrito. Gritaban su nombre pero el ciego atemorizado no respondió. Gritaban encolerizados por haber revelado el secreto. Desafortunadamente, los sacerdotes, al tenerse que ir el maestro que supervisaba la escritura del

sutra, olvidaron escribir sobre sus orejas, por lo que los espíritus de Heike solo veían las orejas de Hoichi. Se las arrancaron de cuajo, para luego descuartizarlas. El pobre Hoichi sintió un dolor terrible, pero no gritó por miedo a que los espíritus le encontraran.

Así el pobre Hoichi se quedó sin orejas. El maestro sacerdote al llegar se lamentó por no haber cubierto sus orejas. Le curaron y le cuidaron hasta que la cicatriz se cerró. Hoichi había quedado liberado del hechizo, pero a cambio había perdido sus orejas. Por eso en la comarca le llamaban "mimi nashi Hochi" el músico sin orejas.

## CUENTOS DE MONGOLIA

### La derrota del rey

Esta era una vez el rey de un país que hizo colgar un aviso un día: –Al niño capaz de decirme una buena mentira le daré un gran premio–. Oyeron esto los nobles y oficiales de la corte y fueron sus hijos a contar toda clase de mentiras al rey, pero ninguna le agradaba. En el mismísimo final apareció un muchacho pobre.

–Y tú, ¿a qué has venido? –preguntó el rey.

–Mi padre me mandó a que cobrara una deuda que Su Majestad tiene con él.

–Con tu padre no hay ninguna deuda, tú mientes –contestó el rey.

–Si realmente he mentido, si le he dicho algo falto de fundamento, entrégüeme entonces el premio.

El rey se dio cuenta del ardid y repuso con prontitud:

–Me parece que todavía no has dicho ninguna mentira.

–Si yo no he mentido, entonces pague su deuda –acometió el muchacho. Al rey no le quedó más remedio que mandarlo a casa entregándole oro y frutas como había prometido.

### Cuento de los tontos

En tiempos lejanos vivía un viejito con su viejita. El viejito le pegaba siempre a la viejita gritándole: –¿Tú por qué no me has parido un niño?

Un día que el viejito había salido, la viejita agarró un ratón, lo envolvió en una zamarra y lo acostó en la cama. Sólo que cuando el viejo regresó, le preguntó: –¿Y eso, qué es?–, a lo cual respondió la viejita: –Hoy parí un niño–. –Magnífico – respondió el viejito muy contento. Miró al niño y preguntó: –¿Por qué pariste un niño tan peludo?–, y contestó ella: –Tiene ya lista su chaqueta para ir a montarles guardia a los caballos de noche.

–Sí, ¿y por qué lo pariste con esa cola?– insistió el viejito.

–Tiene ya lista su urga para ir a por caballos.

–¿Y por qué lo pariste hasta con barba?

–Tiene ya lista su barba para cuando sea oficial.


–Pero si hasta dientes tiene.

–Tiene ya listos sus dientes para comer riñón.

De todas maneras, el viejito estaba muy contento. Hablaron de lavar al niñito y el viejito se lo llevó para ir a lavarlo él mismo. Volvió inmediatamente llorando: –Perdí al niño en el agua–. La viejita dijo: –¿Y qué voy a hacer yo ahora? Parirte un niño, yo te lo parí. Es culpa tuya si no lo supiste cuidar bien, por lo que no me vayas a pegar más–. Y cuentan que el viejo dejó de pegarle desde entonces.



# CORCEL LITERARIO



Todo hombre sensitivo que sufre la condena de nacer en un siglo inmoral (es decir, en una sociedad cuya moral es negar todo tipo de moral), ha tendido siempre, influenciado por su propia naturaleza trascendente, a buscar el reposo y la esperanza que sólo concede la Idea. ¿Acaso existe otra forma de unir, en la vivencia del ser, lo que el tiempo ha sepultado? Pues el camino para conocerse a sí mismo empieza allí donde existe el recuerdo: recordar lo que éramos, saber en dónde está enraizada nuestra conciencia, para así afrontar el destino.

¡Para así despertar a la vida consciente! Y en el fuego armonioso que enciende el divino Apolo, y en los signos metafóricos que inspira la Musa, aprehender la sabiduría humana y contemplar, durante la leve estancia entre los vivos, la hermosura del sentimiento eterno, pues en él todo se enlaza.

Ya los antiguos hallaban en la creación poética, que a la vez es enigma y es revelación, la luz que ayuda al hombre a caminar a través de los laberintos de la existencia. Decíase entonces que sólo la virtud era fuerza, y que la fuerza forjaba héroes. Y así también hoy, haciéndose heredero del verso castellano y del espíritu quijotesco, los poemas de Mario Martín Lera hacen vibrar de nuevo la lira gloriosa de nuestros antepasados:

Canta al cielo, trovador aquitano,  
Que el eco llevará tu son sublime  
Y etérea nube la lluvia esgrime  
Para en llanto arrullar tu amor  
arcano.

Y es que su verso ha sido forjado por la proporción ideal que sólo concede la virtud, y en cada ramo de armonías que nos ofrece, ritmadas con la serenidad estoica de un caballero o de un joven meditabundo, nos trae el recuerdo de nuestra España de Oro, o el dolor teológico del sentimiento cristiano:

### Al despuntar la aurora

¡Vida! Un día a otro día se sucede:  
El ayer es un hoy ajado y maltrecho;  
el hoy, vanidoso, tendrá el despecho  
mañana del ayer que le precede;

será el mañana como el que antecede;  
y la noche, ¡ay! la noche será el trecho  
en que ayer, hoy y mañana en mi pecho  
se juntan, mientras mi existencia cede.

Desgrana impetuoso el reloj las horas,  
mientras laméntase el alma su hastío  
y así, en su ignorancia, caen las auroras.

Peña mi ser este invernal estío,  
se consume, muere y ¡Vida, no afloras!  
Te demoras... Y acaso me halles frío.

### De Granada

Y el agua acariciaba la columna,  
rielando el sol el cristalino piso,  
y el laurel, y la rosa, y el narciso  
brindaban su perfume a la laguna.

La luz besaba el Darro, inoportuna,  
y, en susurros, el surtidor, sumiso...  
brotaba de la acequia el paraíso,  
llorando en sus amores a la luna.

¡Rosa fresca, blanca flor cual nieve,  
de cabello negro y mirada altiva,  
figura etérea de beldad velada...!

Tras el cristal la calle, el ruido. Llueve.  
Dentro, libros abiertos. La deriva.  
Y piel oliva, y versos y Granada.


### Heridas del alma

Trovas de esperanza y vida,  
¡Oh, dulces trovas de amor!  
¿No veis del alma la herida;  
el llanto del trovador?

Dolor de duda que anida;  
mi alma se sume en dolor;  
temiendo ella ser perdida,  
¿qué alma no pierde el valor?

Funda la vida el morir;  
velado estando el motivo,  
sabio, no altivo, es ser fuerte.

Vivo. ¿Para qué vivir?  
¿Vivir por sólo estar vivo?  
Morir. O matar la muerte



“Peregrino en su tierra”, primer poemario de Mario Martín, concilia el sentimiento interno del poeta con toda la realidad que a su alrededor deviene. La peregrinación a través del recuerdo y de lo vivo del presente da testimonio de un hombre que medita acerca de su propia realidad, pero que contemplándolo todo deja brotar su concepción del amor, de la esperanza y del heroísmo.

Daniel Fernández Gámez



# INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING

José Miguel Roncero Martín

El siguiente artículo trata sobre el tráfico de seres humanos y la imperiosa necesidad de Organizaciones Internacionales Gubernamentales (OIGs) y de Organizaciones (Internacionales) No-Gubernamentales (OINGs) de trabajar conjuntamente y aunar esfuerzos para luchar contra la trata de personas. Tanto OIGs como OINGs necesitan mutuamente las unas de las otras para atajar de forma efectiva tanto las circunstancias que favorecen la trata de personas, como los problemas generados por esta actividad. Trabajando en conjunto, OIGs y OINGs pueden cubrir, de un modo más eficaz, las 3Rs (rehabilitación, repatriación, reintegración) y las 3Ps (prevención, protección y persecución), indentificas como clave para lidiar tanto con la trata como con los problemas generados por ésta. El autor sostiene que sólo a través de colaboraciones y alianzas estratégicas entre organizaciones internacionales públicas y organizaciones de asistencia privadas se puede atajar, con éxito, los problemas generados por la trata de personas.

## Abstract

Human Trafficking or Trafficking in Human Beings (HT or THB) is one of the most lucrative illegal activities worldwide. It represents the enslavement of hundreds of thousands, probably millions of persons, for purposes of exploitation, including sexual and other types of abuse. Most of trafficked people are women, and most of them are trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation and forced prostitution.

Human trafficking is an international activity, therefore, an international approaches is needed to address and solve this phenomenon. The United Nations, through its Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides a legal international framework to fight THB. UNODC reports and activities provide information and support to the member States to help them on the fight against HT.

Besides, UNODC created the Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT), an agency that helps International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) on their fight against Human Trafficking on the field.

For this paper, I will speak and exemplify mostly about Europe for a specific reason: most of Human Trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation ends up in Europe<sup>1</sup>, especially in the core Germany-Austria-Switzerland-Netherlands. Although the phenomenon is global, West Europe is the main *destination* region for trafficked people, while East Europe is a very important *origin* region.

Through this essay, I will analyze briefly what is Human Trafficking; what International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), especially the UN-related ones are doing to fight THB; what INGO are doing on the same field; what is the relation between IGOs and INGOs; and how INGOs are essential actors to materialize the IGOs and States policies on the fight against Human Trafficking.

## Human trafficking

Human Trafficking is a modern form of slavery. It is either the second or the third most lucrative illegal business, after drugs trade and weapons trade. The UN and other international organizations have estimated that the trafficking business generates annually about \$2.5 billion.

How many people has been or is being trafficked is very difficult to establish, because they are hidden population. However, UNODC estimates that Europe holds an approximate constant number of 150.000 trafficked people. According to Kevin Bales,<sup>2</sup> about 10-15 percent of his estimates on today's slaves (27 million persons) are trafficked people. Or in other words, two or three million of trafficked people.

According to UNODC, 80 percent of trafficked persons are females (women and girls). From that number, 79 percent is forced to prostitution and sexual exploitation, 18 percent end up in forced-labour related activities, and a three percent is trafficked for other purposes, such as organ removal. Of course, these percentages vary from country to country, with an increment of sexual exploitation in the West. Within the forced labour forms, domestic servitude is an extended practice in the United States and some European areas.

All the countries of the world are involved somewhat in this global phenomenon: as a source  
2 See bibliography.



<sup>1</sup> Within the Council of Europe countries in general.



country, as a *transit* country or as a *destination* country. Some States also combine two or even three aspects, being at the same time *source*, *transit* and/or *destination* countries.

Yet, what is Human Trafficking? The UN Palermo Protocol (2000) defines HT as "*the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs*".<sup>3</sup> The attempt to commit trafficking, the participation in such activities and the organization or direction of others to commit trafficking are also criminal activities.

In HT activities, both men and women are

involved. If mostly women are the victims and males are the *clients*, both men and women are perpetrators. In some cases, such as Lithuania, women represent a surprising 80 percent of recruiters, as UNODC Global Report on HT (GRHT) shows.<sup>4</sup> This report also tells us how little prosecution has been carried out throughout the world, although in many countries anti-trafficking laws have been passed and have been in force for a while. Trafficking in Human Beings represents a highly profitable activity in which victims are used as disposable commodities with low range of either prosecution and condemnations. It is an easy business carried out by *entrepreneurs*, and as enterprises. Both big trafficking networks and small ones live together making profits. They all have the same structure: recruiters, carriers and transporters, violent people in charge of breaking down victims' will and a boss all over it. As we said before, women are also part of the business, mostly as recruiters. In some cases, those women have been trafficked before.

The victims, male or females, are vulnerable people. There is a few naivety but a lot of necessity. Victims are deceived, kidnapped, beat, raped, treated as cattle, and so on. Most of women and girls end up

4 See bibliography.

3 <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/what-is-human-trafficking.html?ref=menuaside>

in forced prostitution and/or sexual exploitation. A few of them are forced to work in domestic servitude. Most of men are forced to work as slaves in farms or factories, and a few of them are also used and abused for sexual practices.

Corruption at high and low level is one of the fundamental factors helping HT. The United Nations has established the relation between corruption and THB.<sup>5</sup> The networks of trafficking are either national or regional. A long distance trafficking is also common, but not dominant. Yet, these networks generate origin, transit, destination, and origin/destination countries. A person trafficked from an origin country (for instance in East Europe) to a destination country (for example, Switzerland) generates a lack of *offer* in the origin country which needs to be covered. Therefore, another victim in another origin country (in Central Asia, for instance) is trafficked into the first origin country, which is now both a destination and an origin country.

Finally, within the main destination countries (Germany and The Netherlands), the majority of victims (around 40 percent) are nationals from Germany or The Netherlands, as the GRHT shows. Why Germans and Dutch people traffic German and Dutch women is a question still unanswered.



against Human Trafficking, focusing on UNODC and the INGO Stop The Traffik (STT).

## UNODC, UN.GIFT AND BLUE HEARTS

UNODC leads the international movement at the international organizations level to fight Human Trafficking. UNODC work against HT is found on its webpage: "*UNODC offers practical help to States, not only helping to draft laws and create comprehensive national anti-trafficking strategies but also assisting with resources to implement them. States receive specialized assistance including the development of local capacity and expertise, as well as practical tools to encourage cross-border cooperation in investigations and prosecutions. The adoption in 2000 by the United Nations General Assembly of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking In Persons, Especially Women and Children marked a significant milestone in international efforts to stop the trade in people. As the custodian of the Protocol, UNODC addresses human trafficking issues through its Global Programme against Trafficking in Human Beings. To date, more than 110 States have signed and ratified the Protocol. But translating it into reality remains problematic. Very few criminals are convicted and most victims are probably never identified or assisted*".<sup>6</sup>

To help fighting HT, UNODC established

5 UN.GIFT B.P.020, "Corruption and

*Human Trafficking; the grease that facilitates the crime*", 2008, Vienna. See bibliography.

6 <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/what-is-human-trafficking.html?ref=menuaside>

the so-called “3Ps”, *Prevention*,<sup>7</sup> *Protection*<sup>8</sup> and *Prosecution*.<sup>9</sup> Prevention of HT is of course the best way to avoid any kind of THB at all. To prevent, UNODC follows a policy of research and awareness campaigns, and focuses in vulnerable communities and conflict zones, where recruitment is normally done. However, when prevention fails, protection of victims is imperative. Protection means, for instance, literal protection of victims, but also their identification. INGOs play a fundamental role in both prevention and protection.<sup>10</sup> Finally yet importantly, prosecution of perpetrators is essential to put an end to Human

7 <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/prevention.html>

8 <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/protection.html>

9 <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/prosecution.html>

10 “Under a major global project largely completed in 2006, UNODC funded support projects for victims of trafficking run by 19 NGOs in India, Mexico, South Africa, Uganda, Ukraine, Moldova, Pakistan, Indonesia and Thailand. The programme offered emotional and practical support, including health care, legal aid, psychological assistance and referrals. More than 280 victims have been repatriated from India to Nepal alone.” <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/protection.html>

Trafficking. Unfortunately, and as UNODC itself states, prosecution to date is very low. Law enforcement mechanisms and actions as well as mechanisms to lower levels of corruption are needed for a better prosecution of perpetrators. UNODC works to address these problems.

The “3Rs”, *Rehabilitation*, *Repatriation* and *Reintegration* are also an important aspect of UNODC’s programme. The rehabilitation of victims and their reintegration in the society and/or their communities are two fundamental processes in the aftermath of a trafficked person. INGOs play again an essential role within these two pillars, especially grass root organizations. Repatriation is a more controversial aspect. In many countries and cases, HT victims are considered as illegal immigrants. Therefore they are forced to leave the country towards their original ones in which they face again vulnerability situations and in many cases stigmatization.

In 2007, UNODC launched the Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT), which “was conceived to promote the global fight on human trafficking, on the basis of international agreements reached at the UN. To date, over 117 countries have signed the [Palermo] Protocol. It is



*managed in cooperation with the International Labour Organization (ILO); the International Organization for Migration (IOM); the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF); the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). UN.GIFT works with all stakeholders - governments, business, academia, civil society and the media - to support each other's work, create new partnerships and develop effective tools to fight human trafficking. The Global Initiative is based on a simple principle: human trafficking is a crime of such magnitude and atrocity that it cannot be dealt with successfully by any government alone. This global problem requires a global, multi-stakeholder strategy that builds on national efforts throughout the world. To pave the way for this strategy, stakeholders must coordinate efforts already underway, increase knowledge and awareness, provide technical assistance; promote effective rights-based responses; build capacity of state and non-state stakeholders; foster partnerships for joint action; and above all, ensure that everybody takes responsibility for this fight. By encouraging and facilitating cooperation and coordination, UN.GIFT aims to create synergies among the anti-trafficking activities of UN agencies, international organizations and other stakeholders to develop the most efficient and cost-effective tools and good practices".<sup>11</sup> The Global Initiative has several INGOs partners,<sup>12</sup> and provides loans to on-field based projects. UN.GIFT tries to bring all together the different national and international actors that fight against THB.*

Besides UN.GIFT, UNODC also launched the Blue Heart campaign,<sup>13</sup> which promotes awareness rising and provides on-street information about Human Trafficking. It has a strong presence in Latin America, especially in Mexico. On June 29, 2010, Spain joined<sup>14</sup> the Blue Heart campaign, being the

11 <http://www.ungift.org/ungift/en/about/index.html>

12 <http://www.ungift.org/ungift/en/partners/civil.html>

13 <http://www.unodc.org/blueheart/en/about-us.html>

14 <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/June/people-for-sale-in-europe-as-spain-joins-campaign-against-human-trafficking.html?ref=fs1>



first European country to do so.

## OSCE

OSCE also takes a serious role in fighting HT. "As either countries of origin, of transit or of destination, trafficking in human beings affects virtually all the OSCE participating States".<sup>15</sup> Human Trafficking is seen by the OSCE as a security and economic threat. The organization fights HT by means of law enforcement, borders and documents control. The OSCE also collaborates with UNODC/UN.GIFT, but due to its nature, it focuses on prosecution and repatriation rather than the other four Ps and Rs. Therefore, the relationship between the OSCE and INGOs is very limited since the working field of them both is different. Nevertheless, this limited relation is not a non-existent one. For instance, through the

15 <http://www.osce.org/cthb/13336.html>

movement “Alliance Against Trafficking in Persons,”<sup>16</sup> OSCE has established links and collaboration ties with several INGOs to fight THB.



## EU

The EU has a vast program to help fighting HT: it has passed a lot of Laws, Bills and Acts to fight trafficking, and funded many programmes. Since May 2009, the EU works together with UNODC to promote the adoption and implementation of the Palermo Protocol. Fighting HT is one of the major goals of EU’s external relations.<sup>17</sup> The EU also supports economically different INGOs on this field. For example, La Strada International, “*a network of nine independent human rights NGOs [which] aims to prevent trafficking in human beings, with a focus on women in Central and Eastern Europe, [by improving] the position of women and to promote their universal rights, including the right to choose to emigrate and work abroad and to be protected from violence and abuse*”,<sup>18</sup> receives funds from the European Commission.

## International non-governmental organizations and human trafficking

As it was in the late 18th century, INGOs are fighting slavery. In the 18th century they fought against legal slavery, originating the first international movement of Civil Society organizations; today they fight against one of the remaining forms of slavery, Human Trafficking.

Uncountable INGOs are fighting HT. Some of them work to eradicate HT as a part of a whole, bigger project; some other carry out anti Human Trafficking activities providing medical and emotional support to the victims; and some others are fully dedicated to combat Human Trafficking.

### INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS COVERING TRAFFICKING ISSUES

Some Human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Doctors Without Borders (DWB) or Médecins du Monde (MDM) fight HT due to of their very same nature. HT is a violation of several Human Rights; therefore, those organizations cannot just be bystanders when it comes about HT. AI and HRW are two perfect examples of organizations which dedicate some effort to combat HT but which major goal is not only HT eradication. Their work on the fields of information research, data collection and public awareness is a very important part of anti-HT fight.

DWB or MDM are, in the other hand, perfect examples of INGOs in which efforts anti-human trafficking activities are also involved. We must not forget that HT is closely related to physical and psychological abuses, but also to sexual transmission diseases (STDs) such as AIDS, syphilis and many others. Drugs abuse and alcoholism are problems often related with HT victims. For a successful *protection* and *rehabilitation*, an effective medical and psychological team is needed, to provide victims with the care they need.

16 <http://www.osce.org/cthb/13413.html>

17 [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/human\\_rights/traffic/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/traffic/index_en.htm)

18 <http://www.lastradainternational.org/>

## INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS FULLY DEDICATED TO FIGHT TRAFFICKING

There are thousands of NGOs and INGOs for which fighting THB is a major goal. Before, I mentioned La Strada International, but there are many more: Anti Slavery (AS); Free the Slaves (FtS); humantrafficking.org; Comité contre l'esclavage moderne (CCEM); ECPAT International; International Centre for Missing & Exploited Children (ICMEC); LEFÖ; Women Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Foundation (WTCLEF); Stop the Traffik; etcetera.

These organizations may be small or large, have a national focus or an international spirit, enjoy big and expensive programs or have modes activities, etcetera. The variety is as large as the number of NGOs and INGOs taking part of the fight against HT. Yet, they all share the same goal.

Dedicated NGOs and INGOs take a determinant part on the fight against HT. They are the grass root organizations which carry out most of the work, especially when it comes about *prevention, protection, rehabilitation* and *reintegration*, and somehow about *prosecution* as well.

*Prevention* is one of the core actions that INGOs do in the fight against Human Trafficking. Through their consciousness-raising and awareness campaigns, INGOs help stopping HT before it takes place in the origin countries; these same activities also help to increase public awareness in destination countries, showing up the problem to the public opinion and ultimately to the men who are paying for having sex with trafficked women, most of time without knowing it. These campaigns also help to spread the knowledge about what Human Trafficking is; THB does not only refer to trafficked women for sexual exploitation purposes, but also child and adult slavery-like practices, the removal of organs, labor exploitation, etcetera. In general, most people ignore these other sides of Human Trafficking.

INGOs also have a very strong paper to play regarding *protection* of victims, and they can do so in many different ways. INGOs and their staff are a

friendlier care-team for victims, whom are normally scared of police or governmental officials. INGOs can provide for safe places for the victims to their protection from their traffickers and the mafia networks. An example of this is the UAE's NGO The Ewa'a Shelter, in Abu Dhabi. It "provides temporary shelter for up to 30 women and children victims of human trafficking and offers psychological, medical, and legal assistance as well as support in rehabilitation."<sup>19</sup> Here, *protection* and *rehabilitation* work together. INGOs can also provide for the specific trained and expert staff that victims need for their *rehabilitation*, from medical doctors to lawyers, psychologists, social workers, working networks, and etcetera. The legal assistance is very important since most of trafficking victims are often considered as illegal immigrants by local authorities, and are likely to be eventually deported.

*Reintegration* is also a field in which INGOs play an important role. Either helping victims with legal and local assistance on the *destination* country, or supporting and helping them on their origin countries, once they have returned there. However, *reintegration* is probably one of the harder tasks in the aftermath of a HT victim. *Destination* countries normally see HT victims as illegal immigrants, and *repatriation* (or more likely, deportation) is an inevitable situation, in most of cases, INGOs can help and provide victims with legal support to legalize their situation and stay in the country if that is their will. Nevertheless, when this is not possible, or the victim's will is to return to his/her origin country, local NGOs and INGOs can also be very helpful. The victim can face the stigmatization of his/her local community, illness, a precarious economic situation, a family that needs support, and etcetera. All these factors create vulnerability, the main reason why the victim fell into trafficking network the first time.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, local NGOs and INGOs working to improve women's situation in the *origin* countries are providing the best on-field work to avoid human trafficking situations.

About *prosecution*, INGOs can offer legal

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19 <http://www.ungift.org/ungift/en/partners/civil.html>

20 According to statistics.

assistance and support to victims who are willing to declare against their former traffickers. INGOs can also provide authorities with information and data that can be used to generate knowledge about HT real situation and therefore improve law enforcement, if necessary. Finally, INGOs can offer a solid network and the organizational capacity to fight back, on legal terms, HT networks.

## **International governmental organizations, International governmental organizations and human trafficking**

In the previous section I just mentioned how NGOs and INGOs can and do take important steps in the fight against Human Trafficking, regarding the 3Ps and two of the 3Rs. However, the relation between INGOs and the IGOs is often very complex, due to the very nature of the relation between INGOs and IGOs, especially the UN and its agencies. Communication

between the two types of organizations is not always fluent, neither constructive. Furthermore, although the goals of UNODC and INGOs regarding Human Trafficking are the same, the chosen paths to achieve the goal of eradicating THB differ from one to the other; and even within INGOs themselves. On the one hand, for local NGOs based on *origin* countries, improving local conditions, especially for women and children, may be the major goal towards stopping HT. On the other hand, for NGOs placed on *destination* countries the best way to combat HT may be the *protection* of victims or the *prevention* through information and awareness-raising campaigns. For a security IGO such as OSCE, strengthening borders and controls of legal documents (such as passports or residence permits) is the major goal towards a HT-free world. For UNODC, public awareness, data collection and research may be the most important activities. However, those different approaches are not and should not be confronted against each other.

That is why in 2007 UNODC launched UN.GIFT, to bring together all the efforts to fight HT under the same *umbrella*, and to combine them all



to multiply the effects of all the present initiatives. The Global Initiative also provides economic help to NGOs and INGOs that are part of the programme. For instance, STT, which brings together more than a thousand groups fighting HT in fifty different countries, is a partner member of UN.GIFT. Through this partnership, UNODC can know what INGOs and NGOs need and demand on their fight against trafficking, and those organizations can benefit from the help and support of an UN agency. UN.GIFT provides technical assistance to these civil society partner organizations. The main objectives of UN.GIFT are building awareness, generating knowledge, improving women's and children's life conditions and sharing information. To do so, UN.GIFT has launched several campaigns; UN.GIFT even offers loans to INGOs to achieve these objectives. Finally, UN.GIFT also acts as a forum in which big organizations such as STT and smaller ones can present demands to the International Community.

## Conclusion

As it was said above, the role that INGOs play in the fight against Human Trafficking is not only important, but also necessary. INGOs are the actors which can carry out more effectively activities aimed

to cover two of the 3Ps (*prevention and protection*) and two of the 3Rs (*rehabilitation and reintegration*). Nevertheless, IGOs and state/governmental help is fundamental to find a cooperative-based as well as comprehensive solution to put an end to THB, from the necessary legal framework aimed to protect victims and prosecute offenders, to the also necessary economic assistance for INGOs and NGOs. Collaboration and information sharing, as it was implemented as a key policy in 2007 through UN.GIFT, is essential.

The fight against HT is a multilevel one; trafficking itself is an international and multilateral activity. Small and big actors are in the *business* of trafficking. Therefore, the only plausible way to approach successfully the global problem of trafficking in human beings is through another global approach; States, IGOs and INGOs are the three actors that have to combine efforts to achieve a victory over Human Trafficking.

Without involvement, collaboration and partnership of States, IGOs and INGOs, Human Trafficking will remain as a form of modern slavery in the coming future.


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# Contemporary Conflict and Poverty Traps: Roads to Nowhere

Kyle DeFreitas

En este artículo, el autor muestra como las nuevas guerras pueden conducir a trampas de conflictos, y como ambos, junto con el fenómeno de las sombras de la globalización, puede conducir a trampas de pobreza. Esta relación se muestra en la figura 1 (ver más abajo). La guerra civil en Sri Lanka, los conflictos en Somalia y en Bosnia Herzegovina, y los conflictos en Uganda, la República Democrática del Congo y Sudán han sido usados como casos de estudios en este artículo, con especial atención puesta sobre:

1. Cómo los conflictos estancan los ingresos y el crecimiento.
2. Cómo la mayoría de los ciudadanos en las naciones menos desarrolladas (o least developed nations -LDC-) dependen excesivamente en productos primarios como Fuentes de ingresos, los cuales no son competencia para los mercados internacionales contemporaneos construidos sobre trabas y aranceles que favorecen a las naciones más ricas y a la demanda internacional de materias primas y productos manufacturados.
3. Cómo las nuevas guerras y las sombras de la globalización contribuyen a la prolongación de un conflicto sin final a la vista (es decir, guerras prolongadas)

## Introduction

Today, nearly one-billion people live in dire poverty,<sup>1</sup> where they are unable to access basic human needs for survival (ie. water, food and shelter), and where the fundamental aspects of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such as the right to life, liberty and security of persons for example,<sup>2</sup> are non-existent. Countries suffering from such conditions include Haiti, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia and the list goes on. However, making circumstances worse for some of these nations is the fact that ongoing conflict is continuously eroding their economy, potential for human capital<sup>3</sup> and domestic infrastructures. In other words, a *conflict trap*<sup>4</sup> is leading them towards a *poverty trap*,<sup>5</sup> and there are several examples which best exemplify this relationship.

First, during any conflict, many of which are based on ethnic differences, not only are incomes and growth damaged within the nation(s) under duress, but wars today take place primarily in developing nations where a significant amount of citizens rely on primary products as a source of income. Unfortunately, primary products are no match for the international market of today which is made up of trade barriers that favour

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1 Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008): xi.

2 “Article 3,” *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: United Nations (online)*. 2010.

3 For the purposes of this paper, ‘human capital’ is defined as: “[p]roductive investments embodied in human persons...[such as] skills, abilities, ideals, and health resulting from job expenditures on education, on-the-job training programs, and medical care.” For more information please see Todaro, 369 – 415 & 826.

4 The term *conflict trap* refers to the instance by which a state is trapped in a continuous cycle of war with no end in sight. A more in depth analysis can be found between pages 11-15 of this paper.

5 The term *poverty trap* refers to different instances by which a state can be trapped in a continuous cycle of poverty that recurs generation after generation. A more in depth analysis can be found on pages 7-8 of this paper.

richer nations, and which is reliant on raw materials and manufactured products. This is in addition to the fact that the economies of the vast majority of nations competing in today’s international market are not suffering from war. Thus, for developing nations faced with conflict and such unfair trade conditions, the result is that income and growth essentially stagnate which erodes any hope citizens may have had for living a life outside of poverty.

Second, wars of today are quite different from wars of the past, known as ‘new wars,’<sup>6</sup> as external financial support through remittances or donations, humanitarian aid, and refugee camps, known collectively as *shadow globalization*,<sup>7</sup> have come to play important roles in contemporary conflicts. However, what is important to understand for the purposes of this paper is that the term ‘new wars’ implies an ongoing conflict with no end in sight, while shadow globalization represents the mechanisms by which new wars are prolonged, and together they contribute to a nation’s movement towards a conflict trap and thus, by extension, a poverty trap as well. This complex relationship will be conveyed through the following examples: (i) the civil war in Sri Lanka, where the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had access to external financing, donations and other forms of support for decades; (ii) the conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where insurgents were able to forcibly take or access aid supplies; and (iii) refugee camps in Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan, which have provided

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6 In brief, the term ‘new wars’ refers primarily to conflicts of a more contemporary nature (ie. predominantly those after the collapse of the Soviet Union, although some wars prior to this, such as the Sri Lankan Civil War, the Vietnam War and the ongoing conflicts in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have transcended from the ‘old war’ era to the ‘new war’ era) which have vastly different characteristics than their antecedents (ie. ‘old wars’). A more in depth analysis of ‘old wars’ and ‘new wars’ can be found on pages 9-11 of this paper.

7 In brief, ‘*shadow globalization*’ refers to phenomena that have arisen alongside ‘new wars’ including diasporic financing of rebel regimes, humanitarian aid and refugee camps for example. A more in depth analysis can be found on page 16 of this paper.




fig 1. The relationship between how new wars can lead to a conflict trap, and how both together can ultimately lead to a poverty trap at both the national and regional level. In addition, though the subject for another essay, the broken arrow running from poverty traps back to new wars represents the potential, cyclical nature of the issues under examination.

rebels of the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) with a place to hide, regroup and continue their campaign of terror.

Therefore, the overall aim of this paper is to convey the relationship of how 'new wars' can lead to a *conflict trap*, and how both, along with the phenomena of *shadow globalization*, can lead a country into a *poverty trap* and a region into a regional poverty trap. This relationship is reflected in Figure 1 up, and is discussed in depth throughout this paper in relation to the aforementioned case study examples.<sup>8</sup> The final section offers potential recommendations on how the international community, via the lowering

8 It is important to note, however, that poverty traps can in fact have the opposite effect in that a *poverty trap* could also lead to the outbreak of a new war and thus a conflict trap as well. The three concepts are all inter-related.

of trade barriers and adopting a regional focus for development using a multilateral approach, could in fact be one step towards helping impoverished nations steer clear of the conflict trap, and thus, by extension, national and regional poverty traps altogether.

## **2. Defining Poverty and Poverty Trap**

*Poverty* is a complex term. Not only can it have different meanings in different countries, but it can even have different meanings to different individuals. For example, is poverty defined as someone with absolutely no money, or as persons who live below US \$1.00 per day and rely entirely on subsistence economy? Or, is poverty defined as persons who have no access to clean water or sanitation, but have

an income of US \$2.50 per day? In reality, there is no true definition as the term *poverty* encapsulates many different economic and socioeconomic factors. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, *poverty* will refer to all aspects of human conditions by which the citizens of a state live under or suffer from at least one of the following aspects: (i) *absolute poverty*, which can be defined as, “[a] situation where a population...is, at most, able to meet only its bare subsistence essentials for food, clothing and shelter to maintain minimum levels of living”<sup>9</sup>; (ii) *international poverty line*, which refers to, “[a]n international real income measure, usually expressed in constant dollars (ie. US \$1.00 per day), used as a basis for estimating the proportion of the world’s population that exists at bare levels of subsistence”<sup>10</sup>; (iii) *subsistence economy*, which can be understood as, “[a]n economy in which production is mainly for personal consumption and the standard of living yields no more than the basic necessities of life—food, shelter, and clothing”<sup>11</sup>; and (iv) *subsistence farming*, which is, “[f]arming in which crop production, stock rearing, and other activities are conducted mainly for personal consumption, characterized by low productivity and high risk and uncertainty.”<sup>12</sup> Each of these definitions in some way relate to and are encapsulated within the definition of *poverty trap*. Thus, keeping the four preceding definitions of poverty in mind, a *poverty trap*, therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, will be defined as, “[a] bad equilibrium for a family, community, or nation, involving a *vicious circle* in which poverty and underdevelopment lead to *more* poverty and underdevelopment, often from one generation to the next.”<sup>13</sup> In other words, it is a situation in which the citizens of a nation are literally trapped in an endless cycle of poverty, whether it be due to lack of economic and other infrastructures, or war.

However, what are some instances in which a *poverty trap* is capable of reproducing itself generation after generation? According to Dr. Paul Collier, Professor of economics at the University of Oxford,


<sup>9</sup> Michael Todaro, *Economic Development*, 10th Ed. (Essex, UK: Pearson Education, 2009): 815.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 828.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 839.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 834.



there are four particular instances including: (i) the natural resource trap;<sup>14</sup> (ii) the landlocked with bad neighbours trap;<sup>15</sup> (iii) the bad governance in a small country trap;<sup>16</sup> and (iv) the conflict trap. Although each example on its own provides a convincing explanation with regard to how different countries end up in a poverty trap, it is the conflict trap that is important for the purposes of this paper.

### **3. Conflict and Poverty Traps: How the Former Can Lead to the Latter**

All conflicts have negative impacts on the economies of those nations which are involved. It is even worse for a developing nation with weak

<sup>14</sup> For more information on the natural resource trap with a concrete example focusing on Nigeria or the Netherlands, please see either Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, 39-44; or Christine Ebrahim-Zadeh, “Dutch Disease: Too Much Wealth Managed Unwisely,” *Back to Basics: IMF Quarterly Finance and Development Magazine* 40.1 (March, 2003): pgphs. 2-3, respectively.

<sup>15</sup> For more information on the landlocked with bad neighbours trap and the implications that being landlocked has, please see Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, 39-41; Jeffrey Sachs, “The limits of convergence - nature, nurture and growth,” *The Economist* (14<sup>th</sup> – 20<sup>th</sup> June 1997): 19, 20 & 24; “FDI in Landlocked Developing Countries at a Glance,” *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development - UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/5* (Geneva: United Nations Publication, 2003): 2-4; and “UNDP Human Development Report 2009 – Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development,” *United Nations Development Programme*. (United Nations Publication, 2009): 192-194.

<sup>16</sup> For more information on the bad governance in a small country trap, please see Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, 64-67.

economic, political and social structures which make it more prone to giving way to violence; the type of contemporary violence which is ongoing with no end in sight (ie. new wars). Thus, the objective of this section are threefold: (i) explain the aspects which differentiate ‘old wars’ from ‘new wars’ as described by Herfried Münkler; (ii) link different aspects of new wars with ways in which they contribute to Collier’s conflict trap concept; and (iii) to convey how both together lead a country towards a poverty trap and a region towards a regional poverty trap.

### **3.1 Münkler’s ‘New Wars’: A Path to the Conflict Trap**

Conflicts of today are increasingly becoming known as ‘new wars’ because they have changed immensely from wars of the past. In his book entitled *The New Wars*, Herfried Münkler’s comparison between wars from the past (ie. old wars) and those of the present (ie. new wars) provide a clear insight with regard to why contemporary wars can lead a country into a conflict trap and towards a poverty trap.

Old wars, such as World Wars I and II, can be identified by the following criteria: (i) they had an end in sight; (ii) states maintained their monopoly over authority (ie. police and military); (iii) they were fought on a battlefield and action was based on concentrated forces in specific places at specific times; (iv) they had decisive battles; (v) fighting was, more or less, in accordance with codified laws of war; and (vi) 90 percent of those killed or wounded were identifiable as combatants under international law. In summary, old wars were bound to end and focused in particular on militant-to-militant combat.

New wars, on the other hand, are literally the exact opposite, in that: (i) there is no identifiable beginning or end; (ii) the state has lost its monopoly over authority; (iii) war is everywhere (ie. densely populated civilian areas, religious centers, hospitals, children’s schools etc.), and action is based on ‘protracted warfare’ (ie. the use of withdrawal and dispersion after launching a lightning attack)<sup>17</sup> and

17 Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars*, (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2005): 12.

guerrilla tactics; (iv) militants are non-combatants under international law; (v) 80 percent of those killed or wounded are civilians;<sup>18</sup> (vi) child soldiers and warlords have come to play significant roles; and (vii) new wars are transnational in their nature (ie. politically, economically, socially and militarily – the main foci of section 4 in this paper).<sup>19</sup> Finally, Münkler identifies the fact that most players in new wars employ ‘strategic defensive’ as their ultimate strategy, which means that contemporary rebels content themselves with using military force for self preservation, extension of power or expanding their potentials for economic control without seriously looking for a military resolution to the war.<sup>20</sup> In fact, Collier terms this strategy “rebellion-as-business” which he describes as the ways in which rebellion with atypically high potential benefits and low costs can pay off through income or other forms of satisfaction for rebels during war (ie. what rebels gain despite the costs it has to society).<sup>21</sup>

Therefore, taking these aspects of new wars into consideration, the most important conclusions that can be drawn for the purposes of this paper are (i) that if such wars have no identifiable beginning or end, (ii) on top of the fact that the state has lost its monopoly over authority, by which (iii) there is no differentiation between combatants and non-combatants, this means that the economy and human capital of that

18 For example, not only have local civilians become targets in *new wars*, but even international personnel. Between 1992 and 2001, 204 UN civilian personnel have been killed, and over 250 assaulted and robbed; between 2004 – 2005, 55 aid workers were killed in Afghanistan alone; and in August 2006, 17 staff from Action Against Hunger were killed in Sri Lanka despite the fact that they were there assisting with tsunami relief work and were in no way connected to the civil war. For more information please see J.L. Holzgrefe, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas” in L. Holzgrefe & R. Keohane (eds.) *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 18.

19 Ibid., 5-25. In fact, these pages provide an excellent in-depth analysis of ‘new wars’ with examples.

20 Ibid. 12.

21 Paul Collier, “On the Duration of Civil War.” *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (2004): 255-256.

nation are likely to continually erode, and both are mandatory for any type of development. In other words, without an economy or human capital there can be no development, and without development there is no hope for citizens which makes a nation suffering from any type of military conflict more prone to falling into a conflict trap. Thus, the different aspects of ‘how’ new wars lead to a conflict trap will be the focus of the subsequent section.

### **3.2 Collier’s Conflict Trap: A Road to the Poverty Trap**

Keeping Münkler’s examples in mind, a new war makes a country more likely to fall into a conflict trap due to its ongoing nature and due to the impact that conflict in general has on a nation’s immediate and long-term economy, as well as that nation’s potential for increasing its human capital, developing infrastructures and expanding its trade ties. Thus, instead of evolving each can crumble and stagnate in the face of an ongoing war, which is more often than not complicated further by the existence of ethnic animosities and political differentiations that only add additional fuel to the fire, like in the cases of Sri Lanka, Rwanda or Sudan. Regardless, the potentiality of these conditions are made worse by the trade barriers developed nations impose on developing nations, which further limit a developing nation’s potentials for growth. As a result, there is a lack of opportunities available which means there is a lack of hope for citizens to live a life that is anything but impoverished, and together these can result in a conflict trap which has drastic consequences for a nation.

#### **3.2.1 Conditions for a Conflict Trap: Ethnic Tension, Trade Barriers and No Hope**

When a state suffers from deep ethnic tensions or political differentiations in addition to its government not having a monopoly over state security, it has become common that the weaker party resorts to guerilla warfare which easily transforms

into a prolonged war with no end in sight. However, making these circumstances worse, according to Collier, is the fact that “[l]ow-income, slow growth and primary commodity dependence make a country [more] prone to civil war.”<sup>22</sup> This is understandable considering low-income means poverty, slow-growth means hopelessness, an over-reliance on primary products means a lack of competitive exports, and all together mean less potential for development and less opportunities for income generation. Further contributing to these challenges are the trade barriers and agricultural protective measures that developed nations place on developing nations, including protective tariffs, non-tariff trade barriers, domestic subsidies and physical quotas on imports.<sup>23</sup> In total, an estimated \$200 billion is lost by developing nations annually due to these barriers.<sup>24</sup> So not only do these barriers limit the potential for growth in developing nations, since primary products are no competition when up against raw materials and manufactured products, but they also *trap* a poor nation in impoverished conditions since the nation’s primary product exports are uncompetitive in the international market and are limited by the imposed trade obstacles, which makes any type of development near impossible. Moreover, when a nation is limited by an over-reliance on primary commodities and trade barriers it is likely that it also lacks the necessary resources for providing its citizens with educational opportunities, a stable government and security; a collective recipe for a country’s being engulfed by a conflict trap.

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22 Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, 22.

23 Todaro and Smith list three additional reasons as to why relying on primary products for a majority of export earnings works against a developing country’s potential for growth, which include: (i) the fact that agricultural exports are not nearly as competitive as raw materials or manufactured goods; (ii) the fact the prices of primary products tend to remain low regardless of quantity or demand; and (iii) the evolution of synthetic substitutes. For a more thorough analysis of each of these examples please see Todaro, 618-628.

24 William Cline, “Global Free Trade Could Lift 500 Million People Out of Poverty,” Peterson Institute for Global Economics – online (17 June 2004): pgph. 3.

Furthermore, without opportunities for education or work, citizens lose hope as they are aware of the fact that their only moral option for survival is a life in poverty. It is at this point that joining a rebel movement starts to look more attractive, especially to young men who face one of two choices: life in dire poverty with no chance of escape, or a chance at a life of riches.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, taking these aspects into consideration, it is likely that a nation suffering from an essentially stagnated economy with no available educational, political, social or economic opportunities also suffers from weak governing structures. This means that rebellion is not difficult and rebels do not have much to lose in attempting to overthrow the government so as to increase their power and economic control.<sup>26</sup> The potential outcome: the outbreak of a *new war* in which competing factions lead the state towards or into a conflict trap by way of Collier's "rebellion-as-business" concept. Although discussed briefly in the previous section, here is a more in-depth account of this notion.

Rebellion-as-business provides unlimited

25 Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, 22.

26 Ibid., 21.

opportunities for rebels to loot and increase their wealth since conflict is ongoing. In turn, this produces high motivation for rebels to preserve these conditions as their chances at a life of riches (ie. hope), as opposed to life in poverty or in prison for their actions, is sustained and can in fact increase since financial and military viabilities during the conflict are their only binding constraints.<sup>27</sup> The result, therefore, aside from ongoing state fragmentation and economic decline, is certainly movement towards a stagnant economy and thus a poverty trap as well.

### **3.2.2 Consequences of War: Some Immediate and Long-Term Impacts of Conflict**

More concretely, however, are some conclusions Collier has drawn through his research that focused on conditions which arise during a conflict that lead developing nations towards a *poverty trap*. First, is the fact that conflict tends to reduce a nation's growth

27 Collier, *On the Duration of Civil War*, 255-256.



by around 2.3% per year.<sup>28</sup> This means that the 26-year civil war in Sri Lanka, for example, has left the country about 58 percent poorer than it would have been otherwise.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, due to the fact that wars destroy transport, trade, governing, economic and social (ie. particularly education mechanisms for increasing human capital) infrastructures, the longer the war the longer and more difficult the recovery process will be. Second, conflict leads to mass movements of refugees which results in a decrease in human capital. Furthermore, conflict can certainly lead to the collapse of public health systems which means citizens cannot be treated. So, if there is an outbreak of disease amongst vast numbers of people migrating due to a conflict, the result is that a domestic security issue turns into regional one. Collier also points out fact that diseases are highly persistent since they do not stop when the fighting ends.<sup>30</sup> Another highly persistent consequence of conflict, however, are economic losses which can also have regional impacts (see section 4.2.2 *Bosnia Herzegovina* for an in depth account).<sup>31</sup> In fact, a study conducted by Reuven Glick and Alan Taylor for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco agree with Collier's examples.<sup>32</sup> Although their study was conducted on an international level and focused on World War's I and II, Glick and Taylor's conclusions are highly relevant and can be adapted to a conflict's impact at the regional level as well, since their findings showed that:

...the effect of belligerent conflict[s] on the volume of international trade...[had] two important [consequences]: first, [conflict] is persistent, meaning that even after [it] end[s], trade does not resume its pre-war level for many years, exacerbating the total costs; [and] second, [this] effect has a multilateral dimension [from which]... trade destruction affects neutral parties as

well, generating a negative externality.<sup>33</sup>

In other words, war has a direct impact not only those who are involved (ie. national level) but also on those who are not (ie. regional level), and in the case of new wars, which are ongoing and transnational in nature, this means that neighbouring countries are impacted as well. In summary, taking into account the ideas, examples and facts laid out by Collier and those aspects of *new wars* as identified by Münkler, the different aspects relating to *why* conflict makes a nation and even a region more likely to fall into a poverty trap become more evident. However, to solidify these this argument even further, particularly that of the regional poverty trap, it is also important to account for and explain an important new phenomena which has risen alongside new wars: *shadow globalization*.

## **4. The Dichotomy of Shadow Globalization: How Good Things Can Actually Be Bad**

So far, this paper has attempted to convey the connection between how new wars can lead to a conflict trap, and how both can lead a nation toward a poverty trap. In order to further solidify these connections, however, it is important to look at some concrete examples. Therefore, in this section the aim is to show how new wars and the conflict trap can lead a nation to a poverty trap through a phenomenon known as *shadow globalization*, which in fact has a complex dichotomy: it is both good and bad.

### **4.1 Shadow Globalization: Understanding the Concept**

As defined by Herfried Münkler, and for the purposes of this paper, shadow globalization refers to, "[a] émigré communities that support either or both warring parties by means of money transfers [and]

28 Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, 27.

29 *Ibid.*

30 *Ibid.*, 27-28.

31 *Ibid.*, 28.

32 Reuven Glick, "Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War," *Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco - Working Paper Series* (August, 2005): 28.

33 *Ibid.*, 1.

all manner of businesses, [and (b)] the recruitment of volunteers [or (c)] the reception of wounded or exhausted fighters.”<sup>34</sup> Thus, in order to satisfy each of the three parts (ie. a, b and c), this section has been divided into three segments each containing at least one example that relates to either a, b or c. Finally, all examples in this section are linked together by two main arguments: (i) that each contributes to the prolongation of war, and as a result (ii) each can lead to a severe decline in a country’s economy overall,<sup>35</sup> thus leading it towards a poverty trap and a region towards a regional poverty trap. In essence, these arguments and the following examples convey the precise reasons as to how new wars, the conflict trap, and shadow globalization can result in poverty traps.

## **4.2 Shadow Globalization and Financing: The Case of the Tamil Tigers**

With regard to Münkler’s first example of *shadow globalization*,<sup>36</sup> émigré communities that support warring parties through money transfers (ie. remittances, donations etc.)<sup>37</sup> and all other manners

34 Münkler, 10.

35 For the purposes of this paper the term ‘economy overall’ refers to declination in a nation’s economic, social, political, infrastructural and educational sectors, and in its potential for increasing human capital, all of which are damaged as a result of conflict.

36 As a side note, Peter Lock provides another interesting financial-based perspective regarding shadow globalization, which he defines as, “the dynamic interrelatedness of the living conditions of the wealthy in seemingly well-regulated western countries and the marginalised masses living in destitute conditions.” For more information, please see Peter Lock, “War Economies and the Shadow of Globalization.” *Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No.3 on Transforming War Economies: Challenges and Strategies* (Apr., 2005): 2-3.

37 Other examples similar to the case of ‘financial shadow globalization’ in Sri Lanka include: (i) remittances from abroad to individual families (ie. to Sudanese or Palestinian workers in oil-rich countries of the Middle-East such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates); or (ii) Bosnian and Croatian workers in Germany or Austria. In some way, remittances in each of these examples have certainly had the potential

of business (ie. through NGO’s, fundraisers etc.) can do more harm than good.<sup>38</sup> This is due to the fact that such contributions prolong war, which in turn contributes to the further deterioration of a nation’s economy overall. Take for example the case of the civil war in Sri Lanka.

In order to establish their own independent state in northern Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) launched its first military offensives against the Sri Lankan government in the mid-1970s. This offensive was in response to the decades of discrimination and exclusion Tamils experienced after British colonial rule was withdrawn in 1948, which left a significant Sinhalese majority dominating the government.<sup>39</sup> However, despite the Sri Lankan government’s economic and military

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of being converted into military resources. For more information on licit, illicit and ‘black-market’ asset-converting strategies please see Mary Kaldor, *New Wars and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001): 107-113.

38 However, this is not to say that NGO’s and émigré communities, for example, should halt their assistance altogether. In fact, this author believes quite the contrary as remittances and international financial assistance have become an important part of globalization and poverty reduction. Instead, this author believes that such assistance should continue, however there needs to be better mechanisms for monitoring exactly where such donations and remittances are being sent which should be the responsibility of the sending country.

39 Shawn Flanigan, “Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: The Cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31.6 (2008): 500. The Sinhalese-dominated government decided to remove the basic civil rights of Tamils during the 1950s by which Tamils were excluded from the army, bureaucracy, administrative posts, university and other educational facilities, as well as the judiciary. Even the Tamil language was outlawed. The result of these circumstances was the evolution of a Tamil nationalism and, as anti-Tamil discrimination became increasingly militant, the development of different Tamil organizations with various ideological outlooks, but each of which was aimed at establishing an independent Tamil homeland (ie. Tamil Eelam) in the northern part of Sri Lanka. For more information, please see Flanigan, 500-501.

superiority, the LTTE was able to carry on their struggle for over three decades due to donations and support from diasporic Tamil communities and LTTE umbrella non-governmental organizations (NGOs) abroad which, by all fronts, appeared to be legitimate NGOs to the western nations they operated in.<sup>40</sup> The result was the development of an LTTE global infrastructure which was capable of leveraging hundreds of millions of dollars from its diasporic communities residing in North America, Europe and Scandinavian countries.<sup>41</sup>

40 For example, such organizations have included: The Australian Federation of Tamil Associations; The Swiss Federation of Tamil Associations; The French Federation of Tamil Associations; The Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils; World Tamil Movement (Canada-based); The Illankai Tamil Sangam (U.S.-based); The Tamil Coordinating Committee in Norway; and The International Federation of Tamils (U.K.-based). Collectively, these organizations not only assisted with raising funds and making donations, but they were also significant in developing and maintaining political and diplomatic support for Tamils within their respective host countries abroad. For more information, please see Christine Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11 (2005): 139-143.

41 It is important to note that although donations were willingly given by some Tamils, others were forced to do so with violence or threats. For example, the World Tamil Movement (WTM) in Canada canvassed areas where there were large Tamil populations (ie. Toronto, Vancouver), demanding large donations on behalf of WTM for the LTTE. Refusals to contribute often lead to

In total, it is has been estimated that from the 1990s through to mid-2000 (prior to the cease-fire agreement in December 2001),<sup>42</sup> the LTTE received \$82 million annually from Europe; U.S. \$650,000 monthly from Switzerland; U.S. \$1,000,000 monthly from Canada; and US \$385,000 monthly from the UK.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, this means that from these nations alone, the LTTE received a monthly income of around US \$8.8 million. However, this is in addition to the potential income the LTTE made from its gem trade, and its alleged participation in narcotics and human trafficking.<sup>44</sup>

Thus, in this example it is clear to see that significant, well-organized diasporic émigré communities that continuously raise and donate

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threats and intimidation, by which the Canadian government finally outlawed WTM as a terrorist-funding organization. For more information please see Mélisa Leclerc, "The Government of Canada Lists the World Tamil Movement as a Terrorist Organization," *Media Relations for Public Safety Canada* (Ottawa, CA: 16<sup>th</sup> June 2008): pgph. 3-5.

42 Nadja Jacob, "Family Violence, War, and Natural Disasters: A Study of the Effect of Extreme Stress on Children's Mental Health in Sri Lanka." *BMC Psychiatry* 8.33 (2008): 2.

43 Christine Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11 (2005): 140-141.

44 Ibid., 141-142.



money to send home can in fact be a bad thing as it contributes to the prolongation of war which by extension contributes to the decline of a national economy overall (ie. economic, social, educational, political etc.). Although some donations reached the affected civilians they were intended for, the case of the LTTE in Sri Lanka is a clear cut example of how a war can be significantly prolonged with external financing from abroad, and how, as a result, this can have negative consequences for a country since Sri Lanka's current United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) places it at 102 out of 182 countries.<sup>45</sup> In addition, the prolonged war has only increased ethnic tensions and distrust between Tamils and Sinhalese, which will likely have negative consequences in future development. In summary, the situation of Sri Lanka is exemplary of how a new war and shadow globalization can lead to a conflict trap, and how all together certainly make a nation much more susceptible to falling into a poverty trap.



### **4.3.1 Somalia**

After the dictatorship of Mohammed Siad Barre collapsed in January 1991, all of Somalia went into chaos as violent clashes between more than a dozen different clans and sub-clans ensued, led by powerful military commanders whose militants were unmerciful, killing anyone in their path. By the fall of 1992, the reigning warlord in the capital city of Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi Mohammed, also fell from power and lost control over any form of monopoly he once had over security.<sup>46</sup> The result was widespread war, disease and starvation, made worse by a severe drought which engulfed the entire country and resulted in the deaths of 400,000 Somalis in 1992 alone.<sup>47</sup> In response to the severity of these drastic circumstances, NGOs quickly rushed to the aid of the millions of affected civilians, but they were caught off guard when their convoys were looted and when armed gangs forced them to pay 'protection money' for allowing the aid to reach their destinations. Michael Birnbaum sums up this scenario best:

[During this time in Somalia] there [was] no neutral aid. The gangs with the weapons, the warlords and their militias knew that...[so] they took control of the aid and the unprotected aid workers.

### **4.3 Shadow Globalization and Humanitarian Aid:**

#### The Cases of Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Moving on to Münkler's second example of shadow globalization which specifies how in new wars the recruitment of volunteers now plays a significant role (ie. humanitarian aid workers and the like), the same arguments apply: (i) that it contributes to the prolongation of war and (ii) that in doing so it can in fact do more harm than good. For this particular section, the cases of Somalia in 1991 and Bosnia-

Herzegovina from 1992-1995 are analyzed.

45 Although Sri Lanka is placed at 102 out of 182 countries by the UN Development Report of 2009, which puts Sri Lanka at a medium HDI, it is important to consider Collier's discovery that civil war can reduce a country's annual growth by 2.3 percent per year, which is separate from the impact conflict has on other areas of development. Thus, if Sri Lanka had not been engaged for such a long time in this civil war it is likely its HDI ranking would be higher.

46 As a brief reminder, losing monopoly over state security mechanisms is one aspect of Münkler's *new wars*.

47 William Keylor, *A World of Nations: The International Order since 1945*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003): 302-303.

Every delivery of beans, protein cakes or vitamin preparations strengthened their position; every new shipment filled their war chests. For they ‘rented out’ the lorries and made their ‘protection troops’ available at a price. Not only did hunger become a weapon in the struggle for power; international aid became an involuntary funder of brutal gangs fighting the civil war.<sup>48</sup>

In other words, humanitarian aid contributed to the prolongation of war and by extension a further deterioration of the Somali economy overall.<sup>49</sup> Furthermore, Somalia’s HDI is so low today that it in fact has no rank.<sup>50</sup> Therefore, the case of Somalia is a precise example of how humanitarian aid can in fact do more harm than good by contributing to the prolongation of war, thus making a nation more likely to fall into a conflict trap and by extension a poverty trap as well.<sup>51</sup>

### **4.3.2 Bosnia-Herzegovina**

In some ways, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was quite similar to that of Somalia. After Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic declared Bosnia’s independence from Yugoslavia in January

48 Michael Birnbaum, *Krisenherd Somalia: Das Land des Terrors und der Anarchie*, (Munich: Heyne, 2002): 93-94, in Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars*, (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2005): 88.

49 In total, it has been estimated that as much as 80 percent of all aid was looted, diverted and even resold in local markets throughout Somalia, from which all proceeds went directly back to the war efforts of the competing factions. See J.L. Holzgrefe, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas” in L. Holzgrefe & R. Keohane (eds.) *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 18.

50 UNDP Human Development Report 2009 – Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development,” *United Nations Development Programme*. (United Nations Publication, 2009): 192-194. Hereinafter referred to as HDI 2009.

51 However, it is important to note that the author is not arguing in favour of halting humanitarian aid. The example is merely for shedding light on the fact that better security for aid convoys is required.

1992, Bosnian Serbs began arming themselves with weapons obtained from the federal Yugoslav army which led to widespread atrocities and genocide against Bosnian-Muslims.<sup>52</sup> Again, NGOs set out immediately to help victims of the violence. However, over two-hundred NGOs found themselves powerless against robbery, ambushes<sup>53</sup> and constant attacks by Bosnian Serbs against staff and volunteers,<sup>54</sup> while aid convoys, even those of the UN, were being halted and permitted to proceed only after a large portion of its relief supplies were taken by the insurgents.<sup>55</sup> In total, over half of all such supplies were stolen and went to feeding the combatants.<sup>56</sup> According to Münkler:

[i]n this way, the UN [and other NGOs] supported both the besiegers and the besieged, and the international community funded the evil at source while trying to hold it in check. At the very least, humanitarian aid [became] something extra that was [used] to pay for the continuation of war.<sup>57</sup>

Again, much the same as Somalia, humanitarian aid contributed to the prolongation of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and even to significant economic declines not only within the country itself but throughout the region as well. For example, following the war Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Bosnia-Herzegovina had fallen from US \$2719 per person to a mere US \$250 per person, while the GDPs of

52 Keylor, 351-352.

53 Mary Kaldor, *New Wars and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001): 110.

54 Frederick Burkle, “Military Security: Lessons for Relief,” in Jennifer Leaning, Susan Briggs & Lincoln Chen (eds.) *Humanitarian Crises: The Medical and Public Health Response*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999): 299.

55 Münkler, 88. For example, in Herzeg-Bosne, which at the height of the civil war was the only way for aid agencies to reach certain areas in Central Bosnia, Bosnian Croats demanded 27 percent of all humanitarian assistance being transported via this route. Otherwise the convoys were denied access. See Kaldor, 110.

56 Thomas Weiss, “Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action,” in S.J. Stedman & F. Tanner (eds.) *Refugee Manipulation* (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press, 2003): 75.

57 Münkler, 88.

Serbia / Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia fell to 49 percent, 65 percent and 55 percent from their 1985 levels, respectively. The countries making up the outer ring of this area were also affected as Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia's GDPs fell to 81 percent, 88 percent, 73 percent and 90 percent from their 1989 levels, respectively.<sup>58</sup> However due to the fact that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not consist of a fragmentation of competing factions as was the case of Somalia, it is not likely that the nation or even the region would have been driven into a full fledged poverty trap (although the author acknowledges that nothing is predictable). Instead, this example conveys how humanitarian aid can certainly contribute to the prolongation of war and to the deterioration of a nation and even a region's economy overall, which, had it been under more fragmented circumstances, could certainly have led to poverty trap.<sup>59</sup>

#### **4.4 Shadow Globalization, Refugee Camps and the Impact of Refugees**

Münker's final example of *shadow globalization* (ie. the reception of wounded or exhausted fighters) is largely representative of the role of refugee camps in new wars, which, like the previous two examples, also contribute to the prolongation of war and the deterioration economies overall, particularly at the regional level. This is due to the fact that refugees tend to flee or migrate into neighbouring countries where refugee camps are set up, which has several types of negative externalities<sup>60</sup> that tend to arise at the regional level which, collectively, have the potential of

leading nations into a regional poverty trap.<sup>61</sup>

60 Idean Salehyan, "The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 52.4 (2008): 789.

61 However, this is not to say that refugee camps should be closed whatsoever. Instead, this author acknowledges their importance and necessity in contemporary conflict. Without them, many more millions of people would die. Therefore, the purpose of this argument and its examples are merely to shed light on the different ways in which refugee camps

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58 Kaldor, 114.

59 Currently, Bosnia-Herzegovina's HDI rank is 76. For more information please see HDI 2009, 192-194.



#### **4.4.1 Economic Burden**

First, refugee migration can inflict an economic burden on host countries.<sup>62</sup> Although some international aid is provided, refugee hosts tend to bear most of the costs for maintaining the refugees. For example, when East Pakistan (ie. modern day Bangladesh) ceded from Pakistan in March 1971 a chain of violence broke out between the Pakistani Army and the newly formed Mukti Bahini rebel army<sup>63</sup> of East Pakistan, and between India and Pakistan. The result was a massive refugee exodus in which an estimated 10 million people fled East Pakistan for India between April and December 1971.<sup>64</sup> The cost of caring for these refugees over the course of a six-month period was estimated at US \$175 million by the Indian government, which resulted in the imposition of new taxes on rail and air travel, postage and periodicals<sup>65</sup> in order to cover the humanitarian assistance and public service costs.<sup>66</sup> Regardless, war inevitably leads to refugee flows and refugees tend to flee to neighbouring countries where refugee camps are set up since these tend to be the safest places. However, the costs of refugee camps tend to be footed by the host country not only directly, but also through work-related and health-related costs.

#### **4.4.2 Ethnic Tensions**

Second, refugee arrivals can lead to ethnic tensions in host countries, not only due to the economic burden it carries, but also due to the fact that refugees are willing to accept employment at can in fact contribute to the prolongation of war, and thus, by extension, poverty as well. In no way is it meant to condone the idea that refugee camps should be closed.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., 792.

64 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *The State of the World's Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000): 59.

65 Salehyan, The Externalities of Civil Strife, 792.

66 Ibid., 789

wages much lower than those which must be paid to other labourers from that locality.<sup>67</sup> Not only does this create competition and resentment amongst host populations, but, as described by Adrian Martin, it also leads to an increase in, “existing perceptions of inequality, resulting in a hardening of group identities [thus] providing a catalyst for hostility towards out-groups [ie. the refugee community].”<sup>68</sup> In other words, these circumstances could lead to conflict between refugees and domestic actors. In addition, a sudden influx of refugees could upset the ethnic balance and balance of power in their host countries<sup>69</sup> which could also lead to refugees being perceived as unwelcome foreigners<sup>70</sup> who pose a cultural “threat” to the survival of the host community.<sup>71</sup> Again, the potential result is conflict between refugees and locals, and the transnationalization of conflict.

#### **4.4.3 Spread of Disease**

Third, refugee influxes can have negative public health consequences for host countries.<sup>72</sup> When wars break out there is a high chance of public health systems collapsing, which means no treatment for illnesses are available. So, if there is a disease outbreak it can rapidly spread amongst

67 Ibid., 793.

68 Adrian Martin, “Environmental Conflict between Refugee and Host Communities,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 42.3 (2005): 333.

69 Salehyan, The Externalities of Civil Strife, 790.

70 Ibid.

71 Myron Weiner, “Security, Stability, and International Migration,” *International Security* 17.3 (1992-1993): 110. In fact, Weiner provides a very interesting discussion regarding the complexities of a so-called “cultural threat.” In brief, he describes how it involves the way in which *host communities* define themselves in respect to how they define *who belongs*. The norms with regard to *who belongs* are governed by *whom* the host community admits, what rights and privileges they are granted and whether or not the host culture actually regards the migrant community as citizens. Thus, within these realms any violation by unwanted immigrants of such norms is often regarded as a threat to basic values and in that sense is perceived by the host community as a threat to national security and their cultural identity. For a more in depth discussion with historical examples please see Weiner, 110-114.

72 Salehyan, The Externalities of Civil Strife, 790.



national populations. In addition, since war tends to result in mass migration, if there is a disease outbreak and some citizens seek safety across borders, once they reach foreign destinations the disease can also spread to the population of the host country, thus having a regional impact as well. Furthermore, considering refugee camps are usually overcrowded and tend to lack sufficient sanitary resources, access to clean water, and food, this makes them a perfect environment for the spread of infectious diseases<sup>73</sup> including: HIV/AIDS, malaria, cholera, diarrhea,<sup>74</sup> measles, meningitis and respiratory infections.<sup>75</sup>

73 Paul Collier et. al. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2003): 36.

74 Salehyan, The Externalities of Civil Strife, 790.

75 Paul Collier et. al. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 25. Some examples of refugee camps where such diseases were/are rampant include the: (i) internally displaced persons in Somalia during 1992 who suffered from measles and diarrhea; (ii) Kurdish refugees in Iraq during 1991 who suffered from diarrhea; (iii)

Thus, not only does this divert domestic medical care resources away from local populations,<sup>76</sup> but it also results in the spread of disease to host populations who then find it difficult themselves to receive timely treatment since doctors are preoccupied with refugee patients on top of their regular patients. Therefore, not only can this further inflict an economic burden on and

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Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda during 1994 who suffered from meningitis; (iv) Rwandan refugees in Zaire (modern day Democratic Republic of the Congo) during 1994 who suffered from diarrhea; (v) Bhutanese refugees in Nepal from 1992–1993 who suffered from respiratory infections and diarrhea; (vi) residents in the eastern part of Democratic Republic of Congo during 2000 who suffered from malaria and diarrhea; and (vii) Afghanistan refugees in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran (today) who suffer from the HIV/AIDS epidemic. For more information please see Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 25 and “HIV/AIDS in Afghanistan,” *The World Bank – online* (August, 2008): 1-2.

76 Salehyan, The Externalities of Civil Strife, 790.

contribute to ethnic tensions within a host nation, but it can also contribute to the deterioration of available local resources and hurt local production. Together, all of these aspects can have negative impacts on the host country's domestic economy overall.

#### **4.4.4 A Place to Reorganize for Armed Conflict**

The final and most important negative externality that can be caused by refugee flows and ultimately lead a region into a regional poverty trap, along with the economic burdens, ethnic tensions and the spread of disease, is the fact that refugee camps, "can directly affect the security and stability of the host country by contributing to organized armed conflict on the host country's territory."<sup>77</sup> This is due to several important factors including: (i) that rebel groups can use refugee camps as bases for operations since they tend to be set up in another country thus allowing rebels to escape the jurisdiction

and repressive capacities of their home state<sup>78</sup> (since they are protected by the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity their host country enjoys); (ii) the fact that refugee flows to refugee camps allow rebels to blend in with innocent civilians which allows war to rapidly cross frontiers and turn into a transnational war; (iii) that refugee camps become part of the war economy as they provide rebels with a sanctuary where they have access to food, shelter, medical and security which allows them to heal, regroup and recruit in order to continue their struggle;<sup>79</sup> and (iv) that refugee migration to refugee camps can in fact extend violence to the host country as governments may pursue their ethnic rivals across the border<sup>80</sup> which has the potential of drawing the host state into the conflict as well.<sup>81</sup> Several examples of governments

78 Idean Salehyan, "Transnational Rebels: Neighbouring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups," *World Politics* 59.2 (2007): 219.

79 Münker, 89.

80 Salehyan, The Externalities of Civil Strife, 789-790.

81 Several examples of governments pursuing their ethnic rivals across borders include: the Turkish government's war against underground Kurdish

77 Ibid.



pursuing their ethnic rivals across borders include: the Turkish government's war against underground Kurdish organizations; Israel's operations in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the wars in West Africa; frontier conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia; and the civil wars in Chad, Sudan and Angola. The result of each: a transnational war.

Thus, the complex dichotomy of shadow globalization as being both good and bad can be understood as follows: although its different aspects (ie. external financing, humanitarian aid and refugee camps) to many extents have good intentions behind them (ie. saving lives, helping civilians etc.), these same aspects are taken advantage offor bad purposes, such as the prolongation of war by insurgents who use them for self-preservation. The result is that conflict is ongoing and more people end up dying, while national and regional economies overall continue to decline. Regardless, the most clear cut example of this, and II of the other aforementioned aspects regarding new wars, shadow globalization, conflict traps and how all together can lead to national and regional poverty traps, involves Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and the Central African Republic's ongoing conflict with the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).



DRC.<sup>82</sup> Naturally, as is the common case in new wars, the result has been humanitarian aid being sent and the setting up of refugee camps. Thus, like in the case of Somalia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, humanitarian aid and refugee camps have only contributed to the prolongation of this conflict.<sup>83</sup> Not only have convoys been looted for food and supplies, but some refugee camps have become home to upward of 50,000 people<sup>84</sup> which has made it easy for Kony's soldiers to hide alongside civilians when injured, hungry or in retreat. Refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) camps have also been subject to brutal attacks

82 Pascal Zachary, "Humanitarian Dilemmas," *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-) 32.3 (2008): 44.

83 However, this example is not to say that humanitarian aid and refugee camps should be abolished altogether. In fact, the author believes quite the contrary as both mechanisms have become two of the most important aspects of any contemporary conflict since they are the only ways of helping and saving the lives of millions of innocent civilians around the world. Instead, this example is just to exemplify the character of new wars and how their prolonged nature contributes to a state and even a region's overall decline.

84 For example, the Pabbo Camp in Northern Uganda houses over 50,000 people, while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has quoted that 1.4 million internally displaced persons still remain in Uganda. Therefore, the option of blending in with civilians is widely available for Kony's combatants. For more information, please see Zachary, 45; and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Uganda: Working Environment," *UNHCR Global Appeal 2010-2011* (2010): *supra* note I at 86.

#### **4.4.5 The Case of Central Africa: How New Wars can Lead to a Conflict Trap, and how Both can Lead to National and Regional Poverty Traps**

For over 20 years, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), headed by Joseph Kony, has been engaged in a violent and brutal campaign to establish a theocratic government in Uganda, during which time untold numbers of adults have been raped, tens of thousands of children abducted for sexual slavery or servitude as child soldiers, and over two-million people displaced between Uganda, Sudan and

organizations; Israel's operations in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the wars in West Africa; frontier conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia; and the civil wars in Chad, Sudan and Angola. For more information please see Münkler, 89.



by the LRA.<sup>85</sup> Furthermore, Kony and his combatants have constantly crossed the borders of neighbouring

85 For example, Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot discovered that apart from low-intensity and small-scale assaults, the LRA has been responsible for the following major massacres at refugee and IDP camps Atiak, where an estimated 170-220 were killed on the 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1995; Karuma, where 50 were killed on the 8<sup>th</sup> March 1996; Acholpi refugee camp, where 100 were killed in July 1996; and Lokung- Palabek where over 400 were killed in January 1997. Also, in February 2004 the LRA attacked an IDP camp near Lira killing over 40, and leaving charred bodies and over a hundred smoldering huts behind them. Such activities, which are much more widespread than these few examples, have in fact resulted in the Ugandan, Sudanese and Congolese governments developing a collective (ie. regional) response to such refugee and IDP camp security threats by deploying military forces to throughout such areas in an attempt to control rebel incursions and to police border crossings. For more information of attacks by the LRA against refugee and internally displaced person camps please see Ruddy Doom, "Kony's Message: A New Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda," *African Affairs* 98.390 (1999): 25-26; Kevin Dunn, "Uganda: The Lord's Resistance Army," *Review of African Political Economy* 31.99 (ICTs 'Virtual Colonisation' & Political Economy - Mar., 2004): 139-140; and Karen Jacobsen, "Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and African State-building," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 40.4 (2002): 589-590.

countries, namely into the DRC and Sudan, where they are protected by the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, thus escaping Ugandan jurisdiction and the reach of the Ugandan military. Overall, these circumstances have drawn other nations throughout the region into the conflict, the most significant example of which can be conveyed via what has been termed the 'Christmas Eve Massacre.'

On the 14<sup>th</sup> December 2008, the Ugandan Army led a joint military operation with support from the armies of the DRC, Southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic by which they attacked the LRA headquarters located in the DRC's Garamba National Park which is located near the border with Sudan. This forced Kony's men to retreat, by which LRA members dispersed into several groups, each of which targeted civilians along their paths. After laying low for a week, the LRA regrouped and on the 24<sup>th</sup> December 2008 launched three simultaneous and devastatingly barbaric attacks<sup>86</sup> against civilians in northern DRC after families had gathered for Christmas festivities. The result was the brutal massacre of at least 620 civilians and the abduction of more than 160 children.<sup>87</sup> Thus, not only is this a clear representation of an ongoing transnational conflict, but after considering the overall economic circumstances of these four countries one can see that the LRA's activities, along with those of other fragmented competing factions that exist throughout the region, have had severe negative impacts on the overall economies of these four nations. In other words, these circumstances have contributed to not only national poverty traps, but a regional poverty trap as well, which is reflected in each of their individual HDI rankings for 2009: Sudan 150<sup>th</sup>; Uganda 157<sup>th</sup>;

86 For example, crushing skulls with axes, machetes, and large wooden bats. Also, most of the few who survived had severe head wounds, and two 3-year-old girls had serious neck injuries which were a result of LRA combatants trying to twist off their heads. For more information please see Niels Jacob Harbitz, "LRA kills more than 600 in Christmas massacre in DR Congo," *Human Rights House Network – online* (2009): pgph. 3.

87 Niels Jacob Harbitz, "LRA kills more than 600 in Christmas massacre in DR Congo," *Human Rights House Network – online* (2009): pgph. 1-3.



Congo 176<sup>th</sup>; and the Central African Republic 179<sup>th</sup>.<sup>88</sup>

#### **4.5 Reflection and Summary on National and Regional Poverty Traps**

Thus, in reflecting again on each of the aforementioned examples, it is clear to see that not only did humanitarian aid and refugee or IDP camps contribute to the prolongation of war, but they also contributed to a further transnationalization of war and thus by extension a deterioration in nations' economies overall. Moreover, all of these factors together, as has been shown with the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that of Central Africa in particular, can severely damage the economic structures of neighbouring states, resulting in either regional economic decline or even regional stagnation in development and economic growth. In fact, Idean Salehyan and Kristian Gleditsch summarize the impact of new wars best in stating that:

[c]onflicts may diffuse through a series of externality effects [ie. economic burden, ethnic tension, the spread of disease, refugee camps, organized armed conflict]. For example, civil wars in one country may cause a decline in trade and investment throughout the region, which leads to deteriorating economic conditions, in turn leading to conditions making conflict [throughout the region] more likely [such as the case of Central Africa].<sup>89</sup>

Thus, taking into account all of the different aspects discussed and examples used in this paper, it is safe to conclude that new wars can lead to conflict traps, and that both together have the potential to lead countries into a poverty trap, and regions into a regional poverty trap.

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88 HDI 2009, 193-194.

89 Idean Salehyan, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War," *International Organization* 60.2 (2006): 336.

## **5. Recommendations: Lower Trade Barriers and Increase Regional Integration Strategies**

Although brief, due to space constraints, the following are a few recommendations on how the poorest countries could start to overcome poverty and poverty traps. The first and most obvious recommendation is that richer nations need to lower protective tariffs, non-tariff trade barriers, domestic subsidies and physical quotas. Otherwise, developing nations stand no chance of becoming competitive in the international market which is the only opportunity they have for raising incomes, increasing growth and overcoming their current reliance on primary product exports. With more money comes more opportunities; economic, social, educational and the like. The second recommendation is that states and international organizations need to move away from bilateral approaches to development. Instead, they should begin to focus on regional approaches to development.

To date, regionalism,<sup>90</sup> or regional integration, is usually defined on the basis of the geographical proximity of nations within a particular area<sup>91</sup> (ie. the I.R. of Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan; Canada-U.S.-Mexico; EU member states; or Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia-Thailand etc.). According to advocates of regionalism, this is due to the fact that:

1. There is a natural tendency towards regionalism based on the homogeneity of interests, traditions, and values within small groups of neighbouring states;
2. Political, economic, and social integration is more easily attained among a lesser number of states within a limited geographic area than on a global basis; and

90 For the purposes of this paper, regionalism refers to organizations that include three or more members.

91 Leroy Bennett, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues 7<sup>th</sup> ed.*, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2002): 236.

3. Regional economic cooperation provides more efficient economic units than the smaller states, and these larger units can compete successfully in world markets.<sup>92</sup>

In other words, as a more unified unit neighbouring countries could in fact increase their potentials for development and competition in the international market since: (i) each will have the opportunity of benefiting from each other's developments while, (ii) simultaneously growing alongside one another at relatively similar paces. Furthermore, should something go wrong in one nation it is in the interest of its regional neighbours to help it overcome the obstacle(s), otherwise they too risk being affected by the problem. As a consequence, this facilitates trust and ultimately leads to better cooperation between neighbouring countries, thus making war much less likely and development much more probable.<sup>93</sup>

Additional support for adopting regional approaches to development can be found via the UN, which has increasingly been undertaking regional-based projects focusing on development. For example, the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) now have a particular focus on regional aims which include the development of: (i) regional transport policies and infrastructures; (ii) regional trade integration policies, trade facilitation and border crossing mandates; (iii) regional cooperation to promote sustainable development; and (iv) support to national policymaking on social and economic issues related to MDGs.<sup>94</sup> Even the United Nations Office on

92 Ibid., 237-238.

93 Interestingly, despite the fact that regionalists and universalists disagree on many aspects of development, they do agree on the fact that, "the international system must eventually be modified from the primacy of the nation-state in the direction of a partial surrender of state sovereignty to larger political units." Thus, according to this author, the only way that this will come to be is by first establishing regional entities by which some sovereignty has been given up, like in the EU. For more information and an excellent comparison between the arguments of regionalists and universalists please see Bennett, 236-239.

94 United Nations Regional Commissions and the Millennium Development Goals, "Brochures: A regional approach to a global problem," *United Nations - online* (2010): 2.

Drugs and Crime has adopted a regional approach to increasing law enforcement capacities and combating against illicit trafficking, corruption, and the spread of HIV/AIDS known as the Paris Pact Initiative,<sup>95</sup> one particular regional strategy of which is mapped out in the Rainbow Strategy papers.<sup>96</sup> In brief, UN agencies and member states have realized the overall benefits of regional approaches to development so have begun focusing on this area, as opposed to bilateral approaches. In summary, international trade policies need to be fair and regional approaches to development projects need to be undertaken as both are mandatory for overcoming conflict, poverty and poverty traps.<sup>97</sup>



## 6. Conclusion

According to Edward Luttwak, “although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace,”<sup>98</sup> while interventions, cease-fires, refugee camps, humanitarian aid and armistices imposed on warring factions by the international community are merely representative of, “combat [being] suspended momentarily [with] a state of hostility prolonged indefinitely.”<sup>99</sup> Despite the fact that there is perhaps some truth to such claims, since they each can

95 For more information please see UNODC Paris Pact Initiative, “What is it?,” *UNODC – online* (2010).

96 According to UNODC’s website, “the Rainbow Strategy is a regional response to the threat posed by the supply, trafficking and consumption of Afghan opiates.” In brief, it aims to reduce the supply, trafficking, and consumption of opiates in Afghanistan, surrounding countries and the world via regional security measures. For more information please see UNODC Paris Pact Initiative, “Rainbow Strategy Papers,” *UNODC – online* (2010).

97 However, it is important to note that the author is aware of the fact that overcoming poverty and poverty traps is much more complex than the very brief recommendations in this particular section offer. First, in order to adequately discuss the benefits and importance of regional integration for development strategies warrants not only an entire essay in itself, but perhaps even research that would compile an entire book. Second, the author is limited by space constraints.

98 Edward Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” *Foreign Affairs* 78.4 (1999): 36.

99 Ibid., 37.

potentially contribute to the prolongation of war, if the international community were to follow Luttwak’s advice this would mean closing refugee camps, halting humanitarian aid and leaving millions of innocent civilians to die in an impoverished environment ruled by natural law. This author, however, cannot agree with such a strategy. In an increasingly globalized world, conflict not only has an impact on a domestic economy but also on regional ones, so Luttwak’s arguments, if followed, would in fact be more detrimental to a region than otherwise. Therefore, it is this author’s belief that the only way to overcome the avenues for conflict and poverty traps is to help impoverished nations break their cycles of poverty so citizens have hope for and a chance at a better future. However, this will only be achieved with fairer international trade laws and a more unified international approach to regional development. Furthermore, if all persons in a developing nation have more equal opportunities to pursue a life outside of poverty (i.e. through education, jobs etc.), then ethnic and political tensions would gradually be reduced and eventually overcome. The final result, therefore, could very well be that conflict and poverty traps one day become obsolete.

# Good With A multi





# Good Governance Without Democracy? A multilinear approach on governance

Joost B. van Dieren

En sus programas de desarrollo, los Estados-Nación occidentales y las instituciones internacionales (como las Naciones Unidas o el Banco Mundial) promueven la democracia en todo el mundo. La democracia es, para estas instituciones, el camino más adecuado para conseguir o consumar libertad y alcanzar un desarrollo económico próspero que traiga prosperidad. Como consecuencia, las políticas tildadas como *no democráticas* son a menudo vistas como negativas. El autor de este artículo critica este enfoque, y pretende demostrar que la buena gobernanza puede existir en países cuyos modelos de gobierno y/o políticas no son democráticos.

Existe una diferencia entre la teoría y la práctica de la democracia. Debido a que la anterior descansa sobre principios normativos, todas las democracias fallan, de algún modo, al ideal teórico de la democracia. Así pues, el foco de atención no debe ponerse en la democratización per se, sino en la buena gobernanza. Esto producirá buenos resultados para la sociedad, y desarrollo multilinear reconocido para los países.

Para probar que la Buena gobernanza puede existir sin democracia, el autor examina dos casos de estudio: Singapur y Bután. También examina dos teorías enfrentadas del ámbito del desarrollo socioeconómico: el principio del paradigma de desarrollo unilineal, y el paradigma de desarrollo multilinear. Finalmente, el autor manifiesta que, en ocasiones, las democracias no son sino fachadas que sirven para ocultar estructuras subyacentes que modelan la sociedad y las políticas de los Estados a nivel de calle. Así pues, las democracias funcionales no son lo mismo que las democracias nominales, y pueden incluso dificultar los objetivos de paz y desarrollo. Esta investigación concluye que resulta pertinente cambiar el enfoque actual centrado únicamente en baremos democráticos por un enfoque centrado en los resultados producidos a través de las políticas de gobierno como medida(s) de buena gobernanza.

# Introduction

Although the concept of democracy was still being contested five decades ago (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek 2006), the programmes of international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) or the World Bank now promote it as the most appropriate way to achieve freedom and development in ever more parts of the world (Abdellatif, 2003). Much research has been conducted, in an attempt to understand this relationship between democratization and development. Indeed, it is often argued that democracy will bring about or increase a country's rate of development, or that a modern society will, in turn, bring about or hasten the democratization process within countries.

In this research, it is argued that it is impossible to impose democracy, or make it work in all countries, since every society's development follows its own path. Democracy does not fit within every nation's context, and in certain cases, is merely a façade which disguises actual political practices. It can thus be questioned whether democracy really is the most appropriate form of government. This research joins the debate on democratization and development, but simultaneously diverges from it by focusing on good governance. This approach makes it possible to move away from the dichotomy of democracy and non-democracy, since the focus should be on positive outcomes for society, regardless of whether its governance is or isn't democratic in practice. This study will attempt to find an answer to the following main research question:

## Can there be good governance without democracy?

This is a critical question, because it may move the discussion away from the concentration on democratization per se and back to the issue of whether a country can be governed in a positive way, with respect to its citizens and their needs, regardless of whether the polity is democratic. This would also support the view that societies differ when it comes to their own unique development paths.

In this research, a deliberate distinction has been made between democratic and non-democratic governance, and is, essentially, a critique of Western countries' systematic promotion of democracy as the sole model of development. The purpose of this work is not to discover which polity is the best alternative to democracy, only whether a particular system can be considered to be good governance. In some ways, this will result in a simplification of reality, in the sense that some non-democracies will be more democratic than others, and vice versa.

In the first part of this study, in an attempt to find an answer to the main research question, an overview of the two paradigms of societal development is provided; one asserts that development and democratization are intrinsically linked, whereas the other states that all societies develop in their own way, because of their individual contexts. This section of the work thus provides the basis for the

critique of the notion that all societies could fit the ideal of democracy.

In the second part of this research, the democratic principles are examined, and critiqued. This is important for the case studies herein, since the criticism of democracy provides an opportunity to argue in support of there being good governance in countries with non-democratic administrations.

The third section introduces the concept of good governance, which will be examined with the aim of highlighting both why it is so important, and the differences between democracy and good governance.

Based on the literature that is reviewed, the cases of Singapore and Bhutan are examined in the fourth section of this study. These are countries that have developed in their own unique ways, without the practice of democracy (according to democratic principles), and are, therefore, valuable sources of information when it comes to answering the main research question.

## 1. Development paradigms


Before inspecting the democratic ideal and the criticisms of it, it is important to examine the theories behind the general paradigms of societal development. Doing so will provide a general theoretical background to the case studies of Singapore and Bhutan, which follow later in this research. Moreover, on the basis of this background, arguments that countries follow their own development paths can be put into the perspective of societal progress.

Within the literature, a distinction can be made between two contradictory perspectives, or paradigms, of societal development. The first is the unilinear development paradigm, which presumes that, although at different rates, all societies go through the same stages of development, with modernity being the final rung (Rostow 1963). The second is the multilinear development paradigm, which presumes that each society develops differently (Steward 1955).

### 1. The unilinear development paradigms

The paradigm of unilinear development consists of many, competing theories, proposed by many different authors, and can be traced back to the ancient Greek philosophers, Plato, and his pupil, Aristotle.<sup>1</sup> Since having an overview of this theory is important when it comes to comparing it to the multilinear development paradigm, a summary of its main premises and assumptions, and a critique thereof, is

<sup>1</sup> For Aristotle, for example, the Greek political paradigm was the ultimate indicator of civilization. Greek culture, he argued, had evolved to the point where laws, self-rule and justice had replaced the chaotic barbarism of much of the rest of the ancient world (Murray 2003).



Unilinear development: Rostow's model of development.

provided.<sup>2</sup>

The main hypothesis of the unilinear paradigm is that all societies go from being traditional (with various polities) to modern (with a democratic polity, which is more valued). From this perspective, a country's underlying conditions, such as its economy, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, socio-cultural traditions, or other structural features, will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the development process (Carothers 2007). A clear example of unilinear development thought is Rostow's theory of "Stages of Economic Growth", which identifies different stages, variables and processes through which a society develops. This (positivist) evolution implies that all societies will go through the stages through which Western society has passed; from a traditional to a modern, democratic society.<sup>3</sup> Europe and North America make up the (modern) first world, the centrally planned economies and the former USSR the second world, and the rest of the world the (traditional) third world.

The notion of modern (or first world) societies connects unilinear theory to capitalism, democracy and Western cultural hegemony, since Western liberal democratic polity is more highly valued than the polity of traditional societies. Accordingly, it is often thought that unilinear development theory considers development to be replicating the "stages of growth" of the Western, modern, countries (Dibua 2006). With this view, the yet to be modernized countries are viewed as being inferior, even when they have attained

the same standards of living as in the West. The present, observable differences are explained by the claim that every society has started at different places along the development path, and have progressed at different rates. The implication is that, not only is the direction of development inevitable, but that some societies are more advanced than others. It is for this reason that this theory is often criticized.

The vulnerability of the unilinear development paradigm became clear in research conducted at the beginning of twentieth century, when it was obvious that some countries failed to fit into the stages that the concept demanded. However, some, mainly (development) economists, persisted in using the theory as the foundation for modernization projects, such as the Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1980s, which concentrated on encouraging governments to adapt to more Western standards of governance (SAPRIN 2004). These programmes obliged the developing countries to adopt the Western notions of the free market and democracy. Even as recently as 1994, after strong criticism from many international organisations, the World Bank stated that "In African countries that have undertaken some reforms and achieved some increase in growth, the majority of the poor are better off and almost no worse off" (World Bank 1994). This provides the World Bank (amongst other international financial institutions) with the justification to proceed with its modernization activities. Among the features of modern society that are deemed to be worthy of imitation, are the extensive division of labour and specialization, urbanization, high productivity, self-sustaining economic growth, well functioning and active state apparatus, a

2 For a far greater overview of unilinear development: Rienstra, 2007.

3 For more details: Rostow, 1963

democratic form of government, and equality before the law. Szirmai adds the notions of rationality, efficient institutions and attitudes, national integration and increased social discipline,(Szirmai2005).

economic conditions which exist between the developed and developing countries. In this light, the Western elite use notions of unilinear evolution as a justification of power.

In summary, the unilinear development paradigm has three main assumptions: (Haferkamp and Smelser 1992)

## 1.2. Critique of unilinear development paradigm

Many scientists, and cultural anthropologists in particular, have criticized the narrow-minded approach of unilinear development paradigm theories. They regard them as Western myths, which are seldom based on a solid empirical footing (generally only on empirical evidence from Western countries). Early critics have argued that the theories were speculative, and systematically misrepresented ethnographic data (Dudgeon 2004). At the same time, they have rejected the categorisation between traditional and modern societies, arguing that so-called traditional, primitive societies have just as much history, and are just as evolved, as their so-called modern equivalents (Steward 1955). This categorisation between traditional and modern also falsely assumes that every society will follow the same path, and has the same goals as those in the West. Furthermore, as noted earlier, critics have claimed that this notion of modernity has an ethnocentric, Western bias. The valuation of Western, liberal-democratic society as the most developed form of governance makes a significant judgement of its non-Western (non-democratic) counterparts. Moreover, the critics have argued that it is simply impossible for all countries to go through the same stages of growth, since internal and external circumstances, time and geographical locations clearly differ from those in the West. Accordingly, the term, development, does not mean that every country would become a liberal democracy like in the West (as is argued in the unilinear paradigm). It instead stresses that, even if a country does become a democracy, there would still be differences in its form and the way it is practiced, bearing in mind the differences between societies. For this reason, no society and its polity will be the same. The general principles of democracy can be embodied in a variety of ways, depending on the context. Thus, when democracy is regarded as the system in which the people rule, the methods of exercising this rule still can vary, depending on the social system and economic development peculiar to each country. These methods also tend to vary depending on political, demographic, economic, and social change. Consequently, the point made here is that no society can simply be put into a unilinear model of general stages of development and expect to become like a Western liberal-democratic nation. Every society has its own context, to which its polity is connected.

Moreover, according to the concept's critics, it cannot be held that societies are clearly bounded and distinct, since one culture and its features are spread across many societies, especially by colonization and, later, globalization. In this context, some critics have even argued that, because unilinear theory is scientific, it has been used to support unjust and often racist social practices, such as colonialism, slavery, and the unequal

1. Societies are either traditional or modern.
2. Societies undergo internal differentiation.
3. Societies will inevitably develop.

These assumptions are not empirically sound, and are contradicted by evidence. Steward, as one of the main contesters of unilinear development paradigms, maintains that "there is no need to discuss the validity of the [unilinear theories], for their vulnerability in the face of twentieth century, (...) ethnographic research has been amply demonstrated. (...) [The theories] failed completely to recognize significant patterns and processes of change in particular cases" (Steward 1955, p. 15). Societies in both the past and today, fail to fit into the general model of unilinear stages of development. This calls for an approach, which considers the multilinearity of these societies, and has a more neutral approach to their variety and value.

## 1.3. The multilinear development paradigm

Just as with the unilinear development paradigm, the multilinear development approach is comprised of many, often competing, theories, proposed by many authors. Julian Steward, author of the 1955 book 'Theory of Culture Change', is considered to be one of the founders of the multilinear development paradigm. The theory of "multilinear evolution", as he termed it, examined the way in which societies adapted to their environments. He argued that anthropologists are not limited to descriptions of specific, existing cultures, believing that it is possible to create theories with which to analyze typical, common cultures, which are representative of specific eras or regions. So far as the decisive factors determining the development of a given culture are concerned, he pointed to technology and economics, political systems, ideologies and religion. All of these elements propel the evolution of a given society in several directions at the same time, resulting in multilinearity (Steward, 1955).

Multilinear development theories evolved as a twentieth-century response to the nineteenth-century unilinear development paradigm. The criticisms of the latter became more widely accepted because the two World Wars affected the self-confidence of Western, democratic, countries. The destruction that resulted put the notion of progress towards the Western stage of growth into another perspective. It also revealed that the developmental processes of the supposedly developed, democratic countries were not yet complete, and that progress was not

the same as development. This led to scholars questioning what the real meaning of the notion of development should be.

The foundation of contemporary understanding of multilinear development theories is the rejection of the premise of universal stages, and the acknowledgement that development follows many different paths. Authors writing in support of the multilinear paradigm, argue that there is no one process which all societies inevitably follow (Dudgeon 2004). According to these scholars, there is no prescribed, unilinear development path which is relevant to every society, which, instead, develops along different, unique (and possibly incompatible) paths (Haferkamp and Smelser 1992). The outcome may well differ from liberal democracy based on Western experience. Szirmai acknowledges this by stating that initial conditions and circumstances are so different for each country, region and historical period, that developmental experiences cannot simply be copied from the West. At every stage of development, there are alternative paths and options (Szirmai 2005).

In contrast to the unilinear development paradigm, the theories of the multilinear concept are careful to avoid unsourced, ethnocentric speculation, comparisons, or value judgments. Instead, individual societies are regarded as existing within their own, unique, historical contexts. Furthermore, the theories relevant to the multilinear development approach do not claim that Western modern, democratic societies are necessarily the best, even though the assumption may be that they have adapted in the best,

or the most sustainable ways to their unique contexts. Every society has its own history, making inter-societal comparison difficult to perform (Bendor, 1975).

The multilinear development theories reject the assertion that development is the same as progress, which is a characteristic of the unilinear development paradigm. Progress implies a goal (such as becoming modern), which a society strives to achieve. Development does not have to be associated with this notion of progress. In fact, it can, essentially, be defined as change within a certain period of time. These theories refute the normative valuation of the idea of development towards progress or modernity, instead providing the opportunity to witness the specific development of each country. Whether this can be valued more or less in comparison to other countries is immaterial.

The authors of multilinear theories, who are generally cultural anthropologists, examine cultures as emergent systems, and argue that the complete social environment, which includes political and economic relationships, must be considered. As political, economic and cultural factors are not isolated within society, Sahlins and Service argue that there is interaction, and a diffusion of their qualities, based on power differences. According to them, this causes societies to deviate from the unilinear development process, and develop in their own specific ways (Sahlins and Service 1960).

Szirmai (2005) examines this interaction and diffusion by focusing on the economic relationships that are



based on their dependent structure, and how they relate to underdevelopment. He argues that the only way for underdeveloped countries to grow and industrialize, is for them to withdraw from the global network of dependent relationships that characterize the capitalist international economic order, and seek alternative paths of development. In this way, globalization would be a reason for countries to develop along different paths, instead of increasingly taking the same approach. The 1969 research by Cardoso and Falleto provided some interesting insights. They maintain that the expansion of the capitalistic, global system resulted in different outcomes in several South American countries. These differences are rooted in the diversity of natural resources, the different periods in which these economies have been incorporated into the international system, the different times at which sections of the local classes allied or clashed with foreign interests or organized different forms of state, sustained distinct ideologies, tried to implement various policies, or defined alternative strategies with which to cope with imperialist challenges at diverse periods of history (Cardoso and Falleto 1969). This highlights the different internal and external contexts of time and place; although globalization can surely be seen as a unilinear phenomenon, the outcomes are different everywhere.<sup>4</sup>

In summary, as Steward pointed out, when these ideas about multilinear development are taken together: (Dudgeon 2004)

1. Societies have their own, specific development paths.
2. Societies can develop along many potential paths.
3. Development is not necessarily equivalent to progress.

<sup>4</sup> An illustrative example is that of Russia: Fedorov (2000) Democratization and Globalization: the Case of Russia. url: <https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/6576/fedorov.pdf?sequence=1>



## 1.4. Conclusion development paradigms.

As often in social science, the truth lies somewhere in between the two ends of the spectrum. The unilinear and multilinear paradigms discussed in this part are not a complete dichotomy because, although they are contradictory, they are not mutually exclusive (Rienstra 2007). There are, undeniably, aspects of development that are the same in every country, despite the criticism of the unilinear paradigm; increased social complexity and political multiplicity, the growth of the service sector, economic differentiation, urbanization, and the decline of the agricultural sector are just a few examples. Thus, there is, to some degree, unilinearity in how societies progress. However, multilinear development of societies state that countries develop differently; in reality multilinear changes then coexist with unilinear development because the political end-form is not democracy per se. Other forms



of governance can also tackle the unilinear aspects evident in the progress of countries. Therefore, other forms of governance remain, and will be considered in the remainder of this research.<sup>5</sup>

## 2. The democratic ideal

Thirty years ago, only a quarter of the countries around the world were democracies. Since then, the democracy has grown rapidly, and is now generally accepted and promoted as the best polity, and is often regarded as the only legitimate form of governance. Samuel Huntington (1991) referred to this widespread international push towards democracy as the third wave of democratization, with the United States being its biggest promoter. According to his theory, the processes of transformation, transplacement and eventually replacement of authoritarian governments would give way to democracy.

This part of this research focuses on the normative content of democratic theory, as a basis for the criticism of the value placed upon democracy. It will, therefore, set out the principles thereof, and highlight why it is so strongly promoted and prized.

Providing one universal definition of democracy is problematic. There are many different explanations proposed by many different scholars, yet the term is used as if we all agree upon its meaning. The word democracy itself is derived from the ancient Greek, Dēmokratia, which means rule by the people<sup>6</sup>. Although this may be a very narrow interpretation, it does reveal its essence. It provides the basis for comparing democracy with other forms of governance, and clarifies that in a democratic country, the citizens have the opportunity to influence politics. Accordingly, Schumpeter (1947, p. 269) describes democracy as "arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote". Yet, there are many more ways of determining the essence of democracy. Bobbio (1987, p. 24) defines it as being "characterized by a set of rules which establish who is authorized to take collective decisions and which procedures are to be applied". Saward (1998, p. 15), on the other hand, describes it as "a political system, in which the citizens themselves have an equal effective input in the making of binding collective decisions".

To a certain extent, Beetham (1992, p. 40) combines these different definitions, and defines democracy as "a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control and where all members of the collective enjoy effective equal rights to take part in the decision making".

The underlying normative assumptions of these definitions of democracy are immediately obvious. Questions arise about the feasibility of notions such as 'the people' (who are

they?), 'majority rule' (is this a just form of rule?), 'effective equal rights' (can this ever be realized?) and 'taking part in decision making' (to what degree, and at which levels of society?). By questioning these ideas, we can investigate the norms and values that underlie them, and eventually start a discussion about the principles of democracy itself. It is then possible to argue that a functional democracy cannot be established in its absolute form anywhere in the world, meaning that there are deficiencies in the way in which it functions in many countries. If this is the case, it can also be stated that democracy is not the best form of governance for every nation.

### 2.1. Principles of democracy

It is now time to look at the main principles of democracy. One of the clearest and most comprehensive works on the concept is Robert A. Dahl's 'Democracy and its critics' (1989). Although an older study, it is generally regarded as being a classical landmark in democratic theory, upon which much literature is based. The list below will follow Dahl's division of a full democracy into five key principles (Dahl 1989). Any compromise on one or more of these criteria results in partial, procedural democracy, or democracy with respect to some essential aspects of governance, but not others (Dessallien 2005).

- 1) **Political equality:** Everyone has an equal capacity for self-determination, and therefore an equal right to influence collective decisions and to have their interests considered when these are made (Dessallien 2005).
- 2) **Effective participation:** All citizens have an adequate and equal opportunity to express their preferences about final outcomes (Dessallien 2005).
- 3) **Enlightened understanding:** Every citizen has an adequate and equal opportunity to discover and validate what his/her preference is on a public issue (Dessallien 2005).
- 4) **Control of the agenda:** Citizens may decide on the topics for public decision-making (they may also decide collectively that certain decisions should be made outside the democratic process) (Dessallien 2005).
- 5) **Inclusiveness:** All adults who are subject to a government and its laws have the right to participate as full members of the democratic process (Dessallien 2005).

According to Dahl (1989), to achieve full democracy according to these five key principles, it is necessary to satisfy the following criteria:<sup>7</sup>

- **Election of government officials** – A basic criterion of democracy is the election of members of parliament,

5 This explains the 'multilinear approach on governance' in this work's title.

6 Dēmokratia can be divided in two elements: 'dēmos' meaning people, mob, the many, and 'kratos' meaning rule or power.

7 Dahl typified incomplete democracies as "polyarchies".



Demokratios - the rule of the people in Athens' Agora

the legislature and the head of government (Dahl 1979 and Beetham 1994). Control over a government's decisions about policy has to be continually vested in elected officials. It includes the reach of the electoral process, its inclusiveness, returning elections, its independence and its fairness. This forms the basis of *rule by the people*. It considers people to be self-determining agents, who should have a say on issues that affect their lives (Beetham 1994). The people are the highest authority, and the government is based on their will. Elected representatives at both the national and local levels must listen to the people and be responsive to their needs (Diamond 2004). The representatives are elected according to the procedure of *majority rule*. This implies that with a majority of votes, a decision or mandate can be considered democratic. Most of the time, unanimity will not be possible. According to democratic theory, majority rule is related to the democratic principle of equality, and leaves the fewest people feeling dissatisfied.

- ***Regular, free, and fair elections*** – In a democracy, people have a choice between different candidates and parties who want the power to govern. This is because ordinary citizens are necessary for the performance of other important functions, which ensure that society continues to function; not everyone can be directly involved in running the country

(Namibia Civic and Voter Education Campaign, 2003). The people can criticize and replace their elected leaders and representatives if they do not perform well (Diamond 2004). Therefore, an *open and accountable government* is required to ensure that the elected and appointed officials perform their duties properly, responsibly, and according to the law (Namibia Civic and Voter Education Campaign, 2003).

- ***Inclusive suffrage*** – Practically all citizens have the equal right to vote in an election, which means that one-person has one-vote (Dahl 1989). To achieve this, a democracy needs *inclusive citizenship*. This means that all of the citizens of a country (that is, all those who were born in a country or have lived there long enough to become naturalised) obey its laws and are not excluded from any of the rights referred to above (Namibia Civic and Voter Education Campaign, 2003). This *rule of law* protects the rights of citizens, maintains order, and limits the power of government. All citizens are equal under the law. No-one may be discriminated against based on his or her race, religion, ethnic group, or gender. The law must be enforced impartially, fairly, and consistently, by courts that are independent of the other branches of government.<sup>8</sup> In a democracy, citizens have certain

8

Following de Montesquieu's 'separation of power' model.

basic rights that the state cannot take away from them. However, citizens have an obligation to exercise these rights peacefully, with respect for the law and for the rights of others (Diamond 2004).

- *The right of all citizens to run for public office* – Almost all adults have the right to run for elective office in the government (Dahl 1989).
- *Freedom of expression* – Citizens have the right to express themselves on broadly defined political matters without danger of severe punishment. These include the criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socio-economic order, and the prevailing ideology (Dahl 1989). Everyone has the right to hold their own beliefs, including their religion, and to say and write what they think. Linked to freedom of expression is *tolerance*, meaning that everyone has to be willing to accept that other people living in the same country may have different political ideas, opinions and preferences (Namibia Civic and Voter Education Campaign, 2003).
- *Citizens have a right to sources of information other than from official channels*: Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, these alternative resources must exist and be protected by laws (Dahl 1989). Democracy is built upon choice – if you do not agree with a specific option, there should at least be others to consider. However, the available options should not only be those offered by government (Namibia Civic and Voter Education Campaign, 2003). *Transparency* is connected to this. In a democracy, citizens have the right to know what the government is saying and doing on their behalf, so that they can evaluate these actions and hold the government responsible (Namibia Civic and Voter Education Campaign, 2003).
- *Associational autonomy* – To achieve their various rights, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups (Dahl, 1989).

Providing a list of the principles of democracy is a difficult undertaking. These principles are themselves not free of the underlying cultural norms and values from which the concept of democracy sprang forth. Lively (1975) argues that no empirical work on democracy can escape a normative load since it cannot avoid the necessity for a definition of democracy that is based on a statement of democratic ends.

Arising from these principles, democracy becomes associated with terms such as liberty, justice, peace, equality, power of the people, and human rights (Carrión 2006). These ideals can be valued so highly that striving to attain them is a goal. However, they are also normative, and almost impossible to achieve in reality. This means that the concept of democracy is very much open to debate. Accordingly, the list set out above is offered as an overview, and is certainly not all-embracing.<sup>9</sup> It,

<sup>9</sup> Therefore, the criteria of polyarchy are supplemented here by related criteria, found in work of other authors (Diamond

nevertheless, provides a background to the critique, which will follow in the next section of this research.

## 2.2. A critical view of democracy<sup>10</sup>

Even Dahl (1989) described his normative model of democracy as being so demanding that it would not be possible for any human organization to meet its democratic principles. In 'Democracy and its critics', Dahl firmly states that "actual democracies fall so far short of the ideal that in practice minorities rule over majorities and the vaunted freedom of self-determination proclaimed as an ideal is effectively denied to a majority of people. (...) They fail to meet democratic standards. This does not deny, and probably is not ordinarily intended to deny, that if democracy were to meet its own standards, it would expand the freedom of self-determination more broadly than any feasible alternative to it" (Dahl 1989, p. 91). The normative principles upon which the definition so heavily relies will thus probably never be attained. The justification of the association of democracy with terms such as liberty, justice, peace, equality, power of the people, and human rights (Carrión 2006), can, therefore, be disproved on their normative basis.


Beetham states it can be contested that in democratic societies all citizens are considered politically equal "as people are not manifestly equal". (1994, p. 8). Obviously, the statement of equality neglects reality when there are undeniable differences in the power of individuals or groups. These can be political, social, or economic (Grugel 2000). Moreover, Dahl himself wrote that the concept's core standard, political equality, "may well be among the most utopian of all human goals" (1958, p. 465). Inequalities undermine the freedom of political debate, or compromise the ability of even the least well off citizens to form and vote on the basis of their convictions (DiZerega 1988). Political equality can, therefore, be regarded as being impossible and highly normative.

Connected to the principle of equality is that of the majority,<sup>11</sup> in which a majority of votes ought to be, not only necessary, but also sufficient for the enactment of laws (Dahl 1989). This justification of the majority principle should lead us to accept its results, even when the outcomes are regarded as being unjust (Barry 1995). Machan (2001) elaborates on this by arguing that, "If by the democratic process of majority rule the rights to life, liberty, or property could be abrogated or violated, some or many participants in democracy would no longer be able to act freely and independently. The majority could threaten

2004, Dessalien 2005, Beetham 1994, and Namibia Civic and Voter Education Campaign, 2003).

<sup>10</sup> A critical view of democracy does not imply that democracy/democratization should be viewed as being bad. It is obvious that democracy has intrinsic values, which this paper recognizes. However, it is important to criticize democracy, in order to widen the discussion and valuation of non-democratic alternatives.

<sup>11</sup> The majority principle holds that every citizen only has one vote (the one-person, one-vote rule). This implies a political equality, since every vote is equal.



such participants and their free judgments, even enact measures that would authorize vindictive official actions against them. Democracy then becomes an empty shell.”

Furthermore, freedom under democracy also would be nothing more than a normative label. According to Wollstein (2006, p. 2-5), “democracy is not the same as liberty. (...) Many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America currently have multi-party democracies, however enjoy little freedom. Vote fraud is massive, opposition candidates are often beaten or murdered, and a small elite controls all power. Citizens have little freedom, but lots of poverty. In Western societies things are better, but far from free of corruption, fraud, and manipulation of voters”. Freedom in every democracy, even in the West, is thus a normative illusion.

Just as the element of freedom is normative, there is also no guarantee of peace in a democratic society. Ostrowski (2002) argues that if all states were democracies, there would be no war, because democracies values peace. However, this does not represent reality. The three greatest imperial powers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, France, Great Britain and the United States, were democracies (Wollstein 2006). Indeed, Wollstein stresses that “in the 20th century, the United States attacked more countries than any other nation”.<sup>12</sup> This is a clear illustration that the assumption that democracy guarantees peace is normative, and does not accord with reality.

Brian Barry challenged the intrinsic justness of democracy in his work ‘Justice and Democracy’ (2004), by stating that “there is nothing inherent in democracy that makes it just. Democracy is a procedure for formally capturing the views of the citizens and translating them into outcomes. That procedure has only tangential connections to the outcomes being just” (Barry 2004). Retaining the belief that every democracy leads to a just society is, therefore, be unrealistic.

<sup>12</sup> Since the end of World War II, the United States has engaged in more than 200 armed conflicts, killing hundreds of thousands of civilians, waging wars or military actions in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, Grenada, Colombia, Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan, Serbia, and Bosnia. In nearly all of these conflicts, there was no direct threat to the United States (Wollstein 2006).

Accordingly, a gap between democratic theory, with its normative principles, and democratic reality, becomes undeniable. A democracy which is fully in line with its theoretical principles does not exist. Even Western liberal democracies, upon which these principles are based, cannot meet these highly normative standards. Yet, the Western liberal democracy is often still regarded as being the ideal. Grugel argues that democracy is often reduced to what is thought to exist in the West, and when applied and compared to situations throughout the world, “then it is not the development of ones own government or society. It becomes the reproduction of the procedures for government which have been developed in Western Europe and the USA” (2000, p. 21).

It is, thus, justifiable to not look at democracy from this generally accepted standpoint, which sees it as the development, expansion and, eventually, the perfection of a society based on Western models (since many countries stop moving towards democracy once they have reached the transitional stage). It seems more appropriate to regard democracy as vulnerable and open to criticism, because no country can meet the normative, democratic principles. This involves looking at democracy from a multilinear perspective, and seeing all societies as the outcome of different internal, historical, and external factors. The Western, democratic, ideal is not, then, the ultimate stage of development, but the outcome of specific advantages favoured by its own context (like the capitalist system of production).

Democracy can, thus, be regarded as a polity which would not meet the needs of every society. Formal democratic procedures become a veil over reality, since democracy takes no account of the hidden structures behind the formal and observable systems of government, which shape political activity on the ground. This can lead to an assumption that systems are democratic because elections are relatively free, parties exist, and liberal freedoms are enshrined in a constitution, even though violence, exclusion, coercion and repression may be the daily realities for the majority of the population (Grugel 2002). Privilege, power, and informal politics can take over; a situation wherein democracy is being manipulated to benefit the goals of the ruling elite.<sup>13</sup> Like in the cases of transitional democracies, it is important to state that there is a difference between countries with functional democratic practices, and countries that can be, formally, described as democracies (Lively 2005).

In theory, it is not too difficult to attain procedural democracy in the narrowest sense, including elements of inclusion and participation through national elections (Dessalien 2005). In reality, however, for some countries, even this kind of democracy is not feasible, let alone in its full theoretical form. Of the 119 countries classified as democratic in Freedom House’s 2005 report, 89 are rated as “free” while 30 are classified as “partly free” (Freedom House 2008).<sup>14</sup> Therefore, a quarter of the world’s liberal democracies fall

<sup>13</sup> For more on this, I recommend Conrad B. (2006) Informal Politics, Hamburg Review of Social Sciences 1(3): 256-272.

<sup>14</sup> Based on a broad range of indicators of political rights (e.g. free and fair elections, freedom of political association, absence of discriminatory policies, corruption, government accountability to the electorate, etc.) and civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression, belief, association, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights). url: [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)



Dmitri Medvédev and Vladímir Putin

short on one or more criteria. They constitute the group of so-called pseudo-democracies, with hybrid systems preserving “a façade of electoral contestation” (Dessalien 2005, p. 16-17). Among them are a significant number of countries from the former Soviet Union (e.g. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia), but also a broad set of countries across Africa, Europe, Asia and Latin America (e.g. Nicaragua, Guatemala, Paraguay, Albania, Moldova, Mongolia, Kenya, Madagascar, Sierra Leone) (Dessalien 2005). These pseudo-democracies were labelled as “transitional” in the 2005 report.

In 2002, Carothers argued that nearly 100 countries (approximately 20 in Latin America, 25 in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 30 in sub-Saharan Africa, 10 in Asia, and 5 in the Middle East) were transitional (Carothers 2002). In recent years, only a relatively small number of these (probably less than 20) are either clearly on the way to becoming successful, well-functioning democracies, or have at least made some democratic progress, and are still enjoying a positive democratization dynamic (Carothers 2002).

In 2002, the UNDP’s Human Development Report confirmed this outcome. It stressed that, despite national elections based on universal suffrage in 81 countries which “transitioned to democracy” in the “Third Wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1991) only 47 were now recognizable as functional democracies (UNDP 2002). In this light, in his 2002 research, Carothers concludes that it is no longer appropriate to assume that all of these transitional countries are actually in a state of transition towards becoming democracies (Carothers 2002).

The data suggests that democratic principles, in terms of an equal right to be heard and equal citizenship, cannot

take root alongside extreme political and socio-economic inequalities. In most of these developing countries, poverty and privilege operate as barriers to democratic incorporation (Grugel 2002). It prevents a level playing field, where groups compete equally for access to government, from operating. When universal suffrage (an element of democracy) is introduced into such fragile, unequal situations, it is clear from what has happened in recent decades, that many countries went on to elect autocratic or extremist regimes (NOWO 2006). This constitutes a paradox; an autocratic outcome through a democratic process.

In so far as criticism of democratic principles is concerned, a division of the world into, democracies equals good and non-democracies equals bad, is unrealistic, and morally inadequate. A wide diversity in the performance of the societies that are democratic and those that are not is noticeable (Dahl 1989). For this reason, in the case studies that follow, democracy will be referred to as functional democracy, and not as formal democracy.

As the multilinear development paradigm highlights, each country has its own development path. Democracy as the best form of governance should therefore be questioned. In some cases, formal democracy can become a veil covering the hidden structures that shape society. The deficiencies of the democratic ideal will then influence the outcomes of the democratic process. In these cases, it is not easy to equate democracy with good governance.

### 3. Good governance

Democratic theory maintains certain principles, which would be greatly valued if they were able to meet a society's particular standards. However, these principles are normative, and cannot apply to the same extent everywhere. In practice, every democracy falls short of the theoretical ideal to some degree. These shortcomings influence the outcomes of the democratic process. In many formal democracies, violence, exclusion, coercion and repression are common. In some countries, democracy therefore becomes a formal veil over the hidden structures that shape society on the ground. In these circumstances, it is not easy to equate the means of democracy with the end of good governance, since every country develops differently. Therefore, it is argued herein that the focus should not be on democratization per se, but on good governance, regardless of whether this is democratic governance or not.

Good governance "brings about a proper balance among state action, the private sector, civil society and the communities themselves" (Tessitore 1999, p. 105). For this reason, international organisations increasingly have good governance as a goal in their development programmes. However, just as with democracy, there is no actual consensus on the meaning of the term.

The UN states that good governance translates into governance for human development, "which is about having efficient institutions and rules that promote development by making markets work and ensuring that public services live up to their name. But it is also about protecting human rights, promoting wider participation in the institutions and rules that affect people's lives and achieving more equitable economic and social outcomes... Governance for human development must be democratic in substance and in form – by the people and for the people" (UNDP 2002 in Dessalien 2005, p. 7).

The World Bank sees governance as "the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services" (World Bank 2007, p. 1). This includes: "the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them" (World Bank, 2008).

The European Commission has defined good governance as "the transparent and accountable management of all a country's resources for its equitable and sustainable economic and social development. It considers that the principles can be defined in terms of three fundamental characteristics: legitimacy, legality and effective application" (Landman and Häusermann 2003, p. 1-2).

Definitions of good governance, including the three given above, generally have some overlapping features. Most emphasize the importance of a capable state that is accountable to citizens and operating under the rule of law (Kaufmann and Kraay 2008). However, there are some differences. Many definitions blend means such as



institutions, processes and rules, with ends like good policy, accountability or efficiency. Yet despite these differences in definition, "most international organizations define good governance in terms of democratic governance in practice" (Dessalien 2005, p. 8).

This is a problematic statement. As previously argued in this research, the performance of democracy is different everywhere. In some countries, democracy is a formal façade, behind which different structures shape political activity in reality. Organizations misinterpret this when equating democracy with good governance; the process of democracy is confused with the end of good governance. Societies develop differently, and in some, democracy does not work as well as in the west.<sup>15</sup> In these circumstances, good governance will not be achieved.

Following Dessalien (2005, p. 10-11), "we cannot qualify a system by its intentions. We must qualify it by the outcomes it produces". A system of governance can, thus, take any form as long as the outcome is good. This can only be accomplished when the polity connects to the context of the country, its culture, history, and its socioeconomic conditions at that moment in time. This statement illustrates that the end of good governance lifts the discussion above that of a pure dichotomy between democracy and non-democracy.

15 As seen with the transitional countries examined in part 2.2.



Abdellatif (2003, p. 21) elaborates on this, by claiming that “the characteristics of good governance are universally accepted, but it should be adapted to the context of local circumstances and according to local conditions. A state system should be based on the deeply embedded social attitudes and cultures, not on a single model of democracy; this is needed to make governance work. (...) Several contextual characteristics may affect the polity, and are more or less likely to have an impact. These are cultural, religious and ethnic diversity and structures, indigenous values, networks and knowledge, the economy: its base, growth and type; financial dependence on external resources, including aid and debt; and degree of integration with the global economy, socio-economic indicators including education, access to basic needs and the role of women and civil society including NGO's”.

It is therefore appropriate to claim that governance is good when it produces a positive outcome for a society, according to the expectations and needs of its citizens. This will be different for each nation and, therefore, the means with which to achieve the end of good governance will also differ. Democracy will only equal good governance when it produces the right outcome for that society.

In this regard, good governance can thus be seen as deviating from the mainstream notion that a democratic polity is the best form of government for all countries, particularly when considering the difference between democratic theory and democratic practice. It thus leaves open the possibility of good governance without democracy.

## 4. Cases – methodology

After examining the literature on development paradigms, democratic principles, the critiques thereof, and good governance, it is now time to concentrate on the cases of Singapore and Bhutan.

The decision to utilise a case study approach in this study was based upon the fact that it provides the kind of context-dependent knowledge that has been shown to be necessary for learning (Flyvbjerg 2006). It also enables an historic understanding of why events occurred as they did to be gained, and provides a basis for generalization (Flyvbjerg 2006).

The cases of Singapore and Bhutan are examples of countries operating without the practice of democracy.<sup>16</sup> In both cases, despite the undemocratic practice, ‘the governing’ enjoys popular support. Both consider good governance, based on their own ‘pillars’, to be fundamental. These cases are, therefore, highly relevant when it comes to answering the main research question: ‘*Can there be good governance without democracy?*’

Singapore provides an interesting case. There, despite the presence of an urbane, prosperous and well-educated middle class, a non-democratic polity has survived virtually

unchecked since the country's independence from Malaysia in 1965. Singapore is, officially, a parliamentary democracy, although the Singaporean People's Action Party (PAP) has an apparently invincible hold on power (Chua 1995). One of the pillars of the PAP's rule and success is its striving for good governance. The World Bank even rated Singapore in the top ten countries with good governance in its 2006 report (Channel NewsAsia 2006).

Bhutan also makes up an interesting case; with the first moves towards democracy made in the 2008 elections, Bhutan has recently started to develop from being an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. It is, however, an illustrative case for two reasons. Firstly, in a decision which stunned his citizens, who remain loyal, His Majesty the fourth King Jigme Singye Wangchuck announced his abdication on the back of a desire to see Bhutan evolve into a parliamentary democracy (Bhaumik, 2002). The second reason relates to the country's incorporation of the concept of Gross National Happiness, within which good governance is a crucial element, and one of the objectives of the King and his followers.

Each of the two cases will highlight the specific context of the country, its polity, and its vision of democracy. They will both acknowledge the multilinear development of societies, since both Bhutan and Singapore follow their own development paths. These examples will also underline the argument that democracy does not fit all societies in the same way as in the West.

Both of the countries studied are approached in the same way. A historical overview is first provided, followed by an examination of each country's current polity. The pillars of good governance are, then, reviewed, and consideration is given to each population's general characteristics, whether they support the way in which they are governed, and whether the system relates to their norms and values. An examination of the outcomes of non-democratic governance follows, together with a brief look at (future) trends. Finally, the conclusion will connect the findings of the case studies to the theoretical part of the paper.

In summary, analysis of the cases of Singapore and Bhutan will highlight and support the following:

- Each society has its own context and development path; their political (end-)form is multilinear.
- There is a gap between democratic theory and democratic practice.
- Good governance is possible without democracy.

<sup>16</sup> In both cases, democratic practice is limited. In Singapore the PAP party, and in Bhutan the King, enjoy the highest form of authority. For this reason, the regimes in Bhutan (mainly until 2007) and Singapore are considered to be non-democratic in reality.

## 4.1. Case-Singapore

### 4.1.1. Historic overview

The Republic of Singapore is a small island state, located on the Malay Peninsula. It is the smallest country in Southeast Asia, being just 707.1 km in size. It had a population of almost 4.6 million in 2007 (DFAT 2008), and has been previously colonized by the British, the Portuguese, and the Dutch, because of its potential as a strategic geographical trading post in the region. It later became the gateway port between the Western and Eastern markets (Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts n.d.).

In 1946, the country became a part of the Malayan Union (known as the Malaysian Federation after 1948), and self-governance was later achieved in 1959. In the same year, the first general elections took place. The People's Action Party (PAP) won 43 seats, which was 53.4% of the total (Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts n.d.). In fact, the period between 1959 and 1965 was the only time when there was competitive opposition politics in Singapore, with the PAP functioning as a Malaysian political party. The party formed a united front with the communists against British colonialism, and Lee Kuan Yew became the first Prime Minister of Singapore (Mutalib 2000).

On the 9<sup>th</sup> August 1965, after six years of self-rule, Singapore achieved complete independence by leaving the Malaysian Federation. The domestic economic circumstances at that time were very different to those of contemporary Singapore. Chua describes the country then as "a non-industrial entrepot and commercial centre of the British Empire with very high rates of unemployment and underemployment coupled with a rapidly growing population" (Chua 1995, p. 101). At that time, Singapore could thus be characterized as a developing country.

In these circumstances, the question of how to make a living was the most important issue requiring resolution, and according to Chua (1995), immediate economic development, through rapid industrialization, was necessary. Singapore's initial strategy was to, essentially, take advantage of its strategic location and the favourable world economy. The country successfully adopted global capitalist influences, and adapted them to their own, Singaporean context (Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts n.d.).

### 4.1.2. The Singaporean polity

Chua (1995, p.69), asserts that the overriding aim of the PAP government's pragmatism is "to ensure continuous economic growth:" it has become "the (...) singular criterion for initiating and assessing all government activities, in terms of how an act will aid or retard this growth." The party administers all elements of citizens' social lives, no matter how private. Chua adds that the economic takes

precedence over the cultural "because economic growth is seen as the best guarantee of social and political stability necessary for the survival of the nation" (Chua 1995, p. 59).

Aimed at achieving that goal, the PAP has dominated the Singaporean government since the country's independence. It began to regulate all key institutions of the state apparatus, such as its bureaucracy, legal institutions, grassroots organizations, trade unions, and the mass media, and appointed leaders to oversee them (Mutalib 2000). Since these institutions can, and often do, challenge the power of the state in functional democracies, Rodan (1998, p. 69) states that "in Singapore they serve more to consolidate and expand the power of the state and to enforce the government's objectives and policies". Despite the calling of general elections, in reality, the PAP became a soft-authoritarian party.

The ruling PAP elite believe that soft authoritarianism is the best way to achieve economic growth. Therefore, the government maintains that it obtains the best results for Singapore, and combines the best of Western and Asian political traditions, even though they are often incompatible<sup>17</sup> (Mutalib 2000, Roy 1994). Goh Keng Swee, Lee Kuan Yew's right-hand man, and Singapore's main economic architect, argued that economic growth demands a great deal of sacrifice from the people, stating that "despite how undemocratic it may seem the people must not be given a choice" (Mutalib 2000, p. 317).

According to Rodan (1998, p.65), effective challenges to the ruling PAP are prevented by a variety of means; "historically, this included some crude forms of intimidation of political adversaries and critical elements of the media by invoking the Internal Security Act (ISA), under which people can be held indefinitely without trial. However, the more pervasive and definitive features of authoritarianism in Singapore involve a sophisticated and systematic combination of legal limits on independent social and political activities on the one hand, and extensive mechanisms of political cooption to channel contention through state-controlled institutions on the other. This suppression of a genuine civil society not only fundamentally hampers the PAP's formal political opponents; it generally blunts political pluralism, including interest group politics. The PAP's political monopoly is rationalized through an elitist ideology, which depicts government as a technical process that must be the preserve of a meritocracy. (...) the PAP state is not opening up for civil society; it is even expanding its own space."

Nonetheless, Chua (1995, p. 41) stresses that there has been no lack of formal politics in Singapore. "There are competing political parties with different platforms that, at election times at least, criticize government policies and elections are conducted without underhanded tampering. That opposition parties win few seats in Parliament is not the fault of the ruling party or government. No political party, however liberal, is in the business of ensuring that the opposition party is elected. Thus, the absence of opposition members in a duly elected Parliament does not automatically imply the absence of politics as defined".

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<sup>17</sup> Order and prosperity are, for example, incompatible with a high degree of personal freedom.



Lee Kuan Yew

Mutalib (2000, p. 313) acknowledges this by stressing that “there are more than 20 registered political parties in Singapore, but they are all overshadowed and overwhelmed by the governing PAP. [However] with the exception of the short period of competitive politics (...) [in the years of the merger with Malaysia], the political landscape in Singapore is characterized by PAP dominance.”

principles which reflect the country’s unique history and circumstances. He emphasises that these principles have helped in “creating a common basis from which we can tackle and solve the many complex problems which arise in governing a country” (Lee 2004, p. 8).

Good governance in Singapore is primarily based on the overarching principle of strong leadership (Lee 2004). Of the many reasons for the country’s success, the values of its leaders and the manner of their control stand out (Mutalib 2000, Teo 2005). In particular, PAP leaders “must know what they want for Singapore, and how to lead the rest of society to follow” (Subramaniam 2001, p. 4). Lee Hsien Loong (2004, p. 7) argues that “at all levels we need leaders who can articulate a compelling vision that will inspire Singaporeans and mobilise them to achieve their best for the country. We need leaders who will do what is right, and not necessarily what is popular.” The leaders should be trusted because of their honesty, competence, and focus on what is in the national interest and for the public good (Subramaniam 2001, Teo 2005). Good government means “putting the nation above self, and national above personal wealth” (Teo 2005).

#### 4.1.2. The pillars of good governance

From the very start, the PAP refused to accept that the existence of an opposition party could provide a basis for a healthy political system (Nam 1969). It considered itself to be the only party which could deliver good governance to the people of Singapore. As Rajaratnam, former PAP Foreign minister, made clear, “the people are more interested in what is good government than having an opposition” (Nam 1969, p. 466).

According to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (2004, p. 8) good governance is comprised of “universal considerations which are relevant for all countries. However every government must also consider the unique context of its country, the nature of its society, the expectations of its people, and decide on the path they want to take.” Therefore, for a form of governance to be successful, it has to be based on its own specific context. In the case of Singapore, Lee considers this context to be four main

A second key principle is to “anticipate change and stay relevant” (Lee 2004, p. 7). This is an important element of a longer-term goal (Subramaniam 2001). Accordingly, the challenges facing all countries ensure that no public service or rule can afford to be passive or reactive. A system should always be open to new ideas, never fail to question old assumptions, and never be trapped in the past (Lee 2004). The government should always opt for what will work for the country in the longer term, rather than for what

will please the people in the short term (Subramaniam 2001). Decisions may, therefore, be unpopular initially, but can, nevertheless, produce social benefits in the future (Subramaniam 2001). This forms the basis of the PAP's governance in Singapore.

The third principle is "reward for work, and work for reward" (Lee 2004, p. 7). Singapore is a small country, without natural resources, and is thus highly dependent on the outside world. Accordingly, it is a key belief that it is only through hard work and intelligence that the country's citizens can earn a living and safeguard their futures (Lee 2004). Teo acknowledges this by stating that "the people of Singapore know that the government does not believe in providing welfare and that to survive and succeed, they have to work hard" (Teo, p. 3). To ensure that the population has the skills needed, the PAP believes that a good education is crucial, and government spending in this area is the second most significant (Teo 2005).

The fourth principle is "a stake for everyone and opportunities for all" (Lee 2004, p. 8). Lee sees nation-building and not institutional strength or economic well-being, as being the ultimate aim of governance. It is "about creating an inclusive society where citizens not merely enjoy economic wealth but feel a sense of ownership and belonging" (Lee 2004, p. 8).

These four principles are the basis of Singapore's good governance and, according to Teo (2005), underpinned the country's striking development from being a developing nation to one with the highest standards of living in South East Asia.

#### 4.1.4. Population characteristics

The Singaporean population has always been multi-racial. Although it contains a majority of Chinese citizens, it has been drawn from a wide variety of geographical origins (Chua 1995). Despite this mix of cultures, citizens share definite cultural beliefs, which are their "core values" (Chua 1995). These values are: placing society above the self,<sup>18</sup> upholding the family as the basic building block of society, resolving major issues through consensus instead of contention, and stressing racial and religious tolerance and harmony (Government of Singapore, 1991).

These core values are part of a wider Confucian mentality, and confirm that Singaporeans' political behaviour is also, essentially, Confucian (Chua 1995, Vogel 1989, Roy 1994, MacFarquhar 1980). According to Clammer (1985, p. 161), "the governments 'mandate from heaven' can [therefore] only be legitimately overthrown when it transgresses utterly beyond the limits of tolerance and forfeits the mandate to govern."

In brief, in Singapore's circumstances, an authoritarian state is advantageous to national economic development (Chua 1995). Indeed, according to Hsiao (1988, p. 18) with such a political culture, the Singaporean PAP "is (...) able to mobilize resources more autonomously without being confronted with too much opposition from various sectors

<sup>18</sup> This was later reworded as 'nation before community and society above the self' to reflect the multi-racial composition of Singapore.

of the society."

Furthermore, Singaporeans are characterized as a highly-educated and disciplined workforce (Chua 1995). As referred to earlier, educational standards are due to a deep rooted sense of being in competition with others for material advantages, leading to a constant personal striving to improve. Secondly, discipline in both the workplace and more generally is notable. This strong desire to achieve, has contributed greatly to the country's economic development (Chua 1995). Moreover, as a result of heavy industrialisation, Singaporeans have had an interest in rising incomes and improved standards of living (Chua 1995, p. 109). This has laid the foundations for the national objective of economic growth and survival (Chua 1995).

#### 4.1.5. Good governance for the Singaporeans?

Chua (1995) argues that one of the reasons why an authoritarian type of politics persists in Singapore is because of the history of repression created by the PAP government. He states that "such repression might have effectively produced a citizenry more intent on avoiding its wrath than on publicly airing their political views and challenging the ruling government (...) So conceived, the success of the PAP's hold on the seats of power may be evaluated only in negative terms (...). This however fails to account for the undeniable popularity of the PAP government among the populace" (Chua 1995, p. 41). Yet, the government's legitimacy is not simply borne out of oppression; it is instead built on a strong ideological consensus with its people, based upon Confucianism and economic pragmatism (Chua 1995).

Roy (1994, p.232) maintains that the consensus in favour of soft authoritarianism is rooted in the premise of "Asian traits" such as industriousness, filial piety, selflessness, and chastity, with negative western characteristics being caricatured<sup>19</sup>. He adds that "Confucian East Asians are more inclined than liberal westerners to accept constraints on individual rights in exchange for stability and economic growth in society as a whole" (Roy 1994, p. 234). This collectivism became one of the key reasons for modern capitalist development in Asia (Chua 1995).

According to Vogel (1989, p. 1051) Singaporeans have "grown better informed and more insistent on having their views heard, however the people (...) fear that reliance on entirely democratic procedures could dissipate the ability of a strong government leadership to represent the overall interests of the people. They are, therefore, more willing to accept strong able leaders who have not been fully legitimized by democratic procedures".

<sup>19</sup> Roy states that these Asian traits are contrasted to negative Western influences. Ong Teng Cheong, former Prime Minister and President, said that by undesirable influences they mean drug taking, a lack of attention to family relationships and the stressing of individualism, emphasis on personal and not social or national interests, sexual promiscuity and laziness (Roy 2004). Lee Kuan Yew adds that "Singapore depends on the strength and influence of the family to keep society orderly and maintain a culture of thrift, hard work, filial piety and respect for elders and for scholarship and learning. These values make for a productive people and help economic growth" (Lee 2000).

Nevertheless, from a Western perspective it is surprising that, despite an urbane, prosperous and well educated burgeoning middle class, authoritarianism has survived virtually unchecked for over four decades in Singapore (Chua 1995). This is particularly interesting given that it is precisely this group who might be expected to be the perfect opponent to such an authoritarian government. Rodan (1993) stresses that potential personal costs are weighed against the relatively good material lives that Singaporeans have experienced and are, indeed, continuing to enjoy under the PAP regime's efficacious management of the economy. The government prioritises job creation, and has made vast improvements to the population's physical living conditions through the Public Housing Programme, leading to virtually universal housing provision. According to Chua (1995), the housing programme's role in sustaining the population's loyalty to the PAP government is significant, and the social costs incurred in housing the people is balanced against the background of such generalised benefits. Appreciative of its efforts, Singaporeans have a high regard for their government, which reduces their willingness to confront it openly.

Even highly-educated and prosperous Singaporeans realise that the PAP is generally efficient and honest, and is able to secure increasingly better living conditions for the country's citizens; Chua (1995, p. 156) adds that "there is therefore massive popular support for the government, giving it a 'surplus' of legitimization and hence, greater room for manoeuvre in policy-making."

In the absence of protest and opposition, acceptance of authoritarianism is thus assumed to be self-evident in Singapore, largely due to the Confucian beliefs of society there (Chua 1995). However, it is clear that attributing legitimisation of the PAP government solely to Confucianism means neglecting important elements of the extant political circumstances of the state itself. Chua (1995, p. 154) asserts that, due to colonization, the citizens "imparted a generalized, vague understanding of democracy and its desirability." Secondly, this understanding and desire in turn accounted for the successful removal of colonization, and the acceptance of the current single-party government. Thirdly, there is a collective memory of political coercion in the earlier years of independence, when "the state could trace and punish the anti-government voters."

In summary, the PAP's soft authoritarian style of government is one that relates to both the Confucian beliefs of the Singaporean population and to the country's (post) colonial history. The PAP has introduced successful policies aimed at achieving economic growth, and has successfully managed and developed Singapore. This has given the government a surplus of political legitimacy, despite its interference in the personal lives of the country's citizens.

#### 4.1.6. Outcomes

Under the authoritarian leadership of the then Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and his PAP, Singapore has

gone from being a developing country to one of the most prosperous. The Port of Singapore is the fourth busiest in the world, the country is still the richest undemocratic non-producing nation globally (Thompson 2007), and has the highest standards of living in South East Asia, which are similar to those in the West. The country's GNP per capita has grown from \$2450 in 1960 to a stunning \$24020 in 2002. In addition, it has experienced an annual rate of growth of more than 10 per cent since 1965 (Bocock 2000). This achievement is particularly remarkable, since Singapore has no natural resources.

Life expectancy reached 79.4 years in 2007, which is one of the world's best. Infant mortality has dropped from 31% in 1960 to 3% in 2002, and the country's education system has improved significantly; 99.5% of school-age children are enrolled in primary school (most of which is taught in English). Adult literacy is comparably high, with 92.5 % of all population over 15 years old being able to read and write. Overall, Singapore has achieved security, social and financial stability, high standards of education and cleanliness, a significant level of home ownership, excellent medical care and high living standards (UNDP 2007).

According to the PAP, rapid economic growth and political stability could not have been achieved if the country had adopted a Western political model (Mutalib 2000, Vasil 1988). This claim is not without merit, as can be seen from the figures set out above. While some economies in the region are still struggling with the effects of the Asian financial crisis, Singapore has developed remarkably well in the short time since its independence. Indeed, Bocock (2000, p. 35) describes Singapore as "instant everything."<sup>20</sup>

In 2006, the World Bank acknowledged the success of the PAP's leadership, and valued the country as being amongst the global top 10 for good governance, with it scoring full marks for government effectiveness and regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Singapore also rated well for political stability, but did fall short in the category of voice and accountability, which measures a society's civility (World Bank 2008).

#### 4.1.7. Prospects

Chua argues (1995, p. 95) that "with three decades of economic growth, improved material conditions and more education, the ideological hold of the PAP's pragmatism seem (sic) to have weakened, along with the apparent acceptance of authoritarian strictures of the state". The population's aspirations have correspondingly grown, and include a desire for greater participation in the formulation of the policies that have less obvious, or more tenuous, connections to the economy. Chua, therefore, maintains (1995) that the "Confucian thesis" in Singapore has become less tenable in recent years. Yet, some elements of Confucian culture, however adulterated by historical experiences, are no doubt inherent (especially amongst

<sup>20</sup> Bocock mentioned instant trade in the early days, instant industry, instant public housing, and instant ethnic integration (Bocock 2000, p. 35).



Singapore from the River

the Chinese majority) (Chua 1995, Roy 1994).

Nevertheless, it may also be argued that Singapore has been successful economically because it played by the logic and rules of global capitalism, albeit without the impediment of the liberal-ideological belief that governments should be non-interventionist when it comes to the economy (Chua 1995).

It is clear that conditions for democracy, such as the availability of higher education and a good standard of living, have been improved. Nonetheless, Singaporeans are aware that the PAP has achieved good governance, whereas the notion of democracy is unfamiliar, and its benefits unclear (Chua 1995).

#### 4.1.8. Conclusion

Singapore is an interesting example of an undemocratic polity. The PAP government, which depends heavily on its own principles of good governance instead of those of Western democracies, has developed a soft-authoritarian form of governance, and has dominated the country's political scene without significant opposition.

Nevertheless, Singapore's government is not just a product of the PAP's leadership, since the country's citizens have provided strong support. Although they have feared the party's wrath, they are still able to acknowledge the connection between the PAP's governance and their Confucian beliefs and economic drive. The PAP is seen as being highly efficient, and providing a good standard of living. Above all, Singaporeans believe that the PAP has successfully managed and developed their country.

Singapore has clearly chosen to develop in its own way, which connects to the norms and values of its population. Significant development and good standards of living have been achieved, suggesting that it is possible to have good governance without resorting to democratic practices.

## 4.2. Case-Bhutan

### 4.2.1. Historic overview

The kingdom of Bhutan is a small country of 47,000 km<sup>2</sup> in the Eastern Himalayas, with a widely dispersed population of 672, 000. It is landlocked by China and India, and is difficult terrain. The country has been isolated from the rest of the world for centuries, and has only recently opened its borders (Ura and Kinga 2004). Unlike the majority of South-Asian countries, it has never been colonised, by either the British who ruled over the Indian continent, or the Tibetans who tried to invade it after it became a distinct entity (Mathou 2000). Because of this, the Bhutanese have always maintained a strong attachment to their traditional culture and the state-religion of Buddhism. "Outside influences have systematically been viewed with healthy suspicion and global trends and fads have consistently met their match in Bhutan" (Dessalien 2005, p. 50). The country, therefore, has an undiluted culture, which is relatively free of Western influences, and has developed along the lines of a coherent and genuine Buddhist ideology, which relies on strong historical references (Winderl 2004).

The contemporary polity is the outcome of a long historical process. Because of the country's relative isolation, the strong attachment to its traditional culture, and the state-religion of Buddhism, major ideological movements, like socialism or liberalism, have not affected the Kingdom.

Bhutan was founded and unified as a country by Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal in the seventeenth century. After his death the country followed a "dual system of government", which split governance between an administrative leader, the "Druk Desi", and a religious leader, the "Je Khenpo" (Mathou 2000). Winderl (2004, p 18) argues that in this period, "political opinions were dominated by the 'Drukpa' form of Buddhism. The society was structured through feudal hierarchies, and political consciousness was generally very low and limited to small circles".

Mathou (2000, p. 235) stresses that during the time of this semi-theocratic system, the administrative leaders could be compared to Kings, although their status in society was slightly different. To that extent, there is a monarchical tradition in Bhutan that goes far beyond the institution itself. It also explains why the hereditary monarchy has become the main source of cohesion and consistency for the current polity.

The unification of Bhutan was, eventually, complete when the religious leaders were replaced by a hereditary monarchy. The highly decentralized dual system was replaced by a structurally and operationally centralized set of basic institutions, with a hereditary King at its core, the first of whom was Ugyen Wangchuck (Winderl 2004).

For most peasants, the change to a hereditary monarchy made little difference in a country as remote and inaccessible as Bhutan. However, the decision appears to have been genuinely popular, not only amongst those responsible for taking it, but also with the public at large, who realized that a new, more effective system was needed (Aris 1997, Winderl 2004). Mathou argues that this was a major factor in nation building and cultural identification.

#### 4.2.2. The Bhutanese polity

The first challenge was to concentrate the power necessary to produce changes in a weakly articulated and organised traditional society and economy (Mathou 2000). Executive, legislative, and judicial power was absolutely merged in the person of the King, who became the centre of the polity (Rahul 1969, Mathou 2000, Anon 2005).

The successive Wangchuck Kings have long exercised strong, active, and direct power without a constitution (one is being implemented in 2008). Political parties and the formation of unions are banned. There is no press freedom, freedom of speech or freedom of expression, and Tsa-Wa-Sum, a Bhutanese law, prohibits any opposition to the King, the country, and the government (Ngedup 2005), the former of whom draws solely upon religion for his authority (Winderl 2004).

The Bhutanese monarchy identifies closely with the country's religious legacy, albeit in a more distinctive way than under the earlier theocratic rulers. Mathou (2000, p.8) explains that "the king of Bhutan is a secular monarch who did not inherit religious authority. As the ruler of the 'Drukpa-Buddhist' society, the king only inherited the secular powers of the administrative leaders. For that reason, he cannot be considered as an absolute monarch in either theoretical or legal terms, but as a ruler by convention as mentioned in the Buddhist tradition." Yet, despite their powers being only secular, the Bhutanese monarchy, nevertheless, utilises a variety of religious symbols.<sup>21</sup>

Because of the monarchy's Buddhist foundations, contemporary Bhutan has a number of distinct institutions. With only a few changes and some significant additions, most of the structures created at the time of the country's unification have survived under the present system. One example is the principle of tripartite participation, involving representatives of the people, the administration, and the community of monks, which is part of consensus politics, and is prevalent amongst most political bodies such as the Tsongdu<sup>22</sup> and the Royal Council<sup>23</sup> (Mathou 2000).

At the present time, religion has come to play a more "modern" role in Bhutan in the sense that monks have lost their political status and autonomy. Nevertheless, the political traditions of peace and non-violence (or the rejection of confrontation) still reflect the Buddhist religion's norms and values (Mathou 2000). It is, therefore, clear that the Bhutanese polity is built upon the customs of negotiation and consensus (Mathou 2000).

21 Mathou (2000, p. 9) provides some examples: "the king is 'the precious master of power and king of drukyul'. He occupies the 'golden throne' and is the only one, apart from the Je Khenpo, to wear the yellow scarf. Both attributes are usually associated with high Lamas. His crown carries the head of a raven which is a reference to the religious history of the country".

22 The Tsongdu was the kingdom's legislative body in 1953. The 150 individual members of this assembly are elected by the King himself (Association of Human Rights Activists, Bhutan 2000). He can also veto any of the recommendations of the Tsongdu (Rahul 1969).

23 The Royal Council advises the King on all matters of national importance. It has developed into a council of elders and became closely linked to the Tsongdu (Rahul 1969).

In summary, many of the current elements of the Bhutanese system of governance initially drew upon the historical structure and processes of the country's past. Winderl (2004) points out that the decisive parameters shaping Bhutan's polity are a strong culture of national independence, self-reliance and self-organization among local communities, the creation of a nation-state, (which is dependent on the definition of a Bhutanese identity, and which is in turn closely related to the dominant 'Drukpa' culture), and the tradition of consensus-building and non-violent conflict resolution in all aspects of life. This has resulted in a hereditary monarchy, wherein the King is more of a "ruler by convention" than a classic absolute monarch.

#### 4.2.3. The pillars of good governance

Since 1972, Bhutan's polity has depended heavily on a home grown philosophy, which is based upon the concept of "Gross National Happiness". King Jigme Singye Wangchuck recognized that the world's dominant economic development model would not correspond to Bhutanese ideals, since it did not live up to the country's beliefs or notions of society (Dessalien 2005). Whereas conventional measures focus on economic growth, the Bhutanese believe that "the demand for material items, the increase in individualism and many other things from the west are detrimental to the people and culture of Bhutan. (...) The Gross National Happiness vision is an alternative measure of development. If focuses less on material wealth and more on spiritual health and the connections between people and the environment for long-term and well-being" (Zangmo 2005, p.1).

Prime-minister Thinley (2005, p. 1) states that "our King was clear that happiness is the ultimate end desired, but not necessarily pursued by every Bhutanese and indeed, every human being. All else for which we labour are but means to fulfilling this wish. Yet it is ironic that human society is pervasively susceptible to confusion between this simple end and the complexity of means. This explains why conventional development or economic growth paradigm is seriously flawed and delusional." According to Thinley the pursuit of Gross National Happiness offers a holistic, more rational and human approach to development.

This pursuit of Gross National Happiness is based on four pillars (Thinley 2005). The first pillar, sustainable and equitable socio-economic development "answers the necessity for materialistic development, which is obvious for development. (...) Ignorance, ill health, deprivation, and poverty are still challenges faced by much of the developing world" (Thinley, 2005, p. 7). Therefore, the Bhutanese see economic growth as an absolute necessity for the eradication of poverty.

The second pillar is conservation of the environment. The Bhutanese Kingdom believes that health and aesthetic experiences depend on the quality of the surrounding physical environment. Many Bhutanese live in harmony with nature, relying on it for food, medicine, pleasure and other essentials (Thinley 2005).



Bhutan's fourth King Jigme Singye Wangchuck (right) crowns his son Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck as the fifth King of Bhutan, in the Throne room of the Tashichhodzong Palace during the coronation ceremony in Thimphu, Bhutan on November 6, 2008.

Preservation and the promotion of culture make up the third pillar. According to Thinley (2005, p. 10), Bhutan is in a highly asymmetric situation, wherein “massive external cultural influences could literally overwhelm local cultural values when the borders open wide under the forces of globalization. (...) The vigorous promotion of the Bhutanese culture preserves its cultural richness and well-being of the Bhutanese citizens.”

The final, and most relevant, pillar is that of the promotion of good governance, the chosen form of which is based upon the national values that are believed to play an important role in the organization and administration of the Bhutanese nation (Ngodup 2005). In this way, institutions respond to the emerging needs of the people (Ura and Kinga 2004). The ideal of Gross National Happiness strives for an outcome of equity, fairness, compassion, justice, peace, environmental sustainability, and cultural and spiritual fulfilment. “These outcomes define the essence of good governance to the Bhutanese” (Dessalien 2005, p. 53).

#### 4.2.4. Population characteristics

The Bhutanese have inherited a philosophy of life, which is deeply rooted in their religious traditions and institutions. Basic values include compassion, respect for life and nature, social harmony, compromise, solidarity, and the prevalence of individual development over material achievements. These characteristics have had a direct

impact on policy making (Mathou 2000). The people seek “a balance between spiritual and material aspects of life between economic development and happiness and peace” (Planning Commission Royal Government of Bhutan 1999, p. 21). The Bhutanese have developed their own regulations, unwritten laws, practices, and customs (Winderl 2004).

Political consciousness has always been limited amongst the general populace. The politicisation processes that have influenced polities in other countries in South Asia, have not reached the Bhutanese (Mathou 1999). Mathou (1999, p. 117-118) explained this situation as being “the result of various factors. First, Bhutan’s ability to insulate itself over many decades from the influence of social and political forces that dominated South Asia has been decisive. In addition, determinant has been the low level of education of the average population that priorities clearly stand out of the political sphere. The existence of a ruling elite, largely unchallenged by adverse forces, and willing to keep the initiative leadership (...) has prevented the emergence of organised factional politics. Eventually, consensus politics, which is one of the major characteristics of Bhutanese traditional society, have provided little scope for popular participation in the decision making process, apart from organised decentralisation”.

As a result of both this low level of politicisation in a large section of the Bhutanese population, and a strong traditional respect for hierarchy, opposition to the monarchy has been marginal and rarely expressed publicly (Winderl 2004). The Bhutanese see themselves as “a strong-willed,

disciplined and law-abiding people with a respect for authority and honest leadership” (Planning Commission Royal Government of Bhutan 1999, p. 19). Therefore, Bhutan’s traditional society has been defined as both patriarchal and matriarchal (Savada 1991). Along with the Buddhist traditions of the monarchy, this respect for hierarchy serves as a key element in the legitimisation of the King.

#### 4.2.5. Good governance for the Bhutanese?

The Bhutanese monarchy has achieved a “remarkably high level of political consolidation”, resulting in “high legitimacy of the political system” (Linder and Cavin 2003). Despite some challenges, few of its citizens are currently willing to challenge the political order (Windler 2004).

One of the main reasons for this legitimacy is that the pillars of the monarchy’s interpretation of good governance are rooted in Buddhist culture (Dessalien 2005). Thinley (2005, p. 2) acknowledges this by stating that “Buddhist culture was always guided towards Gross National Happiness. In 1675 a Buddhist equivalent of ‘Social Contract’ in Bhutan declared that happiness of all sentient beings and the teachings of the Buddha are mutually dependent. The legal code of 1729 further requires that laws must promote happiness of sentient beings (...) A great deal of cultural knowledge and education in traditional society was aimed at conditioning the mind to give or cause happiness to all beings. Enlightening the inner self or human nature became a far greater task than taming nature and manipulating the world for personal or even national gain. This helps explain why the Bhutanese should, in general, have a pre-disposition towards a more holistic, unconventional approach to development which recognizes happiness as the primary and perhaps, only purpose of development”. Gross National Happiness, which is the aim of the Kingdom of Bhutan, can thus be seen as being the logical outcome of its historic development path. There is a balance between tradition and modernity, religion and secularism, and it provides a strong basis for legitimization (Mathou 2000). As a result of this Buddhist cultural foundation, the Bhutanese form of governance achieves positive outcomes, which are related to the needs of its people.

Even more importantly, and despite their undisputed power, and unlike many other absolute monarchies, Bhutan’s four Kings have served their people well. By stabilising the, then, fractious state, Ugyen Wangchuck, firstly, ended the traditional theocracy and established the Wangchuck dynasty. Secondly, by developing the institutions and the practice of effective governance on the basis of a strong sense of public ethics, positive development has been achieved in Bhutan (Dessalien 2005).

According to Dorji (2007, p. 1) the monarchy in this way “has steered the nation through hard times by being close to the hearts of the people. (..) Every Bhutanese stands to pay tribute to all [their] kings for [their] benevolent rule and impeccable leadership; a leadership that has been the epitome of self-denial and true statesmanship”.

The Bhutanese citizens know that the monarchy has brought stability and development, at a time of political turmoil in neighbouring countries. Moreover, the King pursues their most important norms and values, such as unity, peace, stability, happiness, and respect for nature.

#### 4.2.6. Outcomes

Ura and Kinga (2004, p.1) argue that rapid development took place in Bhutan, particularly after 1961 when five-year plans were introduced. “Life expectancy has nearly doubled, reaching 66 years in 2003. By 2003, infant mortality, formerly among the world’s highest, had fallen to 61 per 1,000 live births. [In Bhutan] (...), 77.8 percent of the households and 97.5 % of the urban households have access safe drinking water, 80 percent of school-age children are enrolled in primary school and adult literacy has jumped to 54 percent, up from just 10 percent in 1970”. The expansion of basic health services and primary health care throughout the Kingdom has had a major impact on the overall health and well-being of the population<sup>24</sup> (Mathou 1999).

Economic progress has been similarly impressive. During the past three decades, the Bhutanese economy has undergone dramatic structural changes, supported by the exportation of electricity, which is one of the country’s most significant natural resources (Mathou 1999). Annual economic growth has averaged about 7-8% over the last two decades, and grew by 6.8% in 2003. Bhutan’s GDP per capita reached \$1523 in 2006, more than 6 times than the level in 1980. Thus, despite serious challenges, the country’s policies have had a far reaching, and sustained impact (European Commission 2007). Ura and Kinga (2004, p. 10) stress that these achievements “can be seen as remarkable, given the modest base levels from which the process began”.

One of the reasons for this development is the strong and dynamic leadership of the Kings, who have provided a stable government, and clear direction, together with the prerequisites for a well-functioning administrative machinery, which is connected to the needs of their people.<sup>25</sup>

#### 4.2.7. Prospects

In 2006, the pursuit of Gross National Happiness took a new turn, with the fourth King’s declaration that Bhutan would make the transition from being an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. The explanation of why this move was necessary, stressed that this was the best way to protect the country from someday, inevitably, being

24 Although a quarter of the population earns less than a dollar a day, primary education and health care are free (Shiffler 2007).

25 Ura and Kinga (2004) determined that the other factors are rich resources, low population, primacy of Bhutanese culture and long-term donor support, absence of extreme poverty,

ruled by a King who did not have the people's interests at heart (Putzel 2008). Indeed, as long ago as 1968, the fourth King had announced that he would abdicate if 75% of the members of the Tsongdu passed a vote of no confidence in him. However, it was only his declaration in 2006 that led to the actual restructuring of the country's polity. Prime Minister Thinley stated that the Bhutanese Royal government "has taken such a system as the best conceivable institutional arrangement for securing any public good and good governance. But we should not betray ourselves with the belief that liberal democratic system is the climactic manifestation in a linear and convergent evolution of political institutions, as some scholars have supposed" (Thinly 2005).

The Bhutanese were stunned by the King's decision, which was not made at their request. Indeed, the Bhutanese people do not seem to want a transition towards democracy; the monarchy still enjoys a great deal of popular support and legitimacy (Linder and Cavin 2003), with people believing that the unity it had fostered was responsible for their survival between the two giants, China and India. Moreover, the monarchy reflects Bhutanese norms and values, and it is questionable whether these would remain in a more democratic system. Putzel (2008, p. 1) therefore stresses that "to the Bhutanese people (...) democracy means disagreement, and disagreement threatens their culture and everything they hold dear". For many Bhutanese, a democratic system seems to open them up to destabilizing forces (Shiffler 2007), and they would prefer to remain subjects under the direct rule of the King, to whom they remain very loyal (Chu 2008).

The people of Bhutan regard the proposed changes with a mix of nervousness, skepticism, concern, and distrust (Dorji 2007). A BT poll revealed that most Bhutanese are disenchanted by politics. Of 200 respondents, 62% said that politics in Bhutan will be 'dirty', while 72% felt that those interested in joining in with active politics were driven by the lure of 'money and power' rather than a desire 'to serve the people and the country' (Shiffler 2007). They believe that their Buddhism-inspired social harmony is under threat by the move towards democracy (Chu 2008).

The deep love that the Bhutanese people have for their monarchy, secured a victory in the recent elections for the Bhutan Peace and Prosperity Party, which won 44 of the 47 seats in the new National Assembly. Its leader, Jigme Thinley, became Prime Minister. The popularity of this party is not a surprise, since it is the more royalist of the two which exist, with its candidates having all previously served the King (Sinpeng 2008). Nevertheless, both parties remain closely allied to the King's vision of Bhutan, with both pledging to pursue the royal ideal of Gross National Happiness.

In practice, the current King, 28-year-old Jigme Keshar Namgyal Wangchuck, is likely to remain head of state and retain much influence over the most important decisions<sup>26</sup>. Jamtcho, a citizen of Bhutan and former monk, acknowledges this by arguing that "there would not change much (sic). We still have a king and at the end,

26 However, care is needed when judging the restructuring of Bhutan, as it is at an early stage. A thorough, evidence based, judgement of the effects of the monarchy's restructuring is not yet viable.

he will be the one who makes the decisions" (Mackintosh 2008, p. 15).

#### 4.2.8. Conclusion

To conclude, Bhutan is an extraordinary example, in which the absolute monarchy has served its people well. During this form of governance, the country has developed rapidly, which is unique when compared to its neighbours. Its state-philosophy of Gross National Happiness is the foundation of good governance, which is based on Bhutanese beliefs and values. It is this, in particular, which sets the Bhutanese development path apart from the rest of the world.

Unlike in Singapore, the King of Bhutan took it upon himself to restructure the country's political system and make it more democratic. However, the people are content with the current polity, because their monarchs have served them well. Nevertheless, they have accepted the King's decision to move towards becoming a democracy.

Since the population remains very loyal to its monarch, it is difficult to predict the future of Bhutanese political practices. Currently, despite the recent restructuring, it appears that the King will retain a great deal of power, since this is the polity which connects to the norms and values of the Bhutanese population.

### 4.3. Case study results

The cases of Singapore and Bhutan are intended to highlight and support the following points:

- Each society has its own context and development path; their political (end-)form is multilinear.
- There is a gap between democratic theory and democratic practice.
- Good governance is possible without democracy.

Although the choice of these two cases can be criticized on the basis that the Republic of Singapore utilises democratic elements to meet its soft-authoritarian ends, and the Kingdom of Bhutan is attempting to make the first steps towards democracy, they both clearly draw attention to the feasibility of good governance without democracy. Ultimately, in both cases, the actual practice of governance was undoubtedly non-democratic: in Singapore with the PAP and its stronghold of power, and in Bhutan with the Wangchuck Kings as absolute monarchs.

It can be concluded that the form of governance adopted in both countries seems to have been a two-way process.

Firstly, the governing elite consolidates its rule over society, by its own efforts. In Singapore, in particular, it can be argued that the PAP's dominance is partly due to coercion, oppression and the removal of opposition. In this way, the authoritarian elite retains its dominance over society.

Nevertheless, popular support also provides this elite with a great deal of legitimacy; these forms of governance have produced positive outcomes for their citizens, because they are connected to the countries' culture, history and socio-economic conditions, and are based on deeply embedded social attitudes and beliefs.

Singapore's governance is founded on the Confucian traits of the country's population, which include placing society above the self, upholding the family as the basic building block of society, and harmony. Moreover, the people attribute Singapore's rapid development to the efficient management of the PAP government. These positive outcomes provide the authoritarian PAP with much legitimacy and popular support.

In the case of Bhutan, its polity is founded on traditional Buddhist norms and values. The Kings have always enjoyed popular support, because they have served their people well. Since 1972, the Kingdom has been guided by the principles of Gross National Happiness, which relate to the population's needs. In 2006, however, the King decided to take the first steps towards a constitutional monarchy, which may well influence the future development of Bhutan's polity.

Thus, both Bhutan and Singapore, in their own ways, dissociate themselves from the view that development is, essentially, unilinear. Both countries have deliberately chosen their own ways to develop, which are based on their own contexts and circumstances.

More importantly, these examples highlight that, at least in the short term (Diks 2008), good governance without democracy seems to be feasible. Whether democracy would work if imposed on these non-democratic societies is of course a question that remains to be answered. Equally interesting is the issue of whether the outcomes in both Singapore and Bhutan would be as, or even more, positive if a (more) democratic system had been applied.

Other questions arise from the results of the case studies. For example, what would happen to Buddhist norms and values if Bhutan modernized and/or became more focussed on the material? Moreover, will the ruling governments of both countries be able to stand firm against the international promotion of democracy in the long term? Would both forms of non-democratic governance survive in times of a lack of development, when the results of their governance are not as positive?

## Conclusion

In the attempt to provide an answer to the main research question '*Can there be good governance without democracy?*', this paper moves away from the belief of



Ceremonial dancers line up for the crowning ceremony of his Majesty Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, 28, at the Dratshang Kuena Tashichho Dzong on November 6, 2008 in Thimphu, Bhutan.

many international institutions, that democracy is the most appropriate way to achieve freedom and development in all countries.

The background to this paper is the dichotomy between unilinear and multilinear development. Although the two paradigms are contradictory, they are not mutually exclusive. There are unilinear elements in the contemporary world, but multilinear development sustains, since the political ways of dealing with the unilinear elements are diverse, and do not lead to democracy per se.

To discuss the possibility of good governance without democracy, it is necessary to criticize the principles thereof, and reveal how it cannot be successfully implemented in a one size fits all way. This work does stress that democratic theory maintains certain principles, which would be greatly valued in every society if they could meet its particular standards. However, these principles are normative, and cannot be applied everywhere to the same extent. In practice, all democracies fall short of the theoretical ideal to some degree, and these deficiencies influence the outcome of the democratic process. In many formal democracies, violence, exclusion, coercion and repression may be the daily realities for the majority of the population. In such cases, democracy therefore becomes a veil covering the hidden structures that shape society on the ground. In these circumstances, it is not enough to equate the means of democracy with the end of good governance.

Achieving a positive outcome is only possible when a particular form of governance relates to the specific context of a country, namely its culture, history, geographical location, and place in time, to name but a few factors. Good governance can take many forms, provided the outcome is beneficial. Democracy, in this light, will only ever be appropriate when it produces the right outcome for a particular society. Accordingly, this paper also diverges from the dichotomy of democracies and non-democracies.

In general, but particularly when democratic practice falls



Bhutan's King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck receives greetings from people in the throne room during his coronation ceremony inside Tashichhodzong Palace in Thimphu November 6, 2008.

well short of the democratic ideal, the focus should not be on the means of democratization but on the end of good governance. In some cases, as seen in Singapore and Bhutan, these non-democratic forms of governance can lead to positive outcomes.

On the basis of this approach, good governance without democracy is thus possible, at least in the short term. Yet, the pressure to democratize is apparent, and it is, therefore, questionable whether these forms of governance can be maintained in the long run.

## Discussion and recommendations

The aim of this research was to discover whether good governance is possible in countries with a non-democratic form of government. It does not, however, reveal in sufficient depth the influence of the international institutions, which play a significant role. Accordingly, a further study into the effects of the promotion of democracy on democratic practice and/or the credibility of these democratic institutions would be warranted.

Secondly, the circumstances and contexts of countries change. It may, thus, be feasible that a form of governance also has to change. This could mean that both democratic and non-democratic practices may bring about a positive outcome at certain times, and a negative result at others. The latter should not necessarily lead to the immediate breakdown of existing forms of governance.

Thirdly, researching the multilinear development of (liberal) democratic countries would be a worthwhile exercise.

How much do they differ from each other? Is it possible to argue that multilinear development continues, regardless of a country's state of democratization?

Fourthly, the study of the transition from non-democratic governance with a positive outcome, to non-democratic governance with a negative result, would be of interest. Since a minority holds the power in these circumstances, circumstances can easily be manipulated for their own ends. What factors play a part in this transition?

Given that the move towards a constitutional monarchy has only just commenced in Bhutan, it must also be acknowledged that any analysis of the country's current structure is limited in scope. Therefore, further research, as the country takes its first steps towards a possible democracy, is recommended. This would provide much greater insight into the interaction between democratization and the prevailing norms and values of the citizens of Bhutan, who still regard the King as the highest authority.

My final recommendation is that a study of Russia would provide a good basis for further research on multilinearity and good governance. A non-democratic form of government under Putin seems to suit the country better than the democracy advocated by Gorbachev. Mieris' work (2003) would be of interest and assistance in such circumstances<sup>27</sup>.

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THANKS!